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Abstract: 
 
While audience and participation surveys, as well as econometric demand studies, 
generally confirm that performing arts audiences are relatively elite, there are surprises.  
Education (despite conflicting causal interpretations) is a stronger determinant than 
income, but that evidence is more reliable from survey results than from econometric 
estimation, and arts training is often distinguished from formal education.  The arts as 
luxury goods can only be confirmed by those rare studies controlling for the value of 
time, and price elasticities are often higher than expected, especially when more 
disaggregated data are examined.  Price inelastic demand is more likely the result of low 
pricing strategies of non-profit arts managements rather than any inherent result of an 
acquired taste for the arts, while cross-price elasticity evidence is relatively weak, even 
within the performing arts.  Arts demand cannot adequately be estimated without also 
considering “life-style” variables, or non-standard socioeconomic factors such as sexual 
orientation, gender and socialization processes, and even the role of age has been notably 
complex.  Quality of arts performance or organization seems important, but the 
econometric results are mixed.  Habit formation must be distinguished from learning-by-
consuming and rational addiction in examining dynamic determinants.  Sociologists, 
psychologists, and marketing specialists, as well as economists, have contributed to this 
literature, which remains unusually enigmatic despite about forty years of increasingly 
sophisticated analysis.    
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1.  Introduction 
 
 When readers of La Scena Musicale were informed that “...the likelihood of money being 
spent on orchestral music is linked to consumers’ increasing age, education and income” 
(Ehrensaft, 2001, p.1) they could hardly have been shocked.1   The “high arts” are widely viewed 
as the domain of a minority of elites, long an argument used by opponents of government arts 
subsidization to characterize such support as regressive, and ironically also by proponents who 
stress the need to make culture more accessible to the general public.   Furthermore, one might 
suspect that this consensus and conventional wisdom would render efforts to conduct empirical 
studies of the demand for the arts relatively useless - at best, carefully designed confirmations of 
the obvious. 
  
  This chapter is designed to evaluate that suspicion, and finds surprising evidence of  
contradictory results, personally held convictions that are inconsistent with the empirical evidence, 
and significant popular misconceptions about the findings in some of the most cited empirical 
studies.   It is ironic that the empirical demand studies component of the cultural economics 
literature - commonly viewed as relatively technical and less subject to disagreement and 
normative posturing - seems to be characterized by both faith and science, and is not immune to 
the attractions of a kind of  mythology.   Lévy–Garboua and Montmarquette, themselves 
significant contributors to this literature, reflect this best when they observe: 
  
“It is likely that the demand for the arts is price-elastic and art is a luxury good. But this 
prediction stems more, as yet, from a theoretical conjecture than from well-replicated 
empirical estimates” (2003, p. 211). 
 
While it must be noted that theory does not unambiguously make those predictions, they also 
suggest that we have not yet clarified whether arts goods have close substitutes, hence suggesting 
that we are still “groping towards firm answers” to three of the most basic empirical questions 
regarding arts demand (2003, p. 201).    
 
 It is clear that we expect carefully done empirical analysis to clarify our expectations about 
arts demand, and even La Scena Musicale cited regression equations as the source of the 
understanding of the role of age, education and income rather than merely deferring to 
conventional wisdom and casual observation.  Of course, the word empirical in “empirical studies” 
should not be narrowly interpreted as requiring multivariate regression analysis.  The Collins 
English Dictionary (2000) defines empirical as “derived from or relating to experiment and 
observation rather than theory.”  This is clearly broader than what economists mean by 
econometric modeling - the use of statistical and mathematical methods to estimate parameters in 
                                                          
 1Although they might have been surprised by the optimistic tone of the article, citing 
demographer David Foote as demonstrating that “aging baby boomers” and the “graying of 
classical music audiences” will be a “valuable asset”  that will ultimately lead to an increase in the 
classical music market (Ehrensaft, 2001, p. 1).    
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an effort to verify or refute economic theories.  It is consistent with the Corning and Levy (2002, p. 
218) observation that “studies of demand for the performing arts typically take one of two basic 
approaches: survey studies which seek to characterize the demographics of theater [and other] 
patrons and econometric studies which seek to quantify demand and income elasticities,” although 
it is notable that data for econometric studies are often derived, at least in part, from either 
audience or arts participation surveys.2     
 
 However, while “income and price elasticities... are the usual end-products of empirical 
demand analysis” (Barten, 1992, p. 21), a substantial portion of the econometric literature related 
to arts audiences and arts consumption patterns does not derive such elasticities.  For example, 
while Table 11 (part 3) documents the 29 of the 44 regression based studies that report some kind 
of demand elasticities, only 19 (43.2 percent of the larger total) estimated both own price and 
income elasticities (many of which were not statistically significant), and fewer still also estimated 
any cross price elasticities (see Table 15 below).  Thus, a notable part of the arts demand 
econometric literature is devoted instead to more broadly examining the competing determinants 
of arts attendance or participation patterns without any formal link to the neoclassical theory of 
consumer behavior and its related concerns with formal homogeneity or aggregation constraints.3      
 
 Thus, this survey reports a wide variety of empirical findings not narrowly limited to the 
economic literature but incorporating important contributions from other fields, including those 
from econometric models, audience and arts participation surveys, and simple compilations of 
descriptive statistics.  The arts are defined primarily as the non-profit performing arts (orchestral 
                                                          
 2 For a good roundtable discussion of the difficulties in accurately conducting such 
surveys, see Horowitz (1985).  
 3 Even the standard demand studies that do estimate price, cross price, income and other 
elasticities are faced with sufficient data and econometric challenges such that sensitivity to 
ensuring that estimated demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero while also meeting 
Engel and Cournot aggregation conditions is a luxury few can afford.  While not estimating the 
determinants of attendance directly, Pommerehne and Kirchgassner (1987) is a rare example of 
using almost ideal demand system restrictions to estimate expenditure shares for cinema, theater 
and an all other goods composite in a multi-equation demand system.  The general absence of such 
restrictions can indeed complicate the interpretation of the results, especially regarding the 
controversial issue of price elasticities in the performing arts.  However, many of the conclusions 
regarding other important issues such as the relative roles of income vs. education, “full price” 
versus admission price, specific arts training vs. general levels of education, in-school arts training 
vs. family influence, the complex and changing role of age, and standard socioeconomic vs. the 
dizzying array of “lifestyle” and other socialization proxies for taste variations, are relatively 
similar regardless of statistical technique (e.g. discriminant, cluster, factor or multivariate 
regression analysis of differing specifications), or regardless of the field of specialization of the 
researcher (e.g., economics, sociology, arts policy, psychology, or marketing).  Thus, the practical 
importance of this technical limitation in formal demand estimation should not be exaggerated, 
even if it does complicate the derivation of the standard demand elasticities.    
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and chamber music, opera, ballet and modern dance, and theater, but also including for-profit 
Broadway), although comparisons are made with the largely for-profit media arts and other forms 
of recreation and entertainment, including sports.  While another chapter in this Handbook is 
exclusively devoted to museums (Frey and Meier, Ch. 10), some of the literature on museum 
demand and pricing controversies is reviewed in order to identify common vs. unique factors 
influencing demand across arts forms.4   No effort is made to address the unique issues affecting 
the market for paintings, sculptures, and related art objects generally sold in auction markets.5    
 
 Also, this chapter deals exclusively with the private demand for the arts, most typically 
measured by attendance and related measures, or by participation rates.  This is not the forum for a 
consideration of public demands for the arts linked to social benefits, economic impact studies, 
contingent valuation methods, or any other methods designed to assess the degree of potential 
market failure that might justify tax financed support.  Understanding the factors determining (and 
limiting) the private demand for the arts, and complicating the ability of arts organizations to 
capture adequate “earned” revenue from direct arts consumers, is useful to put such public demand 
studies into a broader context.  However, the potential public goods aspects of the arts and the 
magnitude of marginally relevant external benefits going beyond direct consumption benefits is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but is considered in Section VI of this Handbook.      
 
 The organization is as follows.  Part 2.1 provides an overview of the basic socioeconomic 
and demographic survey findings about arts audiences and the demand for the arts, identifying 
both common and unique factors across different performing arts forms, as well as a review in 
section 2.2 of the evidence regarding audience overlap and “co-patronage” linked to so-called 
segmentation studies.  It is shown that, while the conventional wisdom has at times been 
confirmed, the empirical results from even this largely descriptive literature have been rich and at 
times unexpected.  The degree to which such socioeconomic findings (focusing on age, 
occupation, education and income) have remained similar from the earliest studies (essentially 
from the mid- 1960's) to the most recent is addressed in section 2.3, along with a brief evaluation 
of the evidence for arts “booms” versus arts “busts” and the role that supply factors may play in 
affecting arts demand (although supply issues are also referred to in the discussion in Part 3 
regarding the relative merits of single equation versus simultaneous equation estimation of demand 
functions for the arts). 
 
  Part 3.1 provides a detailed summary of the econometric literature, including efforts to 
estimate specific demand functions.  An overview of the price elasticity results from those studies 
is presented in Part 3.1.1, focusing on the effects that different levels of aggregation and audience 
                                                          
 4 There is also modest overlap with the section concerning revenues in the Handbook 
chapter on “Nonprofit Firms in the Performing Arts”(Brooks, Ch.8). 
 5 Art auctions are covered in Handbook Ch. 16 (Ashenfelter and Graddy), while art as an 
investment is the subject of “Prices and Returns for Art in Ch. 17 (Ginsburgh, Mei and Moses).  
The comparisons made between demand for the performing arts and the media arts also require 
modest overlap with some of the topics covered in the Cultural Industries section V.   
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segmentation have on the empirical results.  Theoretical issues essential to the interpretation of the 
price elasticity results are addressed in 3.1.2, followed in 3.1.3 by an overview of the income 
elasticity differences resulting from different levels of aggregation in the data.  The technical 
challenges that have faced researchers in conducting empirical arts demand studies are addressed 
in 3.2, subdivided into five sections focusing upon (1) the data and model specification problem, 
including the role of the value of time in consumption, and single equation versus simultaneous 
equation estimation; (2) the multicollinearity problem, which presents especially difficult 
challenges in separating the effects of income and different measures of education, while also 
complicating the unique role of age; (3) the related problem of incorporating dynamic issues 
linked to taste cultivation, the role of human capital, and rational addiction versus learning-by-
consuming ; (4) the market definition problem focusing on product and geographic substitutes, 
possibly relevant complements, and the limited evidence regarding cross-price elasticities of 
demand; and (5) the product quality problem, a common challenge that seems to be particularly 
important in the arts.  Part 3.3 addresses the view held by some that “life-style” and various 
socialization measures are more important determinants of the variation in arts consumption 
behavior than are the traditional socioeconomic determinants of age, income, education and 
occupation.  “Mixed” factors such as gender, race and ethnicity, religious affiliation, and sexual 
orientation combine with other variables to complicate that analysis.  The debate regarding 
socioeconomic vs. life-style socialization determinants of arts audiences has often proceeded 
without a consideration of the fundamental demand determining variables of product price, the 
prices of substitutes and complements, and product mix and quality factors that are more closely 
linked to the demand functions of specific sellers of performing arts services.   
 
 A concluding summary and evaluation focuses on an assessment of the Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (2003, p. 211) claim that three main developments are required before more 
definitive answers can be given to questions about the demand for the arts: (1) more careful 
econometric work; (2) the increased use of large data sets; and (3) the “more intensive use of 
explicit models of the cultivation of taste.”  The degree to which there have been significant 
differences in the empirical results as a function of the sophistication of the econometric 
techniques, as well as the size of the database, is addressed along with an assessment of whether 
econometric demand estimation in general (Part 3) has provided greater insight into the 
determinants of attendance patterns compared to the more descriptive evidence from participation 
or audience surveys (Part 2), which ironically often serve as raw data for the econometric studies.      
 
2.  What Do We Know About Arts Audiences?  
 
2.1  Common vs. Unique Findings Across the Performing Arts: The Early Literature 
 
 Two of the earliest empirical observations in arts economics are that (1) performing arts 
audiences are elite in terms of income, education and profession, and hence nonrepresentative of 
the more general population; and (2) there are only trivial differences in those audience 
characteristics across the various performing arts forms (Baumol and Bowen, 1966; Ford 
Foundation, 1974; Book and Globerman, 1975; National Research Center of the Arts, 1976; 
Throsby and Withers, 1979).   In fact, that “audiences from art form to art form are very similar” 
was viewed by Baumol and Bowen as “the most remarkable finding” of their path-breaking efforts 
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to assemble credible data on arts consumption patterns, primarily in the United States (1966, p. 
84).  This overall finding was confirmed by the Ford Foundation’s extensive twelve U.S. city 
survey of theater, symphony, opera and ballet, where it found “striking confirmation that the 
people who attend are indeed disproportionately well-to-do and well-educated” (1974, Vol. II, p. 
13).  Throsby and Withers (1979), evaluating 1976 Australian data, found essential similarity 
between Australian and American audiences, and cited British and Canadian data yielding similar 
results.  A more recent Canadian survey of theater patrons in Montreal found ongoing evidence of 
this elitism in that 54 percent were university graduates, 45 percent earned more than $40,000 per 
year, and only 11 percent were employed in primary (manufacturing or construction) industries 
(Colbert et al., 1998).    
 
 While the prominence in the early arts economics literature of the Baumol and Bowen 
(1966), and Ford Foundation (1974) studies, reinforced by the thorough DiMaggio and Useem 
(1978) evaluation of alternative data from the National Research Center of the Arts (1976), tended 
to focus attention on United States data, the substantial elaborations by Throsby and Withers 
(1979) were especially influential in confirming that this general finding of an “arts elite” was not 
restricted to one country.6   Actually, the commonality of arts consumption patterns across many 
different countries, educational systems and cultures was not a universally anticipated result, as 
Baumol and Bowen discovered when they were told by British colleagues to anticipate much more 
egalitarian results in extending their survey to Great Britain, due to the greater emphasis on the 
humanities in the educational system of that country (Baumol and Bowen, 1966, p. 89).   However, 
except for a slightly higher representation of lower middle income groups in British audiences 
(p.93), Baumol and Bowen found “remarkable” similarity in the British and American results 
(p.89). 
 
 The Baumol and Bowen and Ford Foundation results were not based on econometric 
estimation (with its frequent but hardly exclusive focus on the derivation of various demand 
elasticities).  However, a combination of descriptive, and non-regression and regression-based 
statistical analysis has generally confirmed the significant role of more advanced education (or arts 
training), and to a lesser extent confirmed (but not universally) the significant roles of high income 
and higher status professional employment in overall performing arts demand in a wide-variety of 
international settings.  In addition to Throsby and Withers (1979) for Australia, and Book and 
Globerman (1975) for Canada, examples over many years that are not limited to the study of only 
one art form include: Australia (Throsby and Withers, 1985); Canada (West, 1985; Colbert and 
Nantel, 1989); United Kingdom (Gapinski, 1986; 1988); Spain (Prieto-Rodríguez and Fernández-
                                                          
 6 The importance of the early U.S. data is confirmed by the fact that even Throsby and 
Withers (1979), making a serious effort to incorporate Australian and other country data, 
extensively incorporate the Ford Foundation and Baumol and Bowen data into their illustrations 
and analysis.  Econometric analysis from 1966 to 2005 has been only a bit more balanced, with 
one-half of such studies using U.S. databases (22 of 44 studies).  While one-half of such studies 
are not based on American data, the next highest single country representation is the U.K. at about 
14 percent, and eight other countries are represented by as few as one or at most three such studies 
(Spain).   
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Blanco, 2000; Lopéz-Sintas and García-Álvarez, 2002); the Netherlands (Goudriaan and de Kam, 
1983; Bakker, 1986; Ganzeboom, 1989); Switzerland (Abbé-Decarroux and Grin, 1992); Japan 
(Kurabayashi and Ito, 1992); Italy (Bonato et al., 1990); Sweden (Gouiedo, 1989); Germany 
(Pommerehene and Kirchgassner, 1987; Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995; Kirchberg, 1999); Ireland 
(O’Hagan, 1996); and Norway and Denmark (Svendson, 1992).  Other studies that  focus primarily 
on one individual art form such as theater or symphony orchestras (or on individual arts 
organizations), also tend to confirm the central role of these three socioeconomic variables in any 
study of arts demand (see Part 3).     
 
 However, it would be misleading to conclude that such findings generate consensus about 
the determinants of arts audiences and arts demand.  Not only do income, education, and 
occupation have quite complex effects on arts audience composition and more technically on arts 
demand, but (1) the role of age is frequently different and less stable over time than expected (and 
would over some periods surprise the readers of La Scena Musicale), (2) the importance of prices 
(for the product itself as well as for substitutes and complements) has become more a source of 
disagreement than consensus, and (3) other factors such as perceived performance quality and a 
rich array of demographic and life-style characteristics have often outweighed  income and 
occupation, and sometimes even education.   
 
 In fact, the original Baumol and Bowen (1966) conclusion that arts audiences are relatively 
elite and non-representative of the general population was even attacked by Cwi (1985) as 
fostering a “welfare economics mentality toward arts policy” that primarily serves the interests of 
artistic directors in supporting a kind of political agenda to justify government subsidies in order to 
bring the professional arts “to the people” (Cwi, p. 32, referring to a particular passage in Baumol 
and Bowen, 1966, p. 97).   This is also the context for the periodic debate (see 2.3 below) 
regarding the existence of an arts boom in the United States (Baumol and Baumol, 1980, 1984; 
Heilbrun, 1984; 1993, 1996).  Cwi (1985) argues that even if the basic Baumol and Bowen 
audience profile were to remain relatively constant, substantial societal changes in education and 
occupational choice would progressively make that profile more reflective of the general 
population (and hence less elitist), and that the elitism of arts audiences was always in part the 
result of an overly narrow definition of the arts (e.g. often omitting community theater and other 
more widely consumed art forms), as well as the inevitable consequence of a lack of arts 
marketing imagination.7  
 
 How strong is the evidence of performing arts elitism and audience uniformity?    
Regarding elitism, Table 1 replicates the original key findings in an especially revealing table from 
Baumol and Bowen (1966, Appendix Table IV-D, derived from the Twentieth Century Fund 
audience survey).  The table entries represent “relative frequencies” defined as the ratio of the 
                                                          
 7Of course, coherency in arts research has been hindered by both overly broad as well as 
overly narrow definitions of its subject.  Broad definitions that include listeners to recorded music, 
various arts and crafts hobbyists, and internet surfers can generate “accurate” but relatively 
unhelpful claims that 96 percent of Americans are engaged in some aspect of the arts (see e.g.,  
Cherbo and Wyszomirski, 2000, p. 6).  
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percent of particular arts audience characteristics to the percent of such characteristics in the total 
urban population.   It is thus a direct measure of the degree to which certain types of characteristics 
are over or under-represented in both American and British performing arts audiences in the mid-
1960's relative to their composition of the total population.  This widely disseminated early 
evidence was influential in establishing the enduring perception of the strength of the elitism 
hypothesis.  Table entries above 1.0 indicate an “over-representation” of the characteristic in 
performing arts audiences relative to the general population. 
 
 It is again important to emphasize that the concept of relative frequency used in Table 1 
reflects the ratio of the percent in the audience to the percent in the total urban population.  
Furthermore, the audience survey from which the attendance data are derived does not capture the 
absolute frequency of attendance, i.e. the number of times (per year or per month) a member of the 
audience from any particular demographic group is in attendance.  Thus, as discussed below, the 
importance of any demographic group to the performing arts will be understated if that group 
attends performances an unusually high number of times per time period, and will be overstated if  
that absolute frequency of attendance is unusually low (say, only one time per year).  Despite that 
limitation, the relative frequencies cited in Table 1 do provide useful measures of the degree to 
which a demographic group is “over” or “under” exposed to the arts relative to its size in the total 
population.               
Table 1 
Relative Frequencies of Performing Arts Audience Characteristics 
Relative Frequency = Ratio of Percent in Audience to Percent in Urban Population 
(Income Ranges are for the mid-1960's) 
Characteristic    U.S.  Great Britain Great Britain equivalents 
Age under 20   0.19     0.36  
20-24   2.00     3.46   
25-34   1.75     2.00  
35-44   1.66       1.24  
45-59   1.55     0.93  
60 and over   0.69     0.32  
Prof.-Technical Male/Female 4.96 / 4.51   8.07 / 5.65  
Managerial Male / Female 1.70 / 1.85   1.75 / 1.26  
Clerical and Sales Male/Female 0.76 / 0.53*   1.25 / 0.76 *   
Blue Collar Male / Female 0.05 / 0.05   0.07 / 0.06  
< 4 Yrs. H. School Male/Female 0.04 / 0.05   0.12 / 0.06 School leaving 14 or less 
4 Yrs High School Male/Female 0.29 / 0.53   0.34 / 0.31 Age 15 
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1-3 Years College Male/Female 1.31 / 2.48   1.45 / 1.74 Age 16 
4 Years College Male/Female 3.73 / 5.93   4.07 / 4.71 Ages 17, 18 or 19 
Graduate School Male/Female 10.45/15.80   13.11/15.67  Age 20 or over 
< $3,000 Family Income   0.18     0.18 < £ 500 Family Income 
$3,000 to $4,999   0.30     0.55  £500 to £800 
$5,000 to $6,999   0.45     0.74 £900 to £1,199 
$7,000 to $9,999   0.74     1.02 £1,200 to £1,749 
$10,000 to $14,999   1.96     1.91 £1,750 to £2,499 
Over $15,000 Family Income   7.30     5.84 £2,500 and Over  
Adapted from Baumol and Bowen (1966) with the data derived from the Twentieth Century Fund 
audience survey, Appendix Table IV-D.  * indicates an averaging of the separately reported 
clerical and sales categories for females only in the original Table IV-D. 
 
 The only surprises regarding income, education and occupation in these data are the 
striking similarities between the American and British results, which actually show somewhat 
greater male occupational and educational arts elitism in Britain, and at least very similar patterns 
of female high education and high family income over-representation in the two countries.8              
                                                          
 8 However, Baumol and Bowen observe that it is primarily an “arithmetic weighting” 
phenomenon rather than any substantive economic difference that seems to account for the slightly 
higher British relative frequencies in all categories of male education.  Regarding overall gender 
differences, while not as evident in the occupational results, the higher relative frequency rates of 
females across the different educational levels in the United States (and for the higher educational 
levels in Britain.) is consistent with more recent differential gender results favoring females (e.g. 
Bihagen and Katz-Gerro, 2000, for Sweden) as well as evidence that female spouses play a much 
more significant role in affecting male arts participation behavior than the reverse (Upright, 2004).   
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 Although applicable to the mid-1970`s rather than the mid-1960`s,  Throsby and Withers 
(1979, Table 7.4) reported similar results for Australia, while also stressing that specific 
demographic variables are much more closely linked to frequency of attendance than to data that 
document arts “exposure” or the mere act of attending at least one arts event over some time period 
(p. 99).9   For their lowest income category, a relative attendance frequency of 1.49 can be 
calculated from their reported data, which increases to 2.2 for the intermediate range, and to 8.4 for 
their highest income range.   Regarding education, their implied relative frequencies range from 
0.057 for primary, to 0.546 for secondary, and to 7.10 for the tertiary education level.  However, 
despite such similarities, their Australian data did suggest a few small international differences: (1) 
the role of education appeared to be somewhat stronger in the United States compared to Australia; 
(2) Australian attendance at theater and dance events was somewhat higher than in the U.S., Canada 
and the United Kingdom; but (3) Australians attended serious music events somewhat less than did 
those from the other countries.10      
 
 Age represents the most unexpected result in Table 1, with those aged 20-24 the most over-
represented in both American and British arts audience relative to the size of that age group in the 
general population.  The relative frequencies decline systematically with age, indicating that 
performing arts audiences were dramatically younger than the general urban populations in both 
countries in the mid-1960's.   Section 2.3 addresses the degree to which audience characteristics 
like income and education have remained largely stable over time, while the American age relative 
frequencies have indeed changed toward older audiences.  However, as seen in the Japanese and 
German data reported below in Tables 4 and 5, the age composition of performing arts audiences 
remained surprisingly complex into the early 1980's and mid-1990's, at least in those countries.       
 While Baumol and Bowen (p.79) provided both pessimistic explanations (arts audiences 
have always been more enthusiastic when they were younger, but “drop out” with age) as well as 
optimistic explanations (the young have recently discovered the arts and will now provide a firm 
foundation for future growth) for this youth bias in the early relative frequency data, alternative 
statistics can explain why arts audiences have often been thought to be relatively older.  If one 
shifts attention from relative frequency data to a simple “percentage of arts audiences” measure, the 
importance of older audiences is re-established, especially for orchestras and opera when the 
absolute frequency of attendance is measured.  For example, Baumol and Bowen report (1966, 
                                                          
 9 They also combine two different tables from the Ford Foundation (1974, Vol II) study to 
generate mid-1970`s comparative data for the United States that could also be used to calculate 
relative frequency data similar to that reported in Table 1.  Those mid-1970`s U.S. relative 
frequencies are consistent with the results for the mid-1960's reported in Table 1.  Additional Ford 
Foundation results are reported in detail below.     
 10 The most cited early data regarding Canadian audiences was provided by Book and 
Globerman (1975), whose findings also generally confirm the results in Table 1. West (1985) 
provided arts audience survey data for Ontario (for 1984-85), along with general public telephone 
survey results that allow the calculation of relative frequencies for educational levels (his Table 19, 
p. 82): 0.18 for under 4 years of high school; 0.74 for high school; 0.44 for community college 
(surprisingly lower than high school); 1.78 for university and 4.5 for graduate school.     
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Appendix Table IV-G) that for all sampled New York City performing arts organizations, 8.5 
percent of the audiences were over 60 years of age while 7.7 percent were under 20.  Furthermore, 
this older age “gap” is 8.6 percent vs. 7.8 percent for Off-Broadway, 16.3 percent vs. 9.6 percent 
for Orchestra, 10.1 percent vs. 6.6 percent for Opera, with only Ballet having a higher percentage of 
the youngest (8.9 percent) to the oldest (7.0 percent) represented in the audience.  When frequency 
of annual attendance is considered, the reliance of arts organizations on older audiences becomes 
more pronounced.  For those attending more than 10 times per year, 7.1 percent were over 60 years 
old compared to 2.4 percent under age 20 for Broadway Theater, with the “older age gap” a very 
high 17.9 percent vs. 3.9 percent for Major Orchestras, and a more moderate 7.0 percent to 5.8 
percent for Regional Theater (Baumol and Bowen, 1966, Appendix Table IV-I).       
 
 This disparity in the age evidence between measuring arts audience characteristics relative 
to the general population versus measuring them relative to the total arts audience is a key 
distinction between population participation surveys and audience surveys, and is also evident 
regarding income and education, as revealed in data reported by the Ford Foundation (1974).11  
Table 2 combines data from the Ford Foundation study (Vol. II) Tables 14 and 14A (pp. 13-14) to 
reveal a seemingly less elitist picture when total performing arts audiences are decomposed by 
income range and educational achievement.   
Table 2 
Income and Educational Composition of Arts Audiences 
United States: 1971   
Characteristic Theater % Symphony % Opera % Ballet % 
$0- $7,500 income     13       12      15      20 
$7,500 - $15,000     40       37      34      32 
$15,000 - $25,000     33       34      32      30 
$25,000 and over     14       17      19      18 
Some High School     18       21      20      18 
High School Grad     26       18      18      16 
Some College     23       24      24      26 
College Grad     33       37      38      40 
Source: The Ford Foundation (1974,Vol II), Tables 14 and 14A.  
 
 Comparing Tables 1 and 2 reveals that, despite the highest income groupings being 
dramatically over-represented in arts audiences compared to the general population (over 7 times 
                                                          
 11 Audience surveys are typically based on distributing questionnaires to performing arts, 
museum or exhibit audiences and collecting them upon departure, while participation surveys are 
designed to randomly sample the broader population, not limited to those who have been “self-
selected” as part of an arts audience.   
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the general population in the United States and almost 6 times in Great Britain in Table 1), neither 
of the two highest income classes in Table 2 dominate the overall audience for any of the four 
performing arts types.  Defining income similarly to that in Table 1 as “greater than $15,000” (in 
1971 dollars) enhances the comparability of the tables, but still yields the surprising result that 
higher income attendees represent a bare majority (51 percent) of the audience for both symphony 
and opera, but are slightly outweighed by the two lowest income groups for both the theater (53 
percent) and ballet (52 percent).   
 
 Of course, it is the much smaller overall size of the income elites in the general population 
that explains in part the weaker high income audience results in Table 2.  For that reason, the 
comparable education results are especially striking, since the educational elites are also a relatively 
small group.  While only about 11 percent of the U.S. population in 1971 had a college degree12, 
they represented from between 33 percent (theater) to 40 percent (ballet) of the performing arts 
audiences.  In fact, in contrast to the income results, those with at least “some college” education 
constituted over 60 percent of the audience for symphony, opera, and ballet performances, and 56 
percent of theater audiences.   
 
 Despite this noteworthy difference in the high income relative to the high education 
composition of arts audiences, the data in Table 2 do confirm the broad similarity of the audience 
composition across all four art forms when only income and education are considered.  For 
example, the difference across the four art forms between the highest and lowest percentage figures 
in Table 2 for any one income and educational classification is never greater than 10 percent (high 
school graduates made up 26 percent of theater, but only 16 percent of ballet audiences), and is 5 
percent or less for four of the eight classifications (the two highest income ranges, and the lowest 
and second highest educational levels).  There is very modest evidence that the theater and ballet 
were less elitist in 1971 in the United States (e.g. those two art forms had a slight majority of 
relatively lower income audiences, and the relatively less educated made up 44 percent of theater 
audiences), although the gap between high education and low education audiences was actually 
greatest for ballet in Table 2.     
         Kurabayashi and Ito (1992) provide evidence regarding the demographic composition of 
Japanese audiences for western classical music that is largely consistent with the results from the 
English speaking countries described above, but with some interesting twists.  In Table 3, the 
results of two of their tables (Tables 5 and 6) are combined to show the occupational and income 
composition of audiences for the NHK Symphony Orchestra (NHK, for 1981), the Tokyo 
Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra (TPO, for 1983), and the Tokyo Symphony Orchestra (TSO, for 
1983).   Occupations include professionals (designated in Table 3 as Prof), clerical workers (Cler), 
managerial workers (Mang), the self-employed (S-E), students (Stud), and housewives (HW), while 
incomes are reported per month (in 1,000 yen).   
 
Table 3  
Symphony Audience Composition in Japan: 1981, 1983 
                                                          
 12 Derived from historical data on educational attainment (Tables 264 and 265) in the 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999. 
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(Entries = Percentage of the total audience)      
 Prof Cler Mang S-E Stud HW <150 150-
199.9 
200-
249.9 
250-
299.9 
300 + 
NHK 28.0 15.7 16.4 5.3 14.7 12.2 14.0 13.6 13.7 9.9 48.9 
TPO 25.0 16.5 14.2 3.4 22.5 8.2 16.9 20.6 16.1 8.2 38.2 
TSO 20.4 18.3 8.4 6.3 31.6 4.9 22.3 17.4 16.1 9.5 34.8 
Pop 5.8 11.8 3.5  13.3 26.9      
Source: Kurabayashi and Ito, Tables 5 and 6 (1992), citing original source documents as audience 
data files generated by surveys conducted by the File and Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister`s 
Office.  “Pop” (population) is a renaming of the authors’ “KMMA (1980),” or the percentage of 
that demographic group in the Keihin Major Metropolitan Area, which includes Tokyo, Yokohama 
and Kawasaki, encompassing 70% of orchestra audiences.  No entry is provided for self-employed, 
since that figure is included in the professional classification.   Comparable percentages are not 
provided for the income ranges, hence those cells are empty for the income classifications. While 
the income percentages sum to 100 since they are all inclusive, those for occupations do not, since 
the original source tables do not include all occupational types.       
 
 The occupational results are relatively predictable, but as with Table 2, they are not fully 
consistent with the “arts as elitist” hypothesis, depending on the interpretation.  For example,  
highly educated professionals combine with students to provide only from 42.7 percent  (NHK) to 
slightly over 50 percent (TSO) of these western symphony music audiences (although it is 
noteworthy that students are least attracted, and professionals are most attracted,  to the 
“establishment” NHK Symphony Orchestra).  Kurabayashi and Ito define the elites as 
professionals, managers, and the self-employed, and make the similar point about arts elitism that 
“their share of the audience for the Tokyo Symphony barely amounts to 35 percent,” also noting 
that the combined audience share for these groups is also below 50 percent for the Tokyo 
Philharmonic (p.280).13  Yet, as also reflected in English language audiences, these elite groups are 
indeed over-represented relative to their base size in the metropolitan area (similar to relative 
frequency data), which leads the authors to conclude that audiences for these Japanese orchestras 
“belong to the occupations which constitute the highest social stratum” (1992, p. 281).  Thus, by 
that alternative standard, arts elitism is again revealed.          
 
 While the authors do not speculate on this point, one might interpret the relatively strong 
results for clerical compared to managerial workers (with only a slightly lower composition of 
clerical workers in NHK audiences, and higher clerical composition for both the TPO and 
especially the TSO) as suggesting that income alone is not as important as education (or more 
                                                          
 13  They also report similar results for local audiences for the Sapporo Symphony and the 
Osaka Philharmonic Orchestra (1992, Tables 8 and 9).  In general, Kurabayashi and Ito exhibit 
somewhat more interest in the comparisons across the different orchestras than in the more general 
average results regarding the demographic composition of Japanese audiences.  
 16
pointedly, arts related education)  in determining the composition of arts audiences.  That is, 
managerial incomes will exceed clerical incomes (although probably by a smaller factor than in 
western economies) without generating higher representation for managers in such audiences.  But 
since managers (compared to professionals or students during their school years) are likely to have 
more career-oriented training rather than more broadly based education complementary to arts 
appreciation (except in their earliest years of education), their higher incomes may not translate into 
strong arts appreciation and effective demands for the higher arts.   
 
  The audience composition results based on income in Table 3 are interpreted by 
Kurabayashi and Ito as fully consistent with the occupational data (p. 281).  However, there are 
enigmas in these results that beg clarification: (1) the relative size of the very highest income group 
in Japanese concert audiences is dramatically higher than those reported in Table 2  for the United 
States, and (2) there is a fascinating, and unexplained, significant drop for each orchestra in the 
second highest Japanese income group representation relative to every one of the lower income 
groupings (a result seen only very modestly for American audiences in Table 2, and only regarding 
the second and third income classification, although it does apply across all four art forms). 
 
 The Japanese results regarding age are also of interest in light of the unexpectedly complex 
role that age played in the discussion of American and British audiences from the earlier data, 
although the context of analyzing Japanese audiences regarding western classical music may 
significantly influence the comparability of such results with western audiences. Nevertheless, 
Table 4 documents the surprising results regarding the age composition of Japanese audiences for 
western classical music (a combination of several tables in Kurabayashi and Ito, 1992).  
  
 With the sole exception of a notable trend toward older audiences for the NHK between 
1977 and 1981, these results indicate a remarkable bias toward younger audiences, especially for 
the Osaka Philharmonic, where fully 68.9 percent of females in the audience were younger than 30.  
In    
Table 4 
Age Composition of Japanese Audiences for Symphonic Music  
By Gender and Specific Orchestra (1977, 1981, 1983) 
(Entries = Percentage of Males and Females by Age)  
                NHK ‘77         NHK `81            TPO ’83            TSO  ‘83         SSO ‘81      OPO ‘83 
Age M F M F M F M F M F M F 
<30 42.1 48.3 30.3 35.2 43.7 55.0 53.3 68.1 39.8 50.7 50.8 68.9 
40+ 36.4 33.2 50.7 49.7 35.9 31.8 28.2 20.1 36.3 26.2 29.2 17.4 
Source: Kurabayashi and Ito (1992), Tables 3, 4, and 7.  Audience percentage compositions apply 
to subscription concerts.  Note that the sum of any one column provides the total of either males or 
females who were either younger than 30 or 40 and older.  Summing the rows for any orchestra is 
meaningless (and hence is not restricted to be 100 or less).  NHK: NHK Symphony Orchestra; 
TPO: Tokyo Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra; TSO: Tokyo Symphony Orchestra; SSO: Sapporo 
Symphony Orchestra; OPO: Osaka Philharmonic Orchestra 
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fact, more than 50 percent of each gender was younger than 30 for all non-NHK cases except for 
males attending the Tokyo Philharmonic and the Sapporo Symphony, and even in those cases the 
young group outweighed the older group.  Of course, as noted above, there is a dramatic difference 
in the cultural context of these results, with western music (even of the classical type) potentially 
representing a more experimental and “modern” art form in contrast to native Japanese folk songs, 
enka, rokyoku  and other indigenous music, labeled “Japanese popular melodies” by Kurabayashi 
and Ito (p. 276).  However, this phenomenon should not be overstated, inasmuch as the authors also 
observe that “the tastes of the Japanese people for Western classical music are fairly firmly 
established.”  Also, the correlation results across various types of music reported by Kurabayashi 
and Ito (their Table 2) indicate that there is notably higher correlation between western classical 
and Japanese popular music than there is between Japanese popular music and either traditional 
western music (such as jazz, swing, Dixieland and French popular songs), or modern western music 
forms (such as rock and roll, rhythm and blues, soul, discotheque, or techno-pop).14   In any case, 
the fact that the older audience designation in Table 4 is still relatively young (starting at only age 
40), and the consistency across all orchestras (4 of 5) of the result of young audience dominance in 
the early 1980`s again reflects the often surprising role of age in performing arts audiences. 
 
                                                          
 14 They also observe, inconsistent with the section 2.2 evidence of “audience overlap” in 
American and Australian audiences, that “surprisingly..., opera attracts less interest among 
audiences for classical music” (p. 279). 
 Would anything approximating this youth bias be found in the heart of western classical 
music such as Germany, where classical music is typically referred to as ernste or “E-Musik”, in 
contrast to less culturally “rich” popular or “U-Musik?”  Wiesand (1995) provides evidence of 
notable differences in the propensity of different age groups to consume four different types of 
concerts, but except for the strong youth bias for rock/jazz music, his findings show relatively 
similar consumption patterns among the youngest age group (18-24) across the three other music 
types.  The next youngest group (25-34) shows more variation, but has the highest propensity to 
experience “E-Konzerte.”    The results in Table 5 are adapted from his fifth visual exhibit (a bar 
graph).   
 
Table 5 
German Music Consumption Patterns: 1994 
  (Entries = Percent of age group attending a particular type of concert) 
Music / Age 18-24 25-34 35-49 50-64 65+  Row total 
Music Theater 30 34 36 33 29 162 
“E” Concerts 25 28 26 20 17 116 
“U” Concerts 28 19 34 34 33 148 
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Rock/Jazz 59 42 23 7 4 135 
Column Total 142 123 119 94 83  
Source: Ubersicht 5: Konzerte und Musiktheater - Besucheranteile in den verschiedenen 
Altergruppen 1994 (in %), from Wiesand (1995) .  Figures are approximations from the original bar 
graph entries. Note that since people in any age group can attend from zero to multiple types of 
concerts per year, neither rows nor columns are defined to sum to 100.  However the column total 
reflects the overall propensity of an age group to attend music events, while the row total is an 
indication of the general popularity of a particular type of music.  (The column and row totals are 
not in the original). 
 
 The evidence from Table 5 confirms the expected result that the youngest German age 
group has the highest overall participation rate in attending concerts (i.e. the highest column total), 
with overall participation declining consistently with age.  The row totals also confirm that the most 
“high-brow” music (E-concerts) is the least popular, suggesting that even in a country with a well-
developed classical music tradition, audience development is still a challenge.  The youngest group 
(18-24) is also notable for having relatively similar participation rates for all three non-Rock and 
Jazz music types (although lowest for the classical type E-music).  The most significant result is 
that the second youngest age group (25-34) has the highest classical music participation rate, and 
the combined participation rates of the youngest groups (younger than 35) are higher than the 
comparable rates for the two oldest age groups (older than 50).  Thus, the German evidence is also 
consistent with the earlier results that, at least when frequency of attendance is ignored, the 
performing arts should not automatically be thought of as dominated by older age groups.15  It is 
likely, however, that more detailed evidence regarding the frequency of attendance would modify 
this result in both the Japanese and the German data, as it did regarding the analysis of the 
American age composition of arts audiences.          
 
 Further evidence regarding both the degree of social class elitism and its similarity across 
art form audiences, as well as additional suggestive evidence regarding the relative roles of 
education versus income, was provided by a 1975 national cross-sectional survey conducted in the 
United States by the National Research Center of the Arts (1976). That survey (as noted above) 
formed a key part of the DiMaggio and Useem analysis of social class and arts consumption (1978).   
Table 6 is adapted from the DiMaggio and Useem compilation of some of those survey results 
(their Table 1), stressing the so-called education gap and the income gap in the self-reported 
“exposure” of various types of individuals to seven different “cultural forms” (exposure is defined 
as the percentage of the group who consumed any amount of the art form during the previous 
twelve month period).  For example, an education gap of 58 (percent) is reported for exposure to art 
                                                          
 15 This point is also consistent with the West (1985) Ontario, Canada audience survey 
finding that the same percentage of arts audience (20.1 percent) were 20-30 years old as were 40-50 
years old, and those older than 50 constituted only a trivially higher 20.9 percent of audiences.  The 
dominant age group was 30-40 (29.6 percent).  He did confirm, however, the frequent finding that 
the under 20 age group was dramatically under-represented at only 2.6 percent of Ontario audiences 
in 1984-85.  
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museums because the exposure rate of the most educated group (college graduates) was 78 percent 
while the exposure rate for the least educated group (< high school graduate) was only 20 percent 
(an absolute difference of 58 percent).  Each “consumption gap” entry in Table 6 reflects this 
absolute difference between the exposure rates of the most versus least educated, or the highest 
versus lowest income group.16  In each case, the table also reports the relevant absolute exposure 
rates.   
 
 There are four main messages contained in Table 6 related to American cultural exposure in 
the mid-1970s.  Firstly, there was a sizeable education gap for all seven cultural forms, even 
including popular music, but clearly greatest for the three high arts forms (surprisingly highest for 
art museums, which at different times and using somewhat different measures has been  
less elitist than other art forms).  Secondly, the income gap displays the unexpected pattern of being  
 
 Table 6 
Exposure Rates and Consumption Gaps for Seven Cultural Forms: United States 1975 
(Entries = percent of the relevant population exposed to that art form in last twelve months) 
Category Art 
Museum 
Theater Classical 
Music 
Science 
Museum 
Book 
Reading 
Cinema Popular 
Music 
< High School 20 18 23 17 26 56 25 
College Grad 78 73 77 59 60 85 40 
Education Gap: 
High - Low 
58 55 47 42 34 29 15 
<$5,000  20 17 9 12 29 46 21 
>$15,000 59 57 27 45 49 82 45 
Income Gap: 
High - Low 
39 40 18 33 20 36 
 
24 
Education Gap 
- Income Gap 
19 15 29 9 14 - 7 - 9 
Source: Adapted from DiMaggio and Useem (1978), Table 1; derived from National Research 
Center of the Arts data (1976). (Note: “Education Gap - Income Gap” is not in the original). 
  
lowest for arguably the most elitist art form (classical music), and almost as high for the more 
popularized cinema as it is for art museums and theaters.  Thirdly, this “perverse” behavior of the 
income gap cannot merely be explained by noting that classical music has by far the smallest over-
all exposure by income while cinema has the highest over-all exposure; classical music revealed 
lower overall education exposure rates compared to cinema without reversing the expected 
                                                          
 16 The three educational categories are < high school graduate; <college graduate; college 
graduate, and the four income categories for the mid-1970's are <$5,000; $5,000-$10,000; $10,000-
$15,000; >$15,000).  
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education gap ranking.  Fourthly, the education gap is notably larger than the income gap for all but 
two of the most popularized cultural forms, for which that gap is actually negative (cinema and 
popular music), and is predicably highest for the form likely to make the greatest intellectual 
demands on an audience, classical music.  Therefore, at least regarding education, Table 6 reveals 
largely expected results regarding both the relative elitism of arts audiences and their similarity 
across art forms, but provides some enigmatic results regarding the relationship between income 
and arts consumption.   
 
 While the positive causal relationship between education and income has plagued 
econometric efforts to separate their independent effects, the early non-econometric literature was 
replete with suggestive evidence such as in Table 6, and the Ford Foundation study (1974, Vol. II) 
that the role of education was much stronger than that of income.17   In fact, one of the very few 
                                                          
 17 Globerman (1989) also cites other U.S. data from the Association of College University 
and Community Arts Administrators, Inc. (1984-1985) as providing at least “suggestive” evidence 
that education is more important than income and occupation in determining arts attendance. An 
early effort to explicitly link education to productive efficiency in the consumption of arts activities 
was Globerman and Book (1977).  Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) cite Globerman and 
Book (1977), but only  for their estimation of Engel curves in that paper, especially related to theater.
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books intended to be a text in arts economics (Heilbrun and Gray, 2001) identifies the Ford 
Foundation study as important evidence of the relative effects of education versus income (after a 
brief discussion of the statistical multicollinearity problem (pp. 49-50)). They do, however, also cite 
Gray (1998b) as providing multivariate regression evidence supportive of a larger role for 
education than income, based on an analysis of 1997 National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) 
SPPA data (Surveys of Public Participation in the Arts) which was submitted as a report to the NEA 
(tables A17, A20 and A21).18   
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
 18  Researchers who are selectively familiar with only the econometric literature seem 
especially prone to concluding that there is no coherent evidence of the separate roles played by 
these two strongly positively correlated variables.  For example, papers submitted for publication 
and reviewed by the author that do not cite any of the earlier more descriptive literature on this 
issue, commonly draw this overly pessimistic conclusion.  This conclusion has no doubt been 
reinforced by the fact that two of the best early econometric studies that did indeed confirm a 
relatively weak role for income, did not include education as a separate independent variable in 
their equations (Moore, 1966; Withers,1980; with additional results also reported in Throsby and 
Withers, 1979), and the fact that an early study that did include both independent variables 
(Gruenberg, 1975; see text below) was unpublished.  Furthermore, similar to the case with Gray 
(1998b), two other studies documenting some econometric support for the strength of education 
over income are relatively unknown (Goudriaan and de Kam, 1983; Ganzeboom, 1989). Gapinksi`s 
(1981) attempt (in a very short paper of 4 pages) to separate those effects, seems to have become 
confused in the literature with his related work on costs of production using transcendental 
production functions (Gapinski,1980, which does not include any demand modeling, although 
 22
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Gapinski, 1984, estimates both production and demand functions), or has been lost as an early non-
reprinted Journal of Cultural Economics publication, as is also likely with Globerman and Book 
(1977).   
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 The later National Endowment for the Arts 2002 SPPA survey (NEA 2004) continued to 
report that education, “more than any other demographic factor” is highly correlated with attendance 
at arts events and museums (p. 19).  However, of more relevance to the issue of whether regression 
analysis has confirmed this result, is the NEA sponsored study by Peterson, et al. (2000), which 
generally (but not universally) reports that education is the strongest predictor of arts attendance 
using data from the 1997 SPPA survey and basic OLS estimation.  The results of this American 
based study (not estimating well-defined demand functions), which is not published in any academic 
journal and is already out-of-print, do not appear to be widely known outside of the United States 
(consistent with the observations made in fn. 18).   
 
 It is noteworthy that DiMaggio and Useem (1978), despite the evidence they evaluated 
linked to Table 6 above, were reluctant to conclude that education was the dominant determinant of 
performing arts attendance without also citing the Ford Foundation evidence.  They also cite an early 
unpublished multiple regression analysis using national U.S. cross-sectional data for 1964-65 
(Gruenberg, 1975) to support the relative power of education compared to income or occupation in 
explaining the “tendency to devote leisure time to attending concerts, plays, museums, and fairs” 
(DiMaggio and Useem, 1978, p. 148).  Finally, they especially emphasize the “anomalous pattern” 
in the consumption rate of teachers, which consistently revealed higher arts exposure rates than 
managers and other professionals “of higher class position,” again strongly suggesting the more 
fundamental role of education as a “more salient determinant of arts consumption than other social-
class dimensions” (DiMaggio and Useem, 1978, p. 147).   
 
  Table 7 documents the important evidence from the Ford Foundation study that led it and  
others to conclude that “to a startling degree...it is indeed education rather than income that matters 
most” (Ford Foundation, 1974, II, p. 16).  The powerful message of Table 7 is contained in the cells 
labeled “difference: education” and “difference: income.”  Using theater attendance as an example, 
when income is held constant at either a high or low level, differences in education generate either a 
21 percent differential in attendance rates (for high income), or a 25 percent differential in 
attendance (for low income).  However, when this is reversed, and education is held constant at 
either a high or a low level, differences in income  have much smaller effects - an attendance rate 
differential of only 8 percent for those with high education, and a 12 percent differential for those 
with low education.  
 
Table 7 
Education versus Income:  
Percentage Attending (20 Years Old and Over)  
A. Theater High Education Low Education Difference: Education 
High Income 43% attending 21% attending 22% in attending 
Low Income 35% attending 10% attending 25% in attending 
Difference: Income 8% in attending 11% in attending Avg. Ed / In: 2.47 
B. Symphony    
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High Income 28% 12% 16% 
Low Income 24% 5% 19% 
Difference: Income 4% 7% Avg. Ed / In: 3.18 
C. Opera    
High Income 12% 5% 7% 
Low Income 10% 2% 8% 
Difference: Income 2% 3% Avg. Ed / In: 3.00 
D. Ballet    
High Income 14% 4% 10% 
Low Income 12% 2% 10% 
Difference: Income 2% 2% Avg. Ed / In: 5.00  
E. Broadway 
Musicals 
   
High Income 46% 24% 22% 
Low Income 32% 12% 20% 
Difference: Income 14% 12% Avg. Ed / In: 1.62 
F. Jazz, Rock and 
Folk 
   
High Income 30% 28% 2% 
Low Income 31% 17% 14% 
Difference: Income - 1 % 11% Avg. Ed / In: 1.60 
G. Movies    
High Income 82% 80% 2% 
Low Income 80% 58% 22% 
Difference: Income 2% 22% Avg. Ed / In: 1.00 
Source: Adapted from The Ford Foundation (1974, Vol. II), Table 15.  (Note: “Avg. Ed /In” figures 
are not in the original).  
 
 Since the average educational attendance differential holding income constant is 23.5 
percent, while the average income differential holding education constant is only 9.5 percent, the 
“Avg. Ed / In “ score of 2.47 is derived for theater as the simple ratio of those averages.  While the 
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construction of the Avg. Ed/In measure stretches the boundary of what these data can demonstrate, a 
suggestive interpretation might be that educational level variations are 2.47 times more potent in 
explaining theater attendance differences than are income variations.   However, such a conclusion 
regarding relative explanatory power is more properly the domain of regression analysis, to the 
extent that those effects can indeed be separated (see part 3.2.2 below).   
 
 This stronger education effect is remarkably robust, even strengthening (as measured by this 
imprecise, but suggestive Avg. Ed/ In ratio) for performing art forms with lower overall attendance 
rates than theater, with a ratio of 3.18 for symphonic music, 3.0 for opera (with the lowest overall 
attendance rates) and a surprising 5.0 for ballet (with attendance rates only slightly higher than 
opera).  While much weaker, this apparent relative potency of educational differences in affecting 
attendance rates even extends to popularized Broadway musicals, and the more contemporary music 
forms of jazz, rock and folk (both with ratios of about 1.60).  By this measure, education only fails 
as the stronger factor compared to income in the case of movies, where their average “explanatory 
power” is equal.  Despite legitimate reservations about the interpretation and robustness of the Avg. 
Ed/In ratio constructed in Table 7, this is an intuitively appealing result that is supportive of its 
usefulness.   
 
 It is noteworthy, as well as surprising, that despite the sophistication of some of the 
econometric techniques discussed below (section 3), these mid-1970's Ford Foundation results, 
along with the National Research for the Arts survey data on exposure to the arts during the same 
time period (see Table 6 above), continue to stand as perhaps the most compelling case for education 
as the dominant determinant of variations in performing arts attendance (as evidenced again by the 
Heilbrun and Gray, 2001, discussion of education vs. income on pp. 48-51).19  This issue of how 
much of our understanding of arts demand has been improved by advances in analytical technical 
sophistication is an important theme that is addressed in the concluding section.  
 
2.2.    Segmentation Studies and Audience Overlap: The Co-Patronage Evidence   
 
 Despite the generally strong evidence for the original Baumol and Bowen (1966) conclusion 
that audience characteristics are very similar across all performing arts types, this is not to say that 
the same people constitute the primary audience for all art forms.  In fact, the early evidence on arts 
                                                          
 19 Throsby (1994) also cited Baumol and Bowen (1966) and the Ford Foundation (1974, Vol. 
II) as early studies showing the importance of higher education, income and occupational status in 
determining arts audiences, but did not identify any stronger evidence for education.  This is in 
contrast to the Throsby and Withers (1979) discussion (p. 101) of the “confirmed” evidence for the 
stronger role of education linked to the Ford Foundation (1974) findings of very high teacher arts 
attendance rates and the type of differential income vs. education effects documented above in Table 
7.  More tellingly regarding the influence of econometric evidence on this issue, while noting that 
subsequent time-series and cross-sectional demand studies were able to further clarify our 
understanding of arts demand, Throsby (1994) does not mention any econometric evidence directly 
comparing the relative roles of education vs. income, although citing Withers (1980) for being the 
best evidence of the role of the price of leisure in causing “unadjusted” income elasticities of 
demand to be surprisingly low.    
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cross-attendance or “co-patronage” patterns (often called audience “overlap”) found notable 
evidence of limited audience overlap and a strong tendency for audiences to segment themselves in 
quite interesting ways.   However, more recent evidence suggests that arts audience segmentation 
may be lessening, especially among younger consumers who appear much less concerned about the 
social status of quite differing forms of entertainment extending beyond the arts (e.g. Peterson, 
1992).  
 
 Again, the Ford Foundation (1974, Vol. II) results set the early tone in finding that opera and 
ballet enthusiasts were especially dedicated to the arts in general, although opera attendees were 
particularly fond of symphonic music, while ballet-goers were partial to the theater (p. 11).  But in 
addition to that perhaps predictable distinction, the Ford Foundation surprisingly found that over 33 
percent of symphony concert attendees and over 50 percent of theater-goers never attended any other 
arts events (1974, Vol. II, p. 11).   
 
 Throsby and Withers (1979, pp. 101-102) elaborated upon this evidence using 1976 
Australian population survey data regarding arts exposure to explore the likely degree of audience 
overlap across art forms.  Since their Table 7.1 (p. 97) reported that 17 percent of the 14 year old and 
above population had attended a theater event at least once during the past year, with comparable 
figures of 9 percent for symphony, 6 percent for opera, and 10 percent for ballet, they identified the 
maximum overall population exposure to the arts as 42 percent, if each art form attracted an entirely 
unique audience.  Conversely, full audience overlap would imply a total population exposure of only 
17 percent.  They then cite independent evidence for the relatively sophisticated city of Melbourne 
for a total population exposure of 34 percent (expected to be higher than for Australia as a whole, p. 
102), and overall population exposures in the United States of 23 percent (linked again to the Ford 
Foundation, 1974).   Their overall conclusion that the performing arts reach about 25 percent of the 
above age 14 population of those two countries would actually imply reasonably strong audience 
overlap for Australia inasmuch as their no overlap result was 42 percent exposure (17 percentage 
points higher than 25 percent), compared to 17 percent for full audience overlap (only 8 percentage 
points lower than 25 percent).  Of course, they were essentially guessing at how much lower the 
overall Australian exposure rate would be compared to Melbourne`s 34 percent.  A nationwide 
exposure rate of 30 percent, for example, would be roughly at the midpoint of their benchmark rates 
of 42 and 17 percent and would suggest much less Australian arts audience overlap.  
 
 The issue of the degree of audience overlap vs. segmentation, both within the performing arts 
and across other forms of entertainment (including the media arts) was also the focus of many other 
studies, including a flurry of marketing inspired audience segmentation and co-patronage studies 
typically applying factor or cluster analysis to U.S. data, especially in the late-1970's and early 
1980`s.  In part, these studies seemed motivated by an apparent gap in the arts audience literature, as 
reflected by the observation in Belk et al. (1980) that the DiMaggio et al. (1978) study of 270 
audience studies since 1970 identified “only eight studies examining the co-patronage of various 
cultural forms” (p. 95).  Hence, despite the general assumption by arts managers that they were all 
“drawing from a common pool of aficionados,” there had actually been scant attention paid to 
verifying that proposition (Belk et al., 1980, p. 95; see also Cwi, 1987 and for an application to 
cinema audiences  Cuadrado and Frasquet, 1999).   
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 In fact, the co-patronage (audience overlap) issue has continued to be relatively ignored, 
even in the face of recent sociological studies dubbed the “culture of consumption research stream” 
(Fisher and Preece, 2003, p. 69, citing also van Eijck, 2000; see also Bryson, 1997; Fisher and 
Preece, 2002; López Sintas and García Álvarez, 2004).  This research was stimulated by Peterson’s 
(1992) introduction of the terms “omnivore” (one whose music and leisure consumption is so broad 
and eclectic as to defy being called elitist) and “univore” (by contrast, a person with decidedly 
narrower favorites among music and leisure options) to replace the standard concepts of elite (or 
high brow) versus mass (or low brow) as descriptors of cultural stratification.20  While some of the 
related empirical findings are of indirect relevance to the issue of audience overlap, only Fisher and 
Preece (2002) generate results directly measuring the degree of audience overlap among the five 
major categories of the performing arts, finding a “significant degree” of overlap.  A related example 
of the relative paucity of overlap evidence is the absence of even one table directly documenting 
such evidence in the 2002 Survey of Public Participation in the Arts (NEA, 2004).  Nevertheless, 
somewhat mysteriously, the Chapter 8 summary of the 2002 SPPA results makes the following 
observations about American crossover audiences (pp. 55-58): 
 
 1.  At least 50 percent of attenders at other arts events also visited an arts museum. 
2.  Opera has the most crossover with ballet, and those attending “other dance” are also more 
likely to attend ballet.  Also, over 60 percent of opera attenders attended a musical. 
3.  “Adults attending a ballet or opera performance are much more likely to attend a classical 
music performance” (p. 56). 
4.  More than 40 percent of those attending opera or ballet also attend jazz performances, and 
there is also a relatively high crossover of classical music and jazz audiences. 
5.    Interestingly, only non-musical theater audiences were not identified as having any 
particular crossover “partners.” Belk et al. (1980) had identified the hypothesis that theater 
audiences are somehow different from other arts audiences as a key motivation for their 
interest in examining audience overlaps.  
                                                          
 20 The biggest surprise to economists reading the notable contributions of sociologists to the 
arts participation/attendance literature may well be the inversion of causality that often motivates 
their analysis.  Due to the influence of Bourdieu (1973) and his focus on the role of “cultural capital” 
in “class reproduction,” most sociologists are especially interested in (1) cultural capital as a key 
independent variable (via numerous causal pathways) in the determination of educational and other 
measures of lifetime success, and (2) the adequacy and stability of participation in the high arts as a 
proxy for the more complex notion of cultural capital.  Hence, instead of stressing the role of income 
and education as demand determinants of performing arts attendance, this reverse perspective would 
stress the role of performing arts attendance as a determinant (or a reflection) of the stock of cultural 
capital, and in turn the effect cultural capital has on increasing one’s social status, including 
educational achievement and income.  However, since one way to test the hypothesis that cultural 
capital is declining as a source of social status (or that the performing arts are becoming a less 
significant source of cultural capital) is to examine whether arts participation rates by, for example, 
the more educated or females (for whom such cultural capital seemed to be especially important) has 
shown particularly high rates of decline, the focus reverts back to viewing attendance as the 
dependent variable and educational level and gender as independent variables.  See, e.g. DiMaggio 
and Mukhtar (2004).    
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 These observations are broadly consistent with the Fisher and Preece (2002) conclusions 
using Canadian data (i.e. the 1998 Statistics Canada Time Use Survey of 10,749 adults) that (1) 
opera attenders are the most likely, while theater goers are the least likely, to attend other types of 
performing arts events; (2) symphony, choral music and dance audiences exhibit an intensity of co-
patronage behavior that is less than that of opera fans, and more than that of theater-goers; and (3) 
those who most frequently attend one type of arts performance are a disproportionate share of those 
who most frequently attend other types of performances.     
 
 The earlier detailed co-patronage studies generally uncovered specific audience segments 
when studying attendance patterns at a variety of events (typically including the various performing 
arts, jazz or rock concerts, and different types of museums).  For example, Sexton (1980) and Sexton 
and Britney (1980) found strong evidence for four segments, labeled as (1) “lights,” with relatively 
low attendance at all events, and the largest group; (2) museum fans, from 19.5 percent to 21.4 
percent across two different samples;  (3) “all-rounders,” who frequently attended most types of 
events, averaging about 14 percent in the samples; and (4) “specialists,” who rarely attended any 
events beyond their special interest, ranging from 17.9 percent to 24.2 percent.  The relatively small 
percentage of “all-rounders” in those particular studies would suggest that the generalized finding of 
great similarity of demographic characteristics across the various performing arts audiences does not 
necessarily mean that it is the same people who are populating those diverse arts venues.   While not 
necessarily clarifying the magnitude of audience overlap in the arts, the enthusiasm of marketing 
researchers to differentiate arts audiences by various criteria continues, as exhibited by the Cuadrado 
and Mollá (2000) categorizations of “beginners, theater buffs, enthusiasts and indifferents” based on 
the importance Spanish theater-goers attach to the competing motives of “emotions, cultural 
fulfillment, interest and social hedonism.”21    
 
 The theme of arts audience fragmentation was also the focus of Svendson (1992), although 
the data presented regarding Danish and Norwegian broadly defined cultural consumption patterns 
were more successful in documenting the relative unpopularity of the high arts compared to pop 
concerts, movies and even church events, rather than providing documentation on audience overlap 
or fragmentation.  Furthermore, despite the Ford Foundation (1974) evidence cited above regarding 
the surprising lack of interest of significant portions of American orchestra fans (over 33 percent) 
and theater-goers (over 50 percent) in any other types of arts events, and the Sexton(1980) and 
Sexton and Britney (1980) results regarding specialists vs. all-rounders, Svendson cites the United 
States as being perhaps unique in having especially non-fragmented arts audiences which “tend to 
consume a wide variety of art products” (p. 86).  Svendson contrasts any such audience non-
fragmentation with sociological studies that allegedly show significant intolerance among fans of 
one art form toward other arts enthusiasts, being in fact “illiberal or intolerant towards other art 
loving groups, which are looked upon as inferiors or underdeveloped” (Svendson, 1992, p. 86). 
 
                                                          
 21 The “Market Research Section” in most issues of the International Journal of Arts 
Management is an especially rich source of information of this kind.  For example, Bouder-Pailler 
(1999) provides evidence regarding the motives of French theater-goers reminiscent of Cuadrado 
and Mollá (2000).   
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 These contradictory views of the degree of arts co-patronage have been common.  Belk et al. 
(1980), after describing a number of arts segmentation studies between 1975 and 1980, concluded “ 
“a clear answer to the question of whether attendance at various arts activities tends to cluster 
together and/or with other leisure activities does not emerge from past research” (p. 95).  In an effort 
to remedy that problem, Belk et al. (1980) examined two American surveys of quite different 
populations, but which are highly comparable regarding the type of data collected: (1) an Opera 
America sponsored self-administered audience survey of 2,607 attenders of six major opera 
companies in all regions of the United States except the Southeast, and (2) a National Endowment 
for the Arts random telephone survey of 1,491 residents of four Southeastern U.S. cities who, among 
other screening devices, had attended three or more theater or symphony performances in the past.   
They not only identified more entertainingly labeled “life-style” groupings than the audience 
segments in Sexton (1980) and Sexton and Britney (1980),22 but found (1) relatively strong evidence 
of co-patronage across art forms, especially among heavy attenders of individual art forms but even 
including theater patrons (who, as noted above, have often been thought less committed to the arts 
than other arts supporters), and (2) substantial co-patronage of movies, live sporting events and rock 
concerts among heavy attenders of the performing arts (p. 100).  Table 8 reports these findings (from 
Belk et al. (1980, Table 3). 
 
  Table 8 
    Percent Overlap in Audiences: U.S. 1980 
   Percentage attending at least one time in last 12 months 
                    (Left side entries: Theater & Symphony survey; Right side entries: Opera survey)  
Column Definitions: 
Heavy attenders: HA 
Non-attenders: NA 
Rock Concert 
% attending 
Museums 
% attending 
Ballet 
% attending 
Theater 
% attending 
Symphony 
% attending 
Rock Concerts HA    -----  56 / 77   48 / 49   61 / 82  41 / 67 
Rock Concerts NA    -----  38 / 71   42 / 46   36 / 70    7 / 61 
Museums HA   46 / 10    -----   58 / 58   63 / 82  37 / 82 
Museums NA   29 / 6    -----   35 / 30   33 / 59    7 / 42 
Ballet HA   31  / 7  49 / 87    ------   46 / 87  17 / 77 
Ballet NA   34 / 8   36 / 63    ------   34 / 60     7 / 50 
Theater HA   52 / 9  69 / 83    62 / 59   ------  43 / 70 
Theater NA   28 / 6    33 / 50    34 / 27   ------    7 / 45 
Symphony HA   42 / 8  95 / 82    88 / 62   83 / 80   ------ 
                                                          
 22 These are identified as passive homebodies (20 percent), active sports enthusiasts (19 
percent), inner-directed self-sufficients (14 percent), arts patrons (20 percent), active homebodies 
(13 percent), and active sociables (14 percent).  From Belk et al. (1980, Table 2).  
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Symphony NA   37 / 8  49 / 57    49 / 30   38 / 58  ------ 
Source: Belk et al., (1980), adapted from Table 3 (without the category “Light Attenders” in the 
column headings, defined as attending 1 or 2 events; there is also some reorientation of the table 
headings).  “Heavy attenders” are defined as those attending 3 or more events in the previous 12 
month period.  Note that for comparability across the two samples, no opera results were reported in 
the original table, even for the sample of attenders of the six opera companies across the U.S. 
 
 An example of the interpretation of these results is that 88 percent of heavy symphony 
concert attenders (3 or more times in the last twelve months) in the theater and symphony survey 
(limited to four cities in the Southeastern United States), and 62 percent of those in the opera survey 
(over six companies throughout the U.S.) have also attended a ballet performance at least one time in 
that same time period.   Thus, the first noteworthy result from Table 8 is that, while most of the 
entries are relatively similar between the two survey samples, there can be substantial differences, 
which are especially dramatic in the rock concert and the symphony columns.   The authors suggest 
that while the patterns of co-patronage are similar across the two surveys, the levels can be sensitive 
to the composition of the samples, especially the fact that the opera sample consisted of people with 
especially low base attendance levels at rock concerts, and the relatively low overall base arts 
attendance levels of people in the Southeastern symphony and theater sample.  They conclude that 
“base rates should be carefully examined in considering the absolute levels of co-patronage” (Belk, 
et al., 1980, p. 99).   
 
 Turning to the claimed similarity of patterns of co-patronage regardless of any variations in 
the absolute levels, the authors conclude that they have found substantial evidence of arts (excluding 
rock concerts) co-patronage and audience overlap, with the possible exception of ballet.  That is, 
heavy attenders of museums, theater and symphony (and ballet) performances each have average co-
patronage rates (i.e. attending at least once) that are notably higher for each other art form compared 
to the co-patronage rates of non-attenders.   Their cautionary note about ballet is due to the low 
absolute level of co-patronage that is observed between heavy ballet attenders and symphony 
concerts in the theater and symphony sample (only 17 percent), along with the lower than 50 percent 
absolute co-patronage rates between heavy ballet and the other art forms in that same sample.  
Similarly, only 37 percent of heavy museum-goers attended at least one symphony concert in the 
Southeastern sample, but that low rate was not observed with other art forms.  They also make 
special note of the lack of any compelling evidence for average lower arts co-patronage rates among 
theater and museum audiences compared to symphony and ballet audiences, a result expected by 
many who considered theater and museum patrons to be less dedicated to the arts in general. 
 
 How do these Table 8 results from 1980 compare to the five crossover audience observations 
made in the summary of the 2002 SPPA survey, and to the similar 1998 Canadian results (Fisher and 
Preece, 2002)?  Despite some difficulties in making that comparison (e.g. the 2002 summary results 
do not distinguish heavy from other attenders, and Table 8 has no opera results), some conclusions 
can be drawn.  The 2002 result that at least 50 percent of performing arts attenders also visited an 
arts museum is replicated in the results in both surveys from about twenty years earlier.23  Of course, 
                                                          
 23 While not reported in Table 8, the Belk et al. (1980) Table 3 shows this greater than 50 
percent co-patronage rate as well for their “light attender” category in both samples for all three 
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it must be noted that museums were substantially patronized even by non-attenders of the 
performing arts, although more so in the opera sample, with co-patronage rates above 50 percent in 
that sample even for those who did not attend any performing arts performances in the previous 
twelve months.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
performing arts forms. As expected, the absolute rates are lower than for heavy attenders. 
 In fact, a fascinating result in Table 8 is the generally high absolute level of attendance rates 
at other events among the non-attender sample groups.  Thus, between 30 and 49 percent (depending 
on the sample) of symphony non-attenders still managed to see at least one ballet performance, and 
between 38 and 58 percent attended at least one theatrical performance.   However, for the non-
attenders of theater and ballet, the results are highly sensitive to which sample is used, with much 
lower attendance rates at other art forms in the Southeastern theater/symphony sample compared to 
the national opera sample.  Yet, the relatively high co-patronage attendance rates of non-attenders at 
other arts forms in the opera sample is a cautionary note to the Belk et al. (1980) claimed result of 
high crossover audiences among heavy arts attenders.           
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 The other co-patronage result from 2002 that can be compared to the 1980 results in Table 8 
is the high percentages of opera and ballet audiences in 2002 who also attended symphony orchestra 
concerts.  This result is generally also observed in the 1980 data as it relates to ballet and symphony 
audiences.  The percentage of heavy symphony attenders also attending a ballet performance in 1980 
ranged from 62 percent to 88 percent in the two samples (in contrast to 30 and 49 percent for 
symphony non-attenders).  Conversely, 77 percent of heavy ballet attenders attended a symphony 
concert in the opera sample, compared to only 50 percent of ballet non-attenders.24    
 
 One cannot avoid sensing that the Belk et al. (1980) frustration at the unclear evidence 
regarding arts audience clustering has not been fully resolved, even by their own analysis.  While the 
non-exhaustive evidence examined above does not confirm Svendson’s (1990) extreme suspicions 
regarding narrowly parochial performing arts fans hostile to rival art forms,25 the opposite caricature 
of the voraciously catholic arts devotee also fails to survive close scrutiny.  Despite the similarity of 
characteristics in all performing arts audiences, and the evidence that some art forms like opera and 
ballet, or opera/ballet and symphonic music, tend to have strong audience overlaps, the ability of 
researchers to find identifiable pockets of audience segmentation, and the apparent absence of a 
dominant group of arts “all-rounders” suggests that indeed, not all arts audiences are as alike as the 
casual observer might think.   The surprising evidence regarding the proportion of “non-attenders” 
of one art form who attend other art forms also supports this cautious conclusion.    
  
 
  However, the evidence that omnivores (who are notably eclectic in their patronage of all 
cultural forms, including middle and low brow varieties) are a growing segment of arts audiences 
provides at least indirect evidence that “all-rounder” behavior (with its implied increase in 
performing arts audience overlap) may become more important in the future.  For example, a part of 
this literature investigates the growing influence of omnivores relative to traditionally defined elites 
(with narrowly focused “snobbish” interests in only the most prestigious of art forms).  Fisher and 
Preece (2003), further mining the 1998 Statistics Canada survey data, find that despite demographic 
changes in income, urbanity, and education that would favor a relative growth in snobs, major 
behavioral changes in those elite populations toward more eclectic cultural (especially musical) 
consumption patterns has led omnivores as a group to grow rapidly and to be notably younger than 
                                                          
 24 The symphony and theater sample result of only 17 percent audience overlap between 
heavy ballet attenders and symphony audiences is one of those few results that vary greatly across 
the two Belk et al. (1980) samples, although this 17 percent result is at least notably higher in that 
sample than the 7 percent of ballet non-attenders who saw at least one symphony concert.    
 25 Such behavior would be more common among univores, who have been found more 
prevalent among less educated consumers of lower brow entertainments (Bryson, 1997), although 
extending to the middle classes or even the “upper-middle” classes, but definitely not among the 
upper social classes (López Sintas and Garcia García Álvarez, 2004).  Relish (1997) finds that it is 
geographic mobility and interpersonal “network complexity,” rather than high levels of education 
per se, that is most closely tied to musical consumption across a “wider spectrum of genres,” since 
while the more highly educated did indeed like more types of music than the less educated, “this 
difference was restricted to a narrower range of more ‘elite’ genres.”  
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snobs.26   They provide hope to symphony orchestras in their finding that omnivores, despite their 
more varied cultural consumption, do not seem to show less commitment to classical music 
compared to snobs, who qualify for that label largely due to the intensity of their univore type 
commitment to that art form.  They also express some surprise at their own finding that omnivores 
are more likely to attend theater and dance performances than are snobs, a result that when 
combined with their earlier evidence regarding strong omnivore commitment to classical music, 
could suggest that “omnivores are more committed than snobs to the performing arts in general” 
(Fisher and Preece, 2003, p. 82).      
 
 Therefore, even if much of the recent evidence regarding performing arts audience overlap is 
only indirect (and focused on music), there is reason to believe that the apparent decline, especially 
among the young and more educated, in narrowly focused cultural consumption (obscuring the 
boundaries between high, middle and low brow art forms) would also suggest an expansion of the 
overlap of the audience within any one of those cultural “brow” dimensions.  However, any 
expansion of high arts co-patronage consumption as a result of the more eclectic behavior of 
omnivores also presents a threat to the arts.  Even if one concludes that any “decline of the arts as a 
form of cultural capital ... is taking place more slowly than many observers had predicted” 
(DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004, p.192), it is clear that the performing arts are facing more 
competitive pressure from other forms of entertainment, making a coherent definition of the market 
in which the arts operate (including challenges in estimating parameters such as cross price 
elasticities of demand) an ever more important research priority.  Thus, while the search for an arts 
boom (discussed at the end of the next section) has reverted to a fear of an arts bust, at least some of 
the evidence related to questions of arts co-patronage and audience overlap appears mildly 
encouraging for performing arts providers.      
 
2.3    Stability or Change in Audience Characteristics over Time: The Debate Regarding An Arts 
Boom and Arts Audience Elitism 
 
  Some longitudinal comparisons in audience demographics were made in part 2.2, but are 
expanded upon in this section.27  A significant problem in making such comparisons is that survey 
                                                          
 26 They report an increase of omnivores in Canadian classical music audiences from 4.4 
percent to 6.9 percent between 1992 and 1998 (snobs fell from 8.8 percent to 7.0 percent of such 
audiences).  In this context, snobs are defined as those who attend only classical music concerts 
(defined to include chamber, choral, and opera as well as symphony concerts), while omnivores also 
attend other music performances (i.e. popular, rock, jazz, folk, or country music).  See Fisher and 
Preece (2003), especially Table 1 (p. 74).  The growing influence of omnivores has been 
championed especially by Peterson (1992), and Peterson and Simkus (1993), based on U.S. data.   
 27 If there is a null hypothesis to be tested in such comparisons, it is one stated by Heilbrun 
and Gray, 2001, p. 56): “audience composition appears to be ruled by a powerful inertia.”  They note 
that as of 1978, there seemed to be no “consistent evidence of change over time” in the role played 
by the standard socioeconomic variables of age, gender, education, income and occupation in 
describing arts audiences, citing the extensive comparisons of arts (including museums) audience 
surveys from 1959 through 1977 by DiMaggio et al. (1978, p. 34).  Whether such stability over that 
earlier 19 year period extends to an approximately 40 year period from the mid-1960's to 2002, or 
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populations and techniques, as well as variable definitions are not identical over time, even within 
the same country.28  Despite this caveat, the most recent 2002 Survey of Public Participation in the 
Arts, or SPPA (National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), 2004) provides data that can be 
manipulated to generate an approximation to the relative frequency data originally derived by 
Baumol and Bowen for the mid-1960's (reported above in Table 1).29    
 
 As in the prior discussions, efforts are made to avoid an excess reliance on U.S. data.  
However, even O’Hagan’s (1996) review of the evidence regarding possible diminutions in the 
elitism of the arts (he finds no such evidence; see below) relies heavily on such data, since “the most 
comprehensive data in relation to participation in the arts appear to exist for the United States,” 
which he cites favorably as providing a wealth of information over time based on very large samples 
of over 12,000 people (p.272).  While O’Hagan also cites smaller Irish surveys from 1981 and 1994 
(of 1,200 people), and the Arts Council of Great Britain survey of about 8,000 people in 1991, he 
only uses data from the 1994 Irish survey and the most recent (at that time) 1992 SPPA survey in his 
analysis.30  
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
the more limited 15 year period from 1982 to1997, or 20 year period from 1982-2002 is addressed in 
this section. 
 28 In fact, the NEA warns in the Executive Summary to the 2002 SPPA results that, since the 
1997 SPPA was conducted through a random dial telephone survey with no link to any Bureau of the 
Census results, while the 1992 and 2002 SPPAs were both conducted by the Bureau of the Census, 
data from 1997 are not directly comparable to 2002.   Furthermore, the NEA warns that since the 
sponsoring survey was different in 1992 (i.e. the National Crime Survey) vs. 2002 (i.e. the Current 
Population Survey), as well as differences in the seasons during which the surveys were conducted 
(each month for 1992 and only in August of 2002), even the 1992 and 2002 surveys should only be 
compared with caution.  Mercifully, the questions used in both 1992 and 2002 were almost identical, 
and despite the caveats above, there are many inter-temporal comparison made in the 2002 SPPA, 
including some involving the 1982 results.  
 29 The importance of the 2002 SPPA was emphasized by DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004), 
who, after bemoaning the previous absence of comparable data collected over time, observed that 
“relatively long-term trend analysis has finally become possible” (p.172).  Of course, what they were 
celebrating was the apparent ability of the 2002 SPPA to be compared to the earlier 1982 and 1992 
SPPAs (despite two differences that do not appear to cause any “systematic” biases; see fn 27 
above).  Obviously, this 20 year comparison period presents fewer challenges than a 40 year period, 
which is the reason for the caveats discussed below.  
 30 Further evidence of the difficulty in using the variety of international data for examining 
the topics in this section is reflected in the Heilbrun and Gray (2001) Table 3.2 (p. 45), which 
painstakingly reports on international arts participation rates based on studies from eight countries 
plus the United States.  Such studies provide, however, a hodgepodge of evidence with each country 
represented by a different year, ranging from 1976 for Australia to 1997 in the United States, with 
most of the studies applicable to the early to mid-1980's (five countries), and two to  1988 or 1989 
(France and Quebec).  While it is true that Wiesand (e.g. 1995) has been providing regular “cultural 
barometers” for Germany that might be used to provide some longitudinal comparisons, those 
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 Since the Baumol and Bowen (1966) results were adapted from an audience survey 
(Twentieth Century Fund), whereas the SPPA results are based on participation rates of the general 
population, it is important to use those 2002 SPPA results that are most applicable to determining 
the distribution of audience characteristics whose components are normalized to constitute 100 
percent of the total.31  For example, 2002 SPPA Table 8, “Demographic Distribution of the U.S. 
Adults Who Attend/Visit/Read At Least Once in the 12-Month Period Ending August 2002” reports 
that 42.7 percent of those attending a classical music event at least once were male and 57.3 percent 
were female.   This is in contrast to what is reported in Table 9, “Rates At Which U.S. Adults 
Attend/Visit/Read By Demographic Group, 2002 (Percentage Participation at Least Once),” which 
reports that 10.3 percent of all males and 12.7 percent of all females attended a classical music 
performance at least once.  Since the relative frequencies reported above in Table 1 (from Baumol 
and Bowen, 1966) for the mid-1960's are defined essentially as “percentage representation of a 
group in the arts audience compared to the percentage of that group in the total population,” it is 
clear that the relevant comparison for males is 42.7 percent in the classical music audience (from 
2002 SPPA Table 8) relative to their being 47.9 percent of the total adult population (a relative 
frequency of 0.89, indicating that males are under-represented in such audiences relative to the 
population).  The data from SPPA Table 9 are of interest in showing the “penetration rates” of the 
arts across various demographic characteristics (with the male and female percentages of 10.3 and 
12.7 for classical music cited above confirming the relatively limited audience available to 
symphony orchestras relative to the total population), but are not relevant to the construction of 
relative frequency statistics.           
 Because the first SPPA was conducted in the United States no earlier than 1982 (almost 20 
years after the period addressed by Baumol and Bowen (1966)), and the relative frequency concept 
that measures under vs. over-representation of a demographic group in a total population is an 
important measure that was stressed by Baumol and Bowen in that landmark study, some effort is 
justified to replicate relative frequency data using the latest 2002 SPPA in an effort to facilitate  
comparisons across a 40 year period.   Since the steps required to replicate this relative frequency 
data are somewhat complex, and any long term inter-temporal comparisons resulting from such an 
exercise must be made with caution, more straightforward data from 1982, 1992 and 2002 are also 
reported directly from the 2002 SPPA.  These are supplemented by further analysis focusing on the 
age variable that was considered sufficiently important to justify an entire National Endowment for 
the Arts sponsored study “Age and Arts Participation: 1982-1997” (Peterson, et al., 2000).  The 
results are then also discussed in the broader context of the periodic debate among arts economists 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
reports do not extend over as long a period of time as do the U.S. SPPA studies and do not appear to 
be as detailed.       
 31 As noted previously, while participation surveys, in contrast to audience surveys, provide 
valuable information about the entire population, one weakness is that “participation” is typically 
defined as “attending at least once in the previous twelve month period.” Thus it does not capture 
frequency of attendance.  However, starting with the 1992 SPPA, some limited information has been 
captured about frequency (“average number of attendances per attender”) for each of the different art 
forms, although unfortunately not broken down by attender age, education, income, race or gender.  
This information is reported later in this section. 
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about an arts boom and possible modifications in the elitism of the arts, and the degree to which 
demand growth can ameliorate the significant problems created by the famous cost-disease problem 
(Baumol and Bowen, 1966).     
 
 As previously explained, the table from which the 2002 relative frequency type data can be 
derived is Table 8 (2002 SPPA).  This reports separate percentages of the adult U.S. population by 
demographic characteristics who attended 11 different types of arts events at least once over a 12-
month period (four of which clearly apply to the performing arts as Baumol and Bowen defined 
them, not including the vaguer category of “other dance”).  For example, of those attending a 
classical music performance at least once from August 2001 to August 2002, 19.8 percent of the 
total were in the gender neutral age group 35-44 (with all age classifications summing to 100 percent 
of those attending at least one classical music performance).  Similarly, of those attending an opera, 
18.9 percent were age 35-44.  The figure for ballet is 27.2 percent, while 22.6 percent of those 
attending a non-musical play were age 35-44.  A simple average of these percentages across the four 
art forms (i.e. 22.1 percent) is of some interest when compared to the percentage of 35-44 year olds 
in the total U.S. population (i.e. 21.5 percent), but seriously begs the question of audience overlap if 
it were to be used to construct a relative frequency statistic (which would be 1.03 in that case). 
 
 Regarding audience overlap, the Throsby and Withers (1979) interpretation of comparable 
Australian data (see pp 26-27 above), if applied to the 2002 U.S. case, would result in a range of 
from 27.2 percent of age 35-44 arts “exposure” with total audience overlap (i.e the highest of the 
percentages for the four art forms) to the sum of the four percentages with no audience overlap (i.e. 
88.5 percent).  Since, as noted, 21.5 percent of the U.S. adult population was 35-44 in that period 
(Table 8; NEA, 2004), the relative frequency statistic would range from 1.27 (with total audience 
overlap) to 4.12 (with no audience overlap).  Continuing with the Throsby and Withers (1979) 
methodological precedent, their eventual conclusion was that about 25 percent of the Australian 
population had been exposed to the performing arts (compared to 23 percent in the U.S. from the 
Ford Foundation study, 1974), which can be shown to be the equivalent of multiplying 2.38 times 
the simple average of the percentage exposures of their four arts categories (i.e. 17 percent for 
theater, 9 percent for symphony, 6 percent for opera and 10 percent for ballet, for a simple average 
of 10.5 percent).  Applying a rough downward adjustment to the U.S. case (e.g. 23 percent/25 
percent overall exposure = 0.92 x 2.38 = 2.19, or 2.2) allows for the derivation of 2002  U.S. relative 
frequencies for similar demographic categories as identified above in Table 1 for the mid-1960's.    
 
 For the case described above of the age 35-44 group, the relative frequency would be the 
simple average exposure percentage of 22.1 percent x 2.2 = 48.6  percent, which is 2.26 times the 
21.5 percent of the U.S. population in that age group.  By contrast, the simple mid-point of the range 
for the full audience overlap case (a relative frequency of 1.27) and the no audience overlap case 
(relative frequency of 4.12) is 2.70.  Since it is unclear a priori whether the mid-point simplification 
for deriving the relative frequency statistic is less justified (e.g. possibly biased upward) than the 
“adjusted average” algorithm, both relative frequency results are reported in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 
Derived Relative Frequencies of Performing Arts Audience Characteristics 
(From the 2002 SPPA, U.S.) 
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Characteristic Adjusted Avg 
Method 
Mid-point 
Method 
Characteristic Adjusted 
Avg. Method 
Mid-point 
Method 
Age 18-24    1.60    1.92 Some College    2.15     2.47 
25-34    1.93    2.23 College    4.17     4.81 
35-44    2.26    2.69 Graduate School    6.72    7.82 
45-54    2.83    3.24 Income < $10 K    1.10    1.31 
55-64    2.56    3.00 $10 K - $20 K    1.16    1.34 
65-74    2.36    2.78 $20 K - $30 K    1.32    1.53 
75 and +    1.34    1.63 $30 K - $40 K    1.94    2.25 
Grade School    0.22    0.26 $40 K - $50 K    2.32    2.72 
< High School    0.51    0.61 $50 K - $75 K    2.65    3.04 
High School    0.78    0.95 $75 K and +    4.34    4.96 
Source: Entries are derived from raw data from Table 8 of the 2002 Survey of Public Participation in 
the Arts (NEA, 2004) and represent the ratio of the percentage of the demographic characteristic in 
symphony, opera, non-musical theater and ballet audiences divided by the percentage of that 
characteristic in the general population.  Algorithms are as described in the text above the table. 
 
 It is clear that the mid-point method of deriving the 2002 relative frequencies generates 
uniformly higher values than the adjusted average method.  However, it is the relationship among 
the entries, not their absolute values, that are most revealing and most capable of being cautiously 
compared to those relevant to 40 years earlier (reported in the U.S. column of Table 1).  It is easily 
confirmed that the ratios of any two values in Table 9 are nearly identical for all of the entries using 
either approach to calculating the relative frequencies, the result of the algorithm described above.  
 
 Regarding age, it is interesting that most entries in the earlier Table 1 (with the exception of 
only the very youngest and the very oldest) and all entries in Table 9 have values above 1.0.  That is, 
since the merit of the relative frequency statistic is to determine which characteristics are over vs. 
under-represented in arts audiences relative to the general population, the Table 9 result that all ages 
are over-represented would appear illogical.  While this may indeed be the inevitable result of the 
necessary imprecision in translating the raw data from the 2002 SPPA into relative frequency 
measures, the fact that a similar result was reported by Baumol and Bowen (1966) for the four age 
groupings within the key overall range of 20 to 59 suggests that at least the relative rankings of the 
Table 9 entries provide useful information.   More substantively, in the 1960's in the U.S. the very 
young 20-24 age group was the most over-represented in arts audiences relative to their size in the 
population (again, not including any measure of frequency of attendance), with the relative 
frequencies systematically falling for each subsequently older age grouping.   By contrast, in 2002, 
Table 9 reveals a rising relative frequency from the youngest age classification of 18-24 up to the 
45-54 age group, which is the most over-represented in arts audiences relative to the general 
population.  Then, similar to the 1960's, but starting at that much older age classification, relative 
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frequencies fall for each of the remaining oldest age groupings (but still remain higher than the two 
youngest groups except for the oldest group of age 75 and older, which has a relative frequency of 
only 1.34 compared to the 1.60 and 1.93 of the two youngest groups). This result is consistent with 
other data cited below that suggests that performing arts audiences are becoming older.  It is 
certainly true that the “youth bias’ that was represented in Table 1 is not present in the data from 40 
years later in Table 9.   
 
 Turning to education, one’s confidence in the usefulness of the Table 9 entries is further 
reinforced by the fact that of the six educational classifications, three of them have values less than 
1.0 (suggesting that people with those levels of education are under-represented in arts audiences 
relative to their size in the overall population), and three classifications are greater than 1.0 
(indicating over-representation).   While Baumol and Bowen reported educational results also by 
gender, for both males and females two of the five earlier educational classifications had relative 
frequencies below 1.0, with three classifications greater than 1.0.  Since the 2002 classification that 
is missing from the 1960's results is the extremely low educational classification of “Grade School,” 
it is no surprise that there were three values below 1.0 in 2002 vs. only two values below 1.0 in the 
earlier data.    
 
 While the simplest conclusion would be that the 2002 results fully confirm the 1960's finding 
that higher education is absolutely critical to determining the demand for the arts and the 
composition of arts audiences, there are intriguing differences.  For example, in the 1960's the boost 
in arts audience composition (relative to the general population) that resulted from having a college 
degree rather than just having attended some college was notably greater than in the 2002 data.  That 
is, the relative frequency of male college graduates divided by the relative frequency of males with 
“some college” is 2.85 in Table 1 (i.e., 3.73/1.31), and the same ratio applicable to females is 2.39.  
The gender neutral ratio (using either measure in Table 9) of the” college” to “some college” relative 
frequency is only about 1.94 (i.e., 4.17/2.15).   A similar result applies over time when comparing 
the graduate school to the college ratios of relative frequencies.  In the 1960's this ratio from Table 1 
is 2.80 for males and 2.66 for females, but has dropped to only 1.61 by 2002 (Table 9).  Again, since 
these results are based on the relative values of the entries within both tables, it is not necessary to 
be confident about the legitimacy of comparing the absolute values of the respective entries in Table 
1 vs. Table 9 to find such results noteworthy.   This is especially the case since this result applies 
also to a comparison of the “some college”to the “high school” educational levels (a ratio of relative 
frequencies in 2002 of 2.75 vs. 4.51 for males and 4.68 for females in the earlier data), and to a 
comparison of high school to the “less than high school” educational classifications (1.53 in 2002 
compared to the very high ratios of relative frequencies of 7.25 for males and 10.60 for females in 
the 1960's).  Even the ratio in 2002 of the relative frequency for high school graduates to those with 
only a grade school education is no higher than about 3.55.    
 
 Therefore, this relative frequency evidence suggests that, while the degree of audience over-
representation relative to the general population continues to increase strongly with educational 
attainment, the intensity with which this educational over-representation varies with incremental 
improvements in education has moderated over the past 40 years in the United States.   This is 
broadly consistent with Cwi’s (1985) previously discussed view that ongoing improvements in 
income and education in the general population would make the arts appear to be somewhat less 
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elitist, even if there were no substantive changes in the basic profile of the performing arts audience.  
However, this proposition is hardly confirmed by the Table 9 evidence alone and should be viewed 
as merely suggestive pending more thorough analysis.32   
 
  In particular, the premise that a 40 year “smoothing” of relative frequency statistics across 
incremental educational levels implies some drop in the elitism of arts audiences appears to be 
inconsistent with a quite different metric derived by DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004) over the shorter 
period 1982-2002.  They derive “arts attendance odds” across differing educational levels (using the  
SPPA Table 9 statistics on the percentage of any particular demographic group that has attended any 
particular art form at least once in the past year, in contrast to the SPPA Table 8 data that were 
relevant to the derivation of the relative frequencies reported above in Table 9 herein).33  They find 
that such odds have declined between 1982 and 2002 for both college graduates as well as high 
school graduates, but that “the odds of high-school graduates participating in arts events have 
declined even more quickly than the odds of college-graduates” (citing their Figure 3). Therefore, 
they conclude that there is no support for the notion that the distribution of participation has become 
                                                          
 32 Of course, an overall improvement in real income and educational levels does not imply 
that overall societal inequality is lessening.  Considerable commentary in the United States has 
bemoaned the apparent decline in social mobility, and traditional evidence as measured by the 
Lorenz curve, would suggest that income and wealth inequality have been increasing since about 
1970 after a long period of declining inequality.   
 33 While the derivations are not described in detail, the DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004) 
“attendance odds” figures are clearly not the same thing as the relative frequencies derived above in 
Table 9.  For example, the 0.259 odds figure derived for classical music for those with four or more 
years of college in their Table 2 (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, p. 180) is the result of the following 
calculation.  Table 9 (pp. 16-17) in the 2002 SPPA reports that 21.9 percent of college graduates 
attended at least one classical music event, while 34.1 percent of those with graduate school 
educations did the same.  Since Table 8 (pp. 14-15) of the SPPA reports that there were 36.1 million 
college graduates and 17.4 million with graduate education in the U.S. in 2002 (a total of 53.5 
million), a multiplication of the percentages by those population figures yields 7.9059 million 
college graduate and 5.933 graduate school attenders of classical music.  Since this total of 13.84 
million higher education attendees constitute 25.9 percent of the 53.5 million highly educated 
population, their odds of attending at least once (recognizing the weakness of not having attendance 
frequency data) is 0.259.  These attendance odds figures can then be compared across other 
educational levels, across other art forms, and across time using reasonably comparable data from 
the earlier SPPA reports.  By contrast, the relative frequencies derived for Table 9 above use SPPA 
Table 8 not Table 9 as the core data (representing the relative age, educational and income 
composition of those who attend at least one, say, classical music performance, with those 
percentages constrained to sum to 100 percent).  Those percentages (e.g. oftlinethe 33.1 percent of 
all those attending at least one classical music concert who are in the college graduate category) are 
then compared to the SPPA Table 8 percentage of college graduates in the population (i.e. 17.5 
percent) to derive the relative frequency statistic of 1.89.  Table 9 in the text reports the results of all 
such relative frequencies across the differing performing arts forms after adjusting for overlapping 
audiences as described in the commentary before the table..       
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more equal over time (p. 183).   Furthermore, they find that this growing educational inequality in 
arts participation is particularly large for opera and ballet, although also notable in classical music 
(where college attendance rates dropped from 33.4 percent in 1982 to 25.9 percent in 2002, but 
proportionately even more for high school graduates from 7.6 percent to 4.5 percent).  While the 
Cwi hypothesis -  that changing demographics will lead to a reduction in the measured elitism of arts 
audiences -  is an important hypothesis to test, it is clear that as usual there are different statistical 
measures that can be derived for that purpose, with potentially differing implications, especially 
when the time periods being compared are not identical (see fn. 33).    
 
 Another surprising result in Table 9 is that the 2002 data reveal relative frequencies 
uniformly above 1.0 for all seven income classifications, whereas the 1960's results for the U.S. 
revealed values above 1.0 for only the two highest of the six income ranges.34  Nevertheless, both 
the 2002 and the 1960's relative frequencies uniformly rise with income, but with the over-
representation of the highest income group being 3.7 times larger than that of the second highest 
income group in the earlier data, but only about 1.64 times higher (using either calculation method) 
in the later data, a result that may be due in part to an understatement of the relative frequency of the 
highest income group in Table 9 (see fn. 34).   To the extent that this result is substantive, even after 
adjusting for any such bias in the statistic, it is consistent with the point made above about 
education, where a modestly less elitist audience composition relative to the general population is 
being observed in the most recent data compared to 40 years earlier.  Again, while this is consistent 
with Cwi’s (1985) speculation that the “general population would begin to look more like the arts 
audience and hence make the arts appear less elitist,” it can only be considered tentative in light of 
possibly conflicting evidence from other types of statistics. 
 
 While relative frequency statistics are useful in identifying arts audience characteristics 
relative to the general population, other more direct measures provide important supplemental 
information about changes in the performing arts audience over time.  An interesting feature of such 
inter-temporal comparisons is that there is much more evidence stemming from arts participation 
                                                          
 34 One plausible partial reason for this result is that the percentages of the U.S. population in 
different income classifications in the 2002 SPPA sum only to 89.5 percent (all other classifications: 
ethnicity, age, and education sum to 100 percent).  A footnote to Table 8 in the 2000 SPPA warns 
that “21.5 million adults did not report their income in the August 2002 CPS” (Current Population 
Survey, from which those data were derived).  Thus, when Table 8 reports that 7.0 percent of the 
U.S. Population has less than $10,000 in income, that percentage is derived from only those who did 
report income.  While this approach will cause no error if the non-reporting of income in the 
population survey (which is not used for any tax purposes) is uniformly distributed over all income 
classifications, it is more likely that lower income respondents comply less thoroughly to the survey 
than do the generally more educated higher income groups.  Hence, the percentage of the population 
in the lower income groups is most likely under-stated in the SPPA Table 8 data, from which the 
entries for Table 9 above are derived, while the percentages for the highest income groups are most 
likely overstated (e.g. Table 8 reports the highest income group of > $75,000 as by far the largest 
group at 22.2 percent of the total population).  If this is true, then the relative frequencies for the 
lower income groups in Table 9 should be lower and those for the highest income groups should be 
higher, hence making the 2002 findings more consistent with the 1960's results.      
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surveys as opposed to audience surveys.  For example, it was not possible to find data that would 
allow a direct comparison to Table 2 above, which showed the income and educational composition 
of the audience for the four major performing arts forms in the United States.  Those data were the 
result of the never replicated Ford Foundation (1974, Vol. II) study of twelve U.S. cities having at 
least three of those four art forms.35  Thus, even though the Ford study was based on a sample of arts 
organizations, the burden of conducting an exhaustive study of up to 48 such organizations has led 
to a shift in focus to the periodic NEA sponsored arts participation surveys that also have the merit 
of studying a sample of the entire population and not just those individuals who are already 
appearing as part of an arts audience.  A reflection of this phenomenon is that the widely cited Rand 
study of trends in the performing arts in the U.S. (McCarthy et al., 2001) presents only data tables 
and charts from the NEA’s 1982, 1992 and 1997 public participation surveys (SPPA), not from any 
audience surveys, in their chapter on “Audiences for the Performing Arts.”  However, as seen in Part 
3 below, audience surveys are a common data source for the variables incorporated into the 
econometric literature on performing arts demand.     
 
           The extensive earlier discussion of the complex role of age in arts audiences is reflective of 
the concern among arts organizations and agencies regarding how that role has been changing.  
While any modifications in the role of other dominant variables such as income and education have 
been subtle, the evidence regarding an aging arts audience that was reflected in the relative 
frequency data of Table 9 when compared to Table 1 is even clearer in light of the Peterson et al. 
(2000) study (sponsored by the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts) devoted expressly to this 
issue.36  Table 10  
combines the revealing evidence from Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.5 of that study.   
 
Table 10 
Age Group Percentage Contribution to Total U.S. Attendance: 1982 - 1997 
(S = Classical Music; O = Opera; T = Theater) 
Age S 1982 S 1992 S 1997 O 1982 O 1992 O 1997 T 1982 T 1992 T1997 
                                                          
 35 This is not to say that audience case studies for individual arts organizations are not 
prevalent.  As early as 1978, DiMaggio et al., had identified 270 such studies in their critical review 
of audience studies for the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts. As noted by Heilbrun and Gray 
(2001, pp. 41-42), while individual audience surveys are relatively easy to carry out, the 
requirements for a well-designed population survey make them relatively less frequent (and hence 
only feasible when sponsored by an agency like the NEA).  Nevertheless, the usual simplicity of an 
audience survey would not apply to the extensive undertaking of the Ford Foundation (1974).    
 36 Consistent with the earlier analysis that has shown that the role of age in performing arts 
demand has been much more complex than suspected (and not just in the U.S.), the Peterson et al. 
study was itself commissioned to address the controversy that had erupted following the findings of 
an earlier 1996 NEA Research Division Report (#34) that had found strong support for the 
proposition that U.S. arts audiences were becoming significantly older.  Among those disputing this 
finding were specific arts organizations who did not agree that their audiences were aging.  See the 
Executive Summary (p.1) of Peterson et al. 2000).      
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18-
19 
   5.4 
(+0.6)* 
  1.2 
(-1.8)* 
   1.8 
(-0.3) 
   1.0 
(-3.8)* 
  1.2 
(-1.8)* 
  1.6 
(-0.5) 
 3.7 
(-1.1)* 
 1.9 
(-1.1)* 
1.8 
(-0.3) 
20-
29 
 21.5 
(-2.5)* 
 12.9 
(-5.3)* 
 11.4 
(-4.4)* 
 16.8 
(-7.2)* 
 11.1 
(-7.1)* 
 11.7 
(-4.1)* 
 25.4 
(+1.4)* 
13.7 
(-4.5)* 
14.9 
(-0.9) 
30-
39 
 24.5 
(+3.9)* 
 18.6 
(-4.4)* 
 13.7 
(-9.2)* 
 22.4 
(+1.8)^ 
 20.3 
(-2.7) 
 17.2 
(-5.7)* 
 23.9 
(+3.3)* 
22.9 
(-0.1) 
19.6 
(-3.3)* 
40-
49 
 17.7 
(+2.8)* 
 21.4 
(+2.9)* 
 23.3 
(+1.7)* 
 22.9 
(8.0)* 
 23.1 
(+4.6)* 
 27.5 
(+5.9)* 
 17.9 
(+3.0)* 
21.7 
(+3.2)* 
23.8 
(+2.2)* 
50-
59 
15.4 
(+1.0)* 
 16.9 
(+3.8)* 
 19.5 
(+4.9)* 
 20.2 
(+5.8)* 
 18.7 
(+5.6)* 
 18.4 
(+3.8)* 
 13.7 
(-0.7) 
16.6 
(+3.5)* 
17.2 
(+2.6)* 
60-
69 
  8.5 
(-3.1)* 
 15.5 
(+3.7)* 
 14.5 
(+3.8)* 
  5.9 
 (-5.7)* 
 17.1 
(+5.3)* 
 11.7 
(+1.0) 
 9.8 
(-1.8)* 
15.2 
(+3.4)* 
11.3 
(+0.6) 
70 +   7.1 
(-2.5)* 
 13.4 
(+1.0)^ 
 15.8 
(+3.4)* 
 10.7 
(+1.1) 
  8.6 
(-3.8)* 
 11.8 
(-0.6) 
 5.7 
(-3.9)* 
7.9 
(-4.5)* 
11.5 
(-0.9)^ 
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Peterson et al. (2000), Age and Arts Participation: 1982-1997, Research Division Report 
#42, National Endowment for the Arts, Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.5.  Entries are the percentage 
contribution of each age group to the total attendances for each art form, summing to 100 percent in 
each case.  Values in parentheses represent the difference of the observed percentage contribution to 
attendance compared to the “expected” contribution based on the percentage that group represents in 
the total sample. * indicates statistically significant at p<.01; ^ indicates statistically significant at 
p<.05.  The underlying data are from the 1982, 1992 and 1997 Surveys of Public Participation in the 
Arts, SPPA, from the National Endowment for the Arts. 
 
          While Table 9 provided evidence intended to make some cautious comparisons with data 
regarding the roles of age, education and income in the arts from 40 years earlier, Table 10 provides 
more directly comparable data regarding the role of age over a more limited 15 year period.   The 
parenthetical values for each entry report the difference between what would have been the expected 
attendance contribution of that age group based on its size in the population compared to the reality 
(so that e.g. those aged 40-49 constitute a 5.9 percent larger component of the opera audience in 
1997 compared to their size in the sample population). Thus, Peterson et al. (2000) construct 
information that is in the same spirit as the relative frequency statistics that are reported in Tables 1 
and 9, and which adjust for the fact that the overall population in the U.S. is becoming older.  
Furthermore, for nearly all of these differences between the expected and actual percentages, the 
statistical likelihood of their occurring merely by chance is very low.   
 
         The results reported in Table 10 do not tell a uniformly consistent story.  For example, despite 
a general trend toward older audiences across all three art forms, those 60-69 rose significantly as a 
percentage of all three arts audiences between 1982 and 1992, but then fell somewhat in 1997 (while 
remaining higher than in 1982).  Also, those aged 20-29 fell over the entire 15 period in all cases, 
 43
but recovered modestly between 1992 and 1997 for opera and theater, while the youngest group of 
18-19 year olds actually increased modestly as a percentage of opera audiences over the entire 
period (while, however, consistently representing a lower percentage than would have been 
predicted by their percentage of the population).   
 
  However, the most compelling message of these data is consistent. Over this 15 year period 
in the U.S., those 18-29 fell as a percentage of classical music audiences from 26.9 to 13.2; fell as a 
percentage of opera audiences from 17.8 to 13.3; and fell as a percentage of theater audiences from 
29.2 to 16.3.  Meanwhile, the combined age groups 50 and above rose from 31 percent to 49.8 
percent of classical music audiences; from 36.8 percent to 41.9 percent of opera audiences; and from 
29.2 percent to 40.0 percent of theater audiences.  While it might be unexpected that this age 
composition shift was least evidenced in the case of opera, it would be surprising if performing arts 
managers were not able to detect this overall aging of their audiences, as some had argued.  One 
other feature of this evidence is worth noting.  In contrast to the relative frequencies for those aged 
20-34 in the mid-1960's (from Table 1), which indicated that they were over-represented in arts 
audiences relative to the general population, by as early as 1982, the 20-29 year old group was 
notably under-represented in classical music and opera audiences, and only slightly over-represented 
in theater audiences relative to their size in the population.  However, the 30-39 age group started 
the 15 year comparative period by being over-represented in all art forms (with parenthetical values 
ranging from 3.9 to 1.8), but ended the period in 1997 being substantially under-represented in all art 
forms (with negative parenthetical values of -9.2, -5.7 and -3.3, with the turnaround especially 
dramatic in the case of classical music).   
 
  DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004) make similar observations regarding the comparison of age 
related participation patterns over the slightly longer 1982 to 2002 period, incorporating the latest 
2002 SPPA data not available to Peterson et al. (2000).  They conclude that results vary considerably 
across art forms, with classical music suffering especially high drops in attendance rates among the 
younger cohorts, in contrast to the large increase in attendance among those older than 47 
(especially from 1982 to 1992, with only a slight drop from 1992 to 2002).  They also conclude that 
over the 20 year period, “similar but less consistent trends are visible for ballet and opera” as well as 
stage plays and musical theater productions - with participation in these performing arts forms 
remaining stable or growing among most of the older age groups while dropping among younger 
audiences (DiMaggio and Mukhtar, 2004, p. 177). 
 
  Extending the spirit of the Cwi hypothesis, one prime motivation for the interest in any 
demographic changes in arts audiences has always been the hope among arts supporters that 
economic and social changes would overcome limited audience appeal and usher in an arts boom 
that could overcome any fundamental structural problems plaguing the performing arts.37  Reflecting 
this focus on a possible arts boom,  Baumol and Bowen (1966) has been characterized as “carefully 
deflat[ing] the notion that the U.S. was then undergoing a cultural boom” (Heilbrun, 1984, p. 34).  
Evidence of an arts boom has focused on two primary dimensions: (1) related to the discussion just 
completed, has there been any improvement in the accessibility of the arts to a broader segment of 
                                                          
 37 The focus of the following discussion is on U.S. data, but for an application to Germany, 
see Kirchberg (1999).   
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the population consistent with the long standing goal of expanding audiences beyond narrow elites? 
and (2) regardless of the underlying cause, be it demand shifts or supply shifts, audience deepening 
or audience broadening, are the performing arts actually growing along with their “host” economies?  
 
  As is not uncommon with seemingly simple questions, the competing standards of 
measurement, conflicting evidence over differing time periods and across different units of analysis, 
and differential international trends can easily prompt the observation, even within one country, that 
“the trend of arts activity...is complex and not easily summarized” (Heilbrun and Gray, 2001, p. 38).   
This is dramatized in the conflicting conclusions reached by two prominent cultural economists in 
literally back-to-back papers published in the same issue of the same journal (Journal of Cultural 
Economics 20, 1996).  Revisiting the “perennial criticism” (p. 269) of the arts that they are perceived 
as elitist, O’Hagan (1996) concludes that the picture of arts participation patterns has changed little 
“in any country in the last forty years,”and that based on his more detailed examination of arts 
participation data for the early to mid-1990's from three countries (Ireland, Great Britain, and the 
United States), “arts bodies are just ‘going through the motions’ of emphasizing the importance of 
access for all to the consumption of the high arts”(p. 276)  By contrast, Heilbrun (1996), after 
reiterating that the geographical distribution of performing artists in the United States had become 
much more concentrated between 1970 and 1980, found sufficiently dramatic improvements in the 
accessibility of the arts to the general population between 1980 and 1990 in order to conclude that 
“the arts... are becoming less and less ‘elitist’” (p. 295).    
 
   In this particular case, these conflicting conclusions are primarily the result of a focus on 
two different, although related, aspects of the problem.  O’Hagan finds no direct evidence of any 
lessening of the elitism of arts audiences based on attendance rates as a function of education and 
income (noting in fact that even with zero admission charges, as in many museums and national 
galleries, “the socioeconomic composition of attenders is often just as if not more skewed as for 
other high art forms,” p. 277).  Heilbrun takes comfort in the evidence that, at least in the United 
States, the supply of artists (including visual as well as performing artists) per 10,000 population 
increased substantially in most states, and that despite ongoing “enormous” interstate variations in 
that ratio, the Hoover index of the concentration of arts activity across states registered a decline 
between 1980 and 1990.38   An extension of Heilbrun’s results would emphasize either: (1) the role 
that an exogenous shift in the supply of artists could have on the quantity demanded for the arts as 
the full price falls with enhanced quantity, quality and availability, or (2) the increase in the quantity 
supplied of artists to different regions of the country as a result of an exogenous increase in demand 
for the arts outside of the customarily highly educated, high income, metro population centers.   
 
  Since his empirical analysis is not an econometric estimation of structural demand and 
supply functions, Heilbrun (1996) cannot distinguish between those two potential explanations.  
However, in an earlier search for evidence of an arts boom in the United States, Heilbrun (1984) had 
directly addressed the issue of which side of the performing arts market was primarily driving trends 
                                                          
 38 The ratio of artists to population, unsurprisingly, was strongly higher in states with 
especially large metro areas, but was only inconsistently positively related to income per capita and 
education, and actually negatively affected by “percent of high income population” (Heilbrun, 1996, 
Table VI, p. 293).  
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in overall economic activity.   Assessing whether the increase in the ratio of admission spending for 
the performing arts relative to personal disposable income from 1975 to 1982 was indicative of a 
long awaited arts boom, his analysis suggested that “the surge in supply was not only a response to 
increased demand...[but] was also stimulated by a vast increase in public subsidies which made it 
possible to open up previously untapped markets” so that the rise in relative spending after 1975 
reflects in part the “discontinuous process by which supply has been expanded.”39  Interestingly, the 
Heilbrun (1996) regression results also show consistently positive effects of “state aid per capita” in 
determining the ratio of artists per 10,000 population, although the effect is only statistically 
significant for the performing arts in 1990. Thus, both of the Heilbrun analyses are broadly 
consistent with a supply driven explanation to changes in access to the performing arts. 
 
  While supply factors have not been stressed in empirical studies of arts demand,40 Heilbrun 
is not alone in drawing attention to the role played by the availability of artists and arts facilities in 
influencing arts participation behavior. Khakee and Nilsson (1980) share Heilbrun’s emphasis on the 
role of government subsidies in attempting to make music and theater more geographically 
accessible in Sweden, and stress that the availability of arts facilities cannot be ignored as a key 
factor (along with income, education, available time etc.) in limiting attendance and creating the 
potentially false impression that demand for the arts is low.  In the same publication, Gold (1980) 
stresses that a full assessment of whether demand for the performing arts is low in the United States 
cannot be made without addressing the “absence of opportunity in some communities and the 
extremely limited supply in others,” and warns that even if a major effort were made to increase the 
availability of the arts “significant supply difficulties and bottlenecks would thwart that objective” 
(p.156).    
 
  It might be casually argued that if demand were sufficiently strong, such supply bottlenecks 
and limited facilities would not be observed.  However, the well-known cost structures of the live 
performing arts that require relatively large populations to generate sufficient minimum threshold 
audience sizes and the “indivisibilities” that characterize expanding venue capacity, remind us that 
expanding performing arts supply is not as easy as expanding or contracting the quantity of shirts or 
                                                          
 39 He further draws various interesting parallels to spectator sports and the process by which 
expansion of the number of teams in professional leagues (caused by factors including lower travel 
costs as well as stadium capacity construction issues, not to mention political considerations) can 
cause jumps in spending relative to disposable income that would otherwise seem enigmatic.  Note 
that while Heilbrun (1984) focused on the aggregate increase in performing arts spending relative to 
income that began in 1975, his observation in Heilbrun (1996) that access to the arts declined in the 
1970-1980 period was based on the more concentrated and less dispersed geographic patterns of arts 
activity.     
 40  Many of the formal econometric demand studies recognize the issue of whether single 
equation estimation is acceptable in contrast to requiring systems of simultaneous equations to 
capture the interdependencies of not only supply and demand, but also other possible 
interdependencies linked to government subsidies and other variables.  In general, as discussed in 
section 3.2.1, the treatment of supply and demand decisions as recursive rather than simultaneous 
(hence justifying single equation estimation) has dominated.    
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dinner rolls produced as a function of changing demands.  In fact, the Heilbrun (1984) analogy to 
sports facilities in evaluating “lumpy” supply responses in the arts is consistent with sophisticated 
econometric work regarding sports in Flanders done by Késenne and Butzen (1987), who find 
evidence (among many other results) that the supply of sports facilities (especially for volleyball) is 
a significant determinant of sports participation in that part of Belgium.   Blaug (2001) perhaps 
summarizes this issue best when he asks whether there is a supplier induced demand for the visual 
and performing arts, and observes that once we characterize artistic goods as experience goods, “it is 
doubtful whether we can actually identify demand for the arts separately from the supply of the arts - 
and vice versa” (p. 127).   His conclusion that this dynamic interlinking has “not so far been 
successfully tackled, or even squarely faced in cultural economics” may be too pessimistic, but his 
listing of this issue as a key agenda item for future research is indisputable (Blaug, 2001, p. 127).     
 
  Regardless of which forces are driving the results, the 2002 SPPA (NEA, 2004) that served 
as the key data source for much of the previous complex analysis of changes over time in audience 
composition also provides simpler documentation of changes in the audience size in the United 
States.  Simply stated, while all four primary performing arts forms experienced some increase in 
“millions of adults attending” from 1982 to 2002 (with compound annual growth rates of 0.56 
percent for classical music, 0.74 percent for ballet, 1.29 percent for non-musical plays, and 1.93 
percent for opera), the percentage of adults attending at least once actually dropped for classical 
music (from 13.0 percent to 11.6) and for ballet (from 4.2 to 3.9 percent), although increasing 
modestly for opera (from 3.0 to 3.2 percent) and for non-musical plays (from 11.9 to 12.3 percent).41  
 
  In contrast to these 20 year comparisons, the average frequency of attendance between 1992 
and 2002 is reported in the 2002 SPPA (Table 7, p. 13), and reveals that the “average number of 
attendances per attender” actually rose for classical music (from 2.6 to 3.1), which allowed the 10 
year compound annual growth rate in total attendance to be a relatively healthy 1.9 percent (in 
contrast to the anemic 0.56 percent growth rate in millions of adults attending without reference to 
frequency between 1982 and 2002, as cited above; that comparable growth rate between 1992 and 
2002 is even lower, at 0.26 percent).  Comparable average frequency of attendance figures for the 
other art forms between 1992 and 2002 are: opera rose from 1.7 to 2.0, with ballet remaining stable 
at 1.7, and non-musical plays falling very slightly from 2.4 to 2.3.   The combined effect, therefore, 
of changes in the number of adults attending along with the frequency of attendance is to generate a 
10 year compound growth rates in overall attendance of 2.5 percent for opera, consistent with earlier 
                                                          
 41 Compound annual growth rates are derived from the raw data in Table 1 (NEA, 2004, p. 
2), with the percentages of attending at least reported directly from the table.  Somewhat surprising 
is the decline in the percentage of those attending musical plays (from 18.6 to 17.1 percent, with a 
very modest compound annual growth rate of only 0.70 percent). The most notable increases in 
percent of those attending was registered by art museums and galleries (rising from 22.1 percent of 
adults in 1982 to 26.5 percent by 2002).  Jazz music “exposure” rose modestly from 9.6 percent to 
10.8 percent (with a 1.75 percent compound annual growth rate).  One indication of the challenge 
facing the performing arts, at least in the United States, is that even arts fairs and festivals as well as 
“parks/historic buildings/neighborhoods” had basic exposure rates drop over the 20 year period 
(from 39.0 to 33.4 percent for the former, and from 37.0 to 31.6 percent for the latter).  See SPPA 
2002 Table 1.    
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evidence that opera has been faring better than the other art forms.  Total number of attendances 
actually fell for ballet at a rate of 0.92 per year, with non-musical plays experiencing a less dramatic 
decline in total attendance at the annual rate of only 0.25 over this recent ten year period.    While 
their focus on the somewhat more obscure issue of the arts as a form of cultural capital (see fn. 20 
above) allowed DiMaggio and Mukhtar (2004) to conclude that the role of the arts in that context 
was declining more slowly than feared, the simpler basic time series evidence regarding percent of 
adults exposed to the arts, millions of adults attending, and overall total attendances certainly 
justifies their related conclusion that “some forms of arts activity are losing patronage in the face of 
competitive pressure (pp. 191-192).42    
 
      Cultural economists have long stressed the role that growing income and the ability to increase 
admission prices would have to play if the performing arts are to overcome such competitive forces, 
as well as the structural challenge of the famous unbalanced growth hypothesis (Baumol and Bowen 
(1966).43  For example, Brooks (1997, p. 198) identifies increasing the number of consumers, 
increasing tastes for the arts, and growing consumer incomes as the three basic ways to expand the 
demand for the arts, but cautions that the last of these depends critically on the income elasticity of  
demand, which he suspects is somewhere above unity given the arts’ clear status as a “luxury” 
instead of a “necessity” (at least if one ignores the complex role played by a higher opportunity cost 
of time linked to higher incomes).  Towse (1993) takes comfort in the fact that, despite price 
increases for major opera houses in the United Kingdom between 1985 and 1990 of between 50 and 
105 percent (while the retail price index rose by only 28 percent), both the number of performances 
and seats sold still increased (by 12 and 19 percent respectively), suggesting a very low price 
elasticity of demand (Towse, Tables 9 and 10).   The determination of price, income and other 
critical demand elasticities requires more systematic econometric estimation than is revealed by the 
data analysis above.  The next section examines such elasticity and other evidence regarding demand 
determinants from the econometric literature.      
 
3.  Technical Issues in Arts Demand Studies 
 
  The complex variety of econometric demand estimation results are described and evaluated 
by first providing an overview of the studies deriving own price and income elasticities (including 
an extended discussion of ambiguities in the price elasticity results), and then providing a more 
                                                          
 42 Based on somewhat more sanguine trends between 1992 and 1997 in the United States 
data, McCarthy et al. (2001) were cautiously optimistic about the health of the live performing arts, 
although warning that changes in the SPPA survey procedures and a much higher sample refusal rate 
in 1997 cast doubt on any evidence of increasing arts attendance (pp. 28-29).  They do provide good 
documentation, however, of the dramatic increase in arts participation through the media relative to 
live performances between 1992 and 1997, and more ambiguously between 1982 and 1992 (p. 31).  
 43 Cowen is an exception inasmuch as his optimism regarding this fundamental problem is 
not based primarily on demand side factors linked to economy–wide growth and the allegedly low 
price elasticity of demand for the arts, but instead on his direct challenge to the very notion that the 
performing arts are especially labor intensive or incapable of dramatic technical innovations in 
production and distribution.  See e.g., Cowen (1996) and Cowen and Tabarrok (2000).  
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detailed analysis of selected particular studies, including those generating important findings beyond 
own price and income elasticities.  That analysis is provided primarily by addressing five particular 
challenges in estimating the demand for the arts (3.2 and its subsections).     
 
3.1  An Overview of Estimation Techniques and Results: Price and Income Elasticities 
 
      Since 1966 there have been 44 econometric studies of the demand for (or consumer 
participation in) the performing arts (including Andreasen and Belk, 1980, which is not entirely 
regression based).  Not included in that number are highly specialized marketing forecasting models 
(e.g. the Putler and Lele, 2003, model applied to a university theater company), inspired by 
Weinberg and Shachmut (1978) and Weinberg (1986), whose “ARTS PLAN” model was originally 
designed to predict attendance at a university performing arts series as a function of type of event 
(e.g. popular dance; jazz), season of the year (e.g. spring versus winter), and other variables such as 
promotional spending.44  Also omitted from the 44 studies are several manuscripts tangentially 
dealing with performing arts demand presented at a conference in the summer of 2005, except for 
Montgomery and Robinson (2005), which has particular relevance to the issue of the product market 
for the performing arts and whether the arts and sports are complements or substitutes.      
 
  Of the 44 studies, 29 make an effort to either directly derive or indirectly impute own price 
and/or income elasticities of demand for the performing arts in general, or for specific art forms or 
even individual arts organizations.  A few of these studies also included specific numerical estimates 
of other demand elasticities: cross price (Withers, 1980; Throsby and Withers, 1979; Touchstone, 
1980; Gapinski, 1986; Bonato et al., 1990), leisure price (Withers, 1980; Throsby and Withers, 
1979), donor price (Luksetich and Lange, 1984), tourism attendance (Gapinski, 1988), education 
(Globerman and Book, 1977; Gapinski, 1981), advertising (Luksetich and Lange, 1995), “number of 
shows” (Moore, 1966), and even “unpopularity of conductor” (Greckel and Felton, 1987).  Other 
studies derived coefficient estimates that were not translatable into elasticities, and/or evaluated a 
large number of additional independent variables, many of which lacked either economic or 
statistical significance.    
         
  While rarely the key focus, some measure of the quality of either performances or of the arts 
organization was expressly incorporated into the regression analysis by Throsby (1990; a reprint of a 
paper originally published in the proceedings of a 1982 conference, itself an extension of work 
begun in 1980);  Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987); Greckel and Felton (1987); Felton (1989); 
Dobson and West (1989); Abbé-Decarroux (1994); Krebs and Pommerehne (1995); Luksetich and 
Lange (1995); Corning and Levy (2002); and Urrutiaguer (2002).45  The Abbé-Decarroux and Grin 
                                                          
 44 Hjorth-Andersen (1992) discusses the “demand structure” in a “case study” of the 
Copenhagen theater market (including two major and several smaller theaters). But more space is 
devoted to the cost structure, and only a forecasting equation is reported that links total sales to 
subscription sales in an effort to access the importance of theater reviews.  While that particular 
result is discussed in section 3.2.5, it is not really an econometric demand study. . 
 45  Sometimes these proxies are no more detailed than “program mix” (Jenkins and Austen-
Smith, 1987), or “performance night” and “type of play” (Dobson and West, 1989). The listing in 
the text does not include Kelejian and Lawrence (1980), who suggested a measure of  “high brow vs. 
 49
(1992) examination of the role of risk in arts attendance behavior is really another exploration of the 
role of quality perceptions in arts demand.  Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) identify seven 
“price and quality” variables in their large database, although none of those variables actually 
address the actual or perceived quality of an arts performance or organization, and are dominated 
instead by perceptions of price or cost (unless “parking” is considered a quality variable).  However, 
they confirm the key role played by early arts exposure inasmuch as they explore the process of 
learning by consuming in the development of subjective perceptions of quality.  Quality also played 
an important role in the empirical analysis of feature movies and Broadway plays by Hirschman and 
Pieros (1985), in the descriptive study of genre selection and audience segmentation by Levental 
(1989), and in Huntington, where price was theoretically explored as a proxy for quality (1991).  
Cameron (1996) addresses the general issue of critics as arbiters of quality in the cultural sector (see 
also Levy, 1988), and Tobias (2004) examines quality from the supply perspective, finding through 
regression analysis that aggregated expert opinion is considerably more closely linked to production 
expenses, mean artistic fees, number of new productions and other organization specific factors in 
ballet and opera than in theater.46     
 
    Basic linear ordinary least squares (OLS), especially using the double-log form, was the most 
popular primary estimation technique (used in 18 studies), but other related techniques such as step-
wise OLS (Globerman and Book, 1977; Greckel and Felton 1987; Andreasen and Belk, 1980), 
double-log weighted OLS  (Felton,1992), two-stage least squares, 2SLS (Moore, 1966; Lukestich 
and Lange, 1984, 1995; Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987), as well as conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation (Corning and Levy, 2002), the almost ideal demand system (Pommerehne and 
Kirchgassner, 1987), Clawson-Knetsch distance modeling (Forrest et al., 2000), non-parametric 
linear regression (Schimmelpfennig, 1997), and logit, tobit, or probit non-parametric estimation 
(eight studies) have been used.47  One study (Moore, 1966) reported comparative elasticity estimates 
using six different econometric models.  Many studies have embedded within them a variety of 
techniques designed to correct for the troublesome biases that can plague econometric parameter 
estimation, or that are necessary steps in employing the primary methodology (e.g., maximum 
likelihood estimation).      
 
    Of the 44 econometric studies, 22 rely upon U.S. data (see fn. 6).  Approximately two-thirds of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
low brow” theater performances, but were unable to include it in their reported preliminary 
regression results.  Of those listed, Throsby (1990) and Urrutiaguer (2002) provide by far the most 
thorough treatments (see 3.2.5 below).  
 46 Of these last five citations, only Huntington (1991) is considered in the count of 44 
econometric studies, since the others are not primarily regression based, not focused on demand, or 
because they emphasize primarily the media arts.    
 47 This choice of approaches is in no way at odds with standard practice in empirical 
economics.  DiNardo and Tobias (2001) begin their overview of nonparametric techniques by 
observing: “Even a cursory look at the empirical literature in most fields of economics reveals that a 
majority of applications use simple parametric approaches such as ordinary least squares or two-
stage least squares accompanied by simple descriptive statistics” (p. 11).  
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all studies report time-series results (including some pooling of time series and cross-section data), 
but since a few of those studies also include separate cross-section analysis (Moore, 1966; 
Goudriaan and de Kam, 1983; Luksetich and Lange, 1995) about 42 percent of all studies involve 
cross-section estimation.  Only eight demand studies constitute essentially a case study of one or two 
specific arts firms, with the rest involving some degree of aggregation among many organizations, 
with seven reporting results for some version of the aggregate “performing arts” (although three of 
these also report less aggregated results for separate art forms: Houthakker and Taylor, 1970; 
Throsby and Withers, 1979; Pommerehne and Kirchgassner, 1987).  The most popular separate art 
form aggregation is theater (including a few studies of the for-profit Broadway theater), identified in 
20 studies, followed by symphony orchestras, which were the primary or secondary focus of 16 
studies.  Separate results were reported for aggregated opera companies eight times and for 
dance/ballet companies seven times.   
 
    The most popular dependent variable definitions were attendance normalized by some version 
of population, or a non-normalized measure of attendance or tickets sold per time period (at times 
defined as subscription tickets or single tickets rather than all tickets), both appearing in about one-
third of all studies.  It is generally recognized that these available measures are far from perfect 
proxies for arts consumption, especially in a more general utility maximizing model with consumers 
combining market inputs with time to produce arts “appreciation” (e.g. Globerman and Book, 1977; 
Throsby and Withers, 1979; Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987; Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 
2003).  Even where the focus is on the seemingly more measurable “cultural experiences,” the only 
plausible proxy is some version of observed attendance (e.g., Gapinski, 1980; Luksetich and Lange, 
1995).  As noted above, eight studies used either logit or probit techniques and defined the 
dependent variable in probabilistic terms, while the few remaining studies used a variety of 
dependent variable definitions such as expenditure shares for given art forms (Pommerehne and 
Kirchgassner, 1987), percent of the total of 10 types of live entertainment events that were attended 
in each of those 10 categories (Montgomery and Robinson, 2005; this dependent variable 
supplements a more traditional variable defined as “log of times a type of event was attended plus 
1”), attendance per performance (Abbé-Decarroux 1994; Urrutiaguer, 2002), and  frequency of 
attendance normalized by adult family size (Goudriaan and de Kam, 1983, cross-section model).  A 
variation of an attendance per capita dependent variable is the “visitor rate,” defined as the number 
of people attending from a particular geographic zone in a given week divided by the total 
population in that zone, used by Forrest et al. (2000), applicable to their use of a Clawson and 
Knetsch (1966) travel cost model.  
 
    Due to the important role played by the concepts of own price and income elasticity of demand 
in economic analysis generally and in discussions of the demand for the arts in particular (i.e., are 
the arts luxury goods; is their demand price inelastic?), Table 11 more fully documents the 29 
studies that have reported either own price or income elasticities, or both (including those with 
results that lacked statistical significance).  Note that the table omits any regression study that does 
not derive elasticities, even if it includes income and/or price as variables (e.g. Peterson et al., 2000, 
which focuses on age and provides important results on income vs education, although having no 
price data and not deriving any elasticities).  The sources of the data are identified (including to 
which country they apply), clarifying whether the studies were cross-section or time-series, and 
describing in basic terms the estimation methods that were utilized.  While some of the studies apply 
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to the performing arts in the aggregate, those that estimate different elasticities for specific art forms 
are designated using simple letters for the art forms (as shown in the heading of the table).  Those 
applying to individual arts organizations are also identified.  
 
    The more detailed discussion of the studies identified in Table 11 is organized around the 
issues identified in the sub-sections of Part 3.2 or in 3.3, or are highlighted in the evaluation of the 
results in the concluding evaluation.  Some of the studies that did not include specific price or 
income elasticities (and hence are omitted from Table 11) are also highlighted in those sections (e.g., 
Abbé-Decarroux and Grin, 1992, examining the role of risk; DiMaggio and Ostrower,1990, focusing 
on black and white race differentials; and Lewis and Seaman, 2004, examining the rarely studied 
issues of sexual orientation as well as religious affiliation).  Eight other studies receive relatively 
more attention: Moore (1966); Houthakker and Taylor (1970); Withers (1980); Gapinski (1986); 
Throsby (1990); Felton (1992); Luksetich and Lange (1995), Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 
(1996) and Urrutiaguer (2002).  Also, Schimmelpfennig’s (1997) examination of the role of price 
variations across seating sections within a performance hall in correctly assessing the price elasticity 
of arts demand, as well as the Forrest et al. (2000) analysis of the role of distance traveled in 
estimating that elasticity are especially noteworthy.  Similarly, Globerman and Book (1977) is an 
early underappreciated contribution, and their effort to explicitly apply household production theory 
to the role of education in arts demand has not really been replicated.48  Jenkins and Austen-Smith 
(1987) is among a small group of studies using simultaneous equation estimation techniques, and 
makes especially useful observations consistent with Moore (1966) about the relative merits of using 
OLS versus 2SLS techniques.  While primarily a survey study that also uses univariate correlation 
analysis, Andreasen and Belk (1980) generated limited but provocative regression results regarding 
life-style versus socioeconomic variables that are detailed in section 3.3.  The broader analysis 
follows Table 11 and some additional summary descriptions of the findings of those studies 
identified in the table.       
                                                          
 48 While certainly not stressing this variable (and not suggesting any possible link to sexual 
orientation), Globerman and Book (1977) is also rare in noting the positive effect that “being male 
and unmarried” has on the frequency of attendance at music and opera performances, cet. par. (p. 
25).  See 3.3 below. 
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  A review of Table 11 confirms that, despite the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette suspicion 
that the arts really are luxury goods with own price elastic demands (2003, p. 211), this view indeed 
has not yet been justified by the econometric evidence.49    Regarding estimates of the own price 
elasticity of demand, 12 studies found that the demand for the arts is price inelastic (a result 
consistent with the theoretical expectations of Throsby and Withers, although with some caveats, 
1979, pp. 28-29; and Throsby, 1994, pp. 7-8), while only four found strong evidence of price elastic 
demand.  Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) reported low short run but high long run price elasticity.  
However, five other studies found mixed results for the price elasticity of demand, especially when 
data allowed a more  
 
Table 11 
Summary of Performing Arts Own Price and Income Elasticity Estimates: Sorted by Year 
(T: Theater; M: Music/Symphony; O: Opera; D: Dance; B: Ballet) 
                                                          
 49 Their own technically sophisticated study (1996) did, however, find evidence for higher 
own price elasticities of demand, especially among more experienced theater-goers in France (a result 
seemingly inconsistent with other studies; see below).  Regarding income, while their large database 
with 58 independent variables did not include a direct measure of income and hence did not explicitly 
derive an income elasticity, their strong positive results for proxies such as auto and microcomputer 
ownership were interpreted as evidence for the arts as luxury goods.    
Study Data Methods/Techniques   Price  Income  
Moore 1966 
(see also 
Moore,1968) 
 
 
(1) 1928-1963 Broadway 
aggregate time series; 
various sources of 
published data, e.g. Variety 
(2) April 1962 cross-
section of  7 theaters and 
18 performances via author 
conducted survey 
Naive linear 
2SLS linear 
Naive multiplicative 
2SLS multiplicative 
2SLS multiplicative  
(income constrained) 
2SLS Semi-Log 
-0.48 
-0.53 
-0.46 
-0.56 
 
-0.63 
-0.33 
0.35 
0.36 
0.36 
0.37 
 
1.03* 
0.43 
*cross-sect 
Houthakker 
& Taylor 
1970 
1929-1964 ;Theater, opera 
(and non-profit performing 
arts), U.S.; time series  
  
Single equation OLS 
 
Short run 
“relative” 
price - 0.18 
Long run  
- 0.31 
Short run 
0.74; Long 
run 1.26 
Expend. 
elasticities 
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Globerman & 
Book 1977 
Audience surveys of 100 
arts performances in 
Ontario Canada, 12/15/73- 
03/15/74 
Step-wise OLS None T: 0.76 
D: 0.76 
M: 0.92 
O: 1.07 
Withers 
1980; 
Throsby & 
Withers 1979 
U.S. 1929-1973 aggregate 
across all performing arts; 
attendance data derived 
from admissions spending  
Survey Current Business 
Conventional (CV) 
Double-log OLS:   
Time Allocation (TA) 
Double-log OLS:     
- 0.90 to 
 - 1.19 
 
- 0.62 to 
- 0.67 
0.64 to 1.55
 
1.43 to 2.78
  
Throsby & 
Withers 1979 
Australia 1964 - 1974,  7 
major companies: 
aggregated & segmented 
by art form. Data as 
provided to IAC Inquiry 
Same approach as 
Withers 1980 with 
USA data 
 
CV: 
-0.62 to       
- 1.00 
TA: 
-0.61 to 
-1.17 
No 
significant 
effect in 
either CV 
or TA 
models 
Touchstone 
1980 
Ford Foundation survey 
data (1965-66 and 1973-
74) and other U.S. time 
series  
OLS with dummy 
variables for arts 
organization types; 
grouped by art form 
and size 
(imputed) 
T: -0.11 
O: -0.10 
M:-0.13 
B:- 0.09 
None; 
income 
effects 
strongest 
for O and B
Gapinski 
1981 
Ford Foundation U.S. data 
for large orchestras 1966-
1974 time series 
Kendall/Spearman 
correlation statistics 
plus OLS joint 
regression income, 
education  
None  
 
0.36 
Goudriaan & 
de Kam 1983 
Dutch cross-section survey 
for 1979 and time series for 
1948-1975 for music and 
theater events receiving 
government support 
OLS linear for cross-
section; Double-log 
OLS for time-series; 
two separate 
equations. 
 
 
None T: 0.38 
T: 0.10  
(with 
educat and 
age)  
M: 1.02 
M: 0.48 
(ed; age)  
Gapinski 
1984 
Royal Shakespeare Co.  
1965-66 to 1980-81; 
Aldwych & Stratford 
theaters Arts Council data 
Double-log OLS on 30 
observations of pooled 
data for the 2  
theaters 
- 0.66 
 
1.33 
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Lange & 
Luksetich 
1984 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1970 U.S. cross-section of 
28 Major, 59 Metropolitan 
and 41 Urban /Community 
Orchestras. ASOL survey 
of member (American 
Symphony Orchestra 
League) 
 
 
 
Both OLS and 2SLS 
equations run with and 
without a “donation 
price.”  Elasticities 
reported next column 
are w/o donor price. 
With donor price, all 
price elasticities drop 
slightly; and no stat 
significance for Major.
Overall 
- 0.49 
Major: 
- 0.39 
Metro: 
- 1.26 
Community 
- 1.37 (not 
significant) 
 
None 
Gapinski 
1986 
13 London companies (2 
theater, 2 opera, 4 
orchestras, 5 dance) 1971-
72 to1982-83. Arts Council 
of G.B. & annual reports 
London Orchestral Concert 
Board 
Singe equation with 
modified 2-step 
regression to variably 
correct for 
autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity 
across organizations  
T:  - 0.07 
O: - 0.18 
M: - 0.27 
D: - 0.29 
 
 
T:  0.06 
O:  0.09 
M: 0.27 
D:  0.26 
Pommerehne 
& 
Kirchgassner 
1987 
German household 
spending 1964-1984; 
focused on cinema, theater 
and a composite “all 
other.” German Federal 
Statistical Office 
“Almost-ideal-
demand-system” to 
derive spending 
equations; rationality 
restrictions. Derived 
for 1964, 1974,1984 
and average and high 
income consumers 
T: - 1.65  
3 yr avg. 
average 
income 
T: - 1.22 
3 yr avg. 
high income 
 
T: 2.44 
3 yr avg. 
average 
income 
T: 1.50 
3 yr avg 
high inc. 
Low stat 
significanc
e 
Jenkins & 
Austen-
Smith 1987 
Panel of 35 repertory 
theaters for years 1977-78 
to 1980-81 receiving grants 
from the Arts Council of 
Great Britain 
Simultaneous system 
model w. 5 equations 
including theater 
supply, donor grants 
and demand; double-
log 2SLS and OLS  
+ 1.1 to  
+ 2.5, stat.  
sig. at .05, 
(possible 
quality 
proxy or 
poor price 
data) 
0.264 to 
0.541 but 
not stat. 
sig. 
(education 
also in 
eqns.) 
Greckel & 
Felton 1987 
Time-series (mid 1970's - 
80's) for Louisville 
Orchestra (LO) and 
Louisville Bach Society 
(LBS); data from 
organizations  
 
Double-log linear and 
non-linear equations  
for each organization; 
step-wise regression to 
identify key variables, 
including conductor 
popularity 
LO: 
- 0.336 to   
- 0.46 
(not sig) 
LBS: 
- 2.33 
(not sig) 
LO: 
2.658 (not 
sig) to 
6.134 
LBS: 
2.26  
(not sig) 
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Felton 1989 13 U.S. opera companies 
over 7 or 8 seasons (1979-
1986) divided into 3 budget 
groups; with subscriber vs. 
single ticket attendance 
separated; Data from some 
companies +  Opera 
America 
Double-log single-
equation OLS. 
Only subscriber 
attendance results are 
significant for only 3 
companies 
SF Opera 
- 1.62  
San Diego 
- 1.00 
Houston 
- 0.64 
 
Not  
significant 
in any 
equations 
Carson & 
Mobilia 1989 
Time series for Broadway 
1975/76 through 1987/88 
OLS including lagged 
dependent variable and 
seasonal effects. Prior 
weeks attendance 
reduces current attend. 
Current 
month neg. 
not sig.; 
prior month 
= - 0.38 
- 4.74 in 
summer; 
other 
seasons = 
5.78 
Bonato et al. 
1990 
Published time series data 
1964-1985; Italy 
aggregating across theater, 
opera, ballet, classical and 
light music 
Double-log OLS 
adjusting for first 
order serial correlation 
using Hildreth-Lu  
- 0.38 
 
0.78 
 
Throsby 
1990 
3 Sydney Theater 
Companies 1974-1978; 
company data 
Single equation 
double-log OLS 
- 0.41 
(not sig.) 
None 
Oteri & 
Trimarchi, 
1990 
Italian study of drama 
attendance 
OLS with partial 
adjustment model  
accounting for 
accumulated human 
capital 
Not 
statistically 
significant 
Not 
statistically 
significant 
Felton 1992 24 U.S. orchestras (9 
years), 14 ballet (6 years) 
and 12 opera (7 years); 
1979-87; ASOL, 
Dance/USA; Opera 
America data 
Double-log weighted-
least square (WLS) for 
each budget group of 
each art form, using 
the standard deviation 
of the OLS residuals 
for weights 
 
Avg large 
M: - 0.57; 
Avg. small  
M: - 0.95 
Avg. large 
B: - 0.29;  
Avg. small    
B: - 0.13;  
Avg. large 
O: - 0.28;    
Avg. small 
O: - 0.56 
2 largest 
M: 0.767 to 
1.048;  
Largest B 
group:  
3.088 
2nd largest 
B: 1.868;  
No effect 
for O  
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Abbé-
Decarroux 
1994 
A single Geneva theater 
over 7 years 1982-83 to 
1988-89 (64 productions) 
Company provided data 
Double-log OLS; no 
serious first-order 
serial correlation 
problem; 
Distinguishes among 
total demand; full 
price and reduced 
price audiences 
  
Total 
demand: 
 - 0.9945 
Full price: 
 - 0.3082 
(not sig.) 
Reduced-
price: 
- 2.4488 
(but not sig 
different 
from -1.0)  
None 
 
Felton 
1994/95 
25 large U.S. orchestras 
over 21 years 1971-72 to 
1991- 92 ASOL data  
Double-log OLS on 
separate total and 
subscriber only 
attendance. 
 
Total 
attendance:  
- 0.85 
Subscriber: 
-0.24 
Total 
attendance: 
1.40 
Subscriber: 
0.82 
Luksetich &  
Lange 1995 
135 measures of activity 
for 74 U.S. orchestras1975 
though 1984, and 300 
measures of orchestra 
activity for all ASOL 
members for 1985, 1986, 
1987. 
Six equation 2SLS 
simultaneous model 
with second stage 
estimated using pooled 
cross-section, time-
series techniques. 
Separate equations for 
3 orchestra sizes.  
Major 
orchestras: 
- 0.33  
Metro: 
-0.42;  
Small: 
- 0.16 
 
Major and 
Metro  
Not sig. 
Small: 
Negative 
elasticity 
Krebs & 
Pommerehne 
1995 
Aggregate annual theater 
and opera data for 
Germany (w/o East), 
1961/62 to 1991/92 
Linear OLS model 
including quality and 
lagged attendance 
variables 
Short run: 
 -0.16 
Long run: 
- 2.6 
0.1 but not 
statistically 
significant 
Lévy-
Garboua & 
Montmar-
quette 1996 
French Ministry of Culture 
1987 survey of 8,000 
people, including 1,000 
theater-goers. Two sub-
samples: attended theater 
last 4 years; attended last 
year. 
Learning-by-
consuming model. 
Heckman 2 step 
procedure controlling 
conditional factors and 
selectivity bias, using 
probit and then OLS 
with White’s corrected 
variance-covariance 
matrix of coefficients 
-1.47 very  
experienced   
 
-1.00 less 
experienced 
 
 
None 
(but strong 
positive 
results for 
wealth 
proxies 
suggested > 
1 income 
elasticity 
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Schimmel-
pfennig 1997 
1995 Royal Ballet Summer 
Season. 9 performances: 
Giselle (4) and Sleeping 
Beauty (5) 
Demand estimated for 
Orchestra, Grand Tier, 
Balcony, and Center 
and 65 Rear day seats. 
Non-parametric linear 
regression.  
  
Median for 
Giselle: 
Orchestra: 
-3.48 
Grand Tier: 
-1.34 
Rear  
- 3.02 
Beauty: 
Orchestra: 
-5.56 
Grand Tier: 
-1.72 
Rear  
- 4.30 
None 
Ekelund & 
Ritenour 
1999 
ASOL, NEA Research 
Division for entire U.S. 
1973-1992 
Single equation linear 
OLS test of Becker’s 
theory of time costs 
  
Inelastic  
(highly  
significant) 
 0.78  
normalized 
Forrest et al. 
2000 
Royal Exchange Theater 
Manchester UK, for 1992-
93, survey data during run  
The Brothers Karamazov 
Clawson-Knetsch  
demand function 
linked to visitor 
distances   
Point at 
mean: -1.24 
Arc: -1.11; 
varies with 
education 
None 
Corning & 
Levy 2002 
Box office receipts Pacific 
Conservatory of the  
Performing Arts (S Calif.); 
1990-98; 3 venues  
Conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation 
for 3 different venues. 
Double-log “backup” 
- 0.05 
- 1.36 
- 4.87 
(stat.sig) 
1 of 3 >1.0; 
3 >0 but 
only 2 sig. 
  Note: “None” indicates that no elasticities were estimated, due largely to an absence of data. 
 
disaggregated analysis of different price ranges, audience characteristics, or type and sizes of 
individual arts organizations (distinctions also more common in the studies finding high price 
elasticities).  While Withers (1980) and Throsby and Withers (1979), which are quite aggregated 
studies for the performing arts in the United States and Australia, also find what might be viewed as 
somewhat mixed evidence on price elasticity, any modest evidence for slightly price elastic demand 
disappears when the price of leisure is added to the model, and Withers interprets his findings as 
supporting the view that demand “is not likely to be highly elastic in the short run due to the nature of 
the performing arts as an acquired taste” (1980, p. 739).  The role that acquired taste plays in 
interpreting price elasticity results is discussed in more detail below in 3.2.3.      
 
  In fact, the price inelasticity result is much more prominent in those studies, regardless of 
technical sophistication, that used very aggregative data across all performing arts groups in contrast 
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to studying individual arts organizations,50 and/or that used a measure of ticket price (such as total 
revenue divided by attendance)  that does not measure the actual prices paid by different types of 
consumers (see 3.1.1 below).  Notably, Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987), the only study to find 
statistically significant but positive own price elasticities, explain the paradox of that finding in part by 
suggesting that price is serving as a proxy for quality (although they also include a “program-mix” 
variable suggesting that less “esoteric” productions have a small positive effect on paid attendance), 
but also due to their overly aggregated measure of price (i.e. an average of total box office revenues 
over the entire season divided by total season attendance; p. 170).  
 
  Thus, the widespread view that the demand for the arts is price inelastic is highly simplified, 
and subject to misinterpretation unless the underlying reasons for that finding are examined carefully. 
Studies that make important distinctions among arts consumers include: Pommerehne and 
Kirchgassner (1987) distinguishing average income from high income; Abbé-Decarroux (1994) 
distinguishing those paying full price vs. a reduced price; Felton (1989 and 1994/95) distinguishing 
total attendance from subscriber attendance (the distinction between single ticket and subscriber is 
made in a number of papers); Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) distinguishing more 
experienced from less experienced theater-goers; Schimmelpfennig (1997) distinguishing among three 
different seating sections for two different ballets; Forrest et al. (2000) distinguishing among 
consumers by distance traveled and educational level within those areas, and Urrutiaguer (2002) 
distinguishing consumers who lend greater credence to the subjective views of drama critics from 
those who weigh more heavily the quality implied by artistic directors also being manager.51   
 
  Those studies making important distinctions among individual arts organizations as opposed to 
using more aggregate data for either the performing arts or for aggregate measures of any one art form 
(e.g. theater vs. opera) include:  Lange and Luksetich (1984) and Luksetich and Lange (1995) 
distinguishing among major, metro, and smaller community orchestras; Greckel and Felton (1987) 
using data for individual organizations, and distinguishing between the Louisville Orchestra and the 
Louisville Bach Society; Felton (1989) distinguishing three different opera budget sizes for both 
                                                          
 50 Of course, this aggregation problem is hardly confined to the arts.  The common estimation 
of supply and demand functions “using uniform prices and quantities across products, yielding a single 
industry-wide demand elasticity estimate” is criticized in a study of the personal computer market as 
especially misleading when firms produce differentiated rather than homogeneous goods, since “each 
product is likely to face a different demand elasticity,” ideally requiring a focus on “individual 
products’ attributes and their market position” in estimating demand elasticity (Stavins, 1997, pp. 347-
348).  For a comprehensive review of heterogeneity and aggregation problems in economics, see 
Blundell and Stoker (2005), with applications to demand modeling (pp. 350-364).  
 51 While not included in Table 11, since he did not estimate actual price and income 
elasticities, Gapinski (1988) made a useful distinction between tourists and residents using the same 
database used in his much cited 1986 study of 13 London arts companies over 12 years.  He found 
large positive and statistically significant income coefficients for tourists, but statistically insignificant 
income coefficients for residents (no price coefficients were statistically significant. But he did derive 
a “tourist attendance elasticity” of demand that was higher for his aggregate measure of tourists (i.e. 
0.645) than for his so-called “high-roller” tourist group (an elasticity of 0.227).     
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subscriber and single ticket attendance, and deriving elasticities for individual opera companies; 
Felton (1992) distinguishing both among average groups of orchestras, ballet and opera companies by 
budget size, and among individual companies within those larger groups; and Corning and Levy 
(2002) examining a theater company with three different location venues in Southern California.   
 
3.1.1  Price Elasticity Differences by Level of Aggregation   
 
  Despite particular limitations in each of the studies using more disaggregated data, they 
understandably generated a richer and more complex array of results than was the case with those 
studies deriving a price and income elasticity of demand for the overall performing arts.  Furthermore, 
it is noteworthy that those more disaggregated studies were generally (but not universally) more likely 
to find higher own price elasticities of demand, and to a lesser extent, a wider variety of income 
elasticities of demand than were the studies that used less precise data and applied to more aggregated 
measures of either arts organizations or consumer groups.52   
 
  It is hard to dispute that studies that apply to individual organizations that vary by size, arts 
type and location, or that distinguish among consumers on the basis of the actual prices paid, income 
levels, types of seats purchased, or subscriber vs. single ticket status are analytically superior to 
studies that fail to make such distinctions.  Thus, despite the understandable call for more careful 
econometric work linked more explicitly to models of taste cultivation (e.g. Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette, 2003), there is reason to believe that an even more compelling problem is to obtain 
the right kind of data that apply to a more germane unit of analysis, even when using less sophisticated 
estimation techniques.53 
   The more disaggregated studies generally have higher price elasticities, in part because they 
often have a better measure of price as well as being able to segment audiences in various important 
ways.  Instead of using the artificially constructed “average price” based on total revenue divided by 
                                                          
 52 As discussed in Part 2.2, marketing studies are always sensitive to audience segmentation, 
and while not attempting to estimate precise demand elasticities, they often find evidence suggesting 
that estimating a price elasticity using an average price will yield faulty results.  Colbert et al. (1998) 
surveyed the audiences of seven theaters in Canada and, unsurprisingly, found a wide divergence in 
attitudes about ticket prices both between and within groups of subscribers and non-subscribers.  They 
conclude that there are two key segments: one group primarily constrained by a lack of time, and the 
other by the level of ticket prices.  Scheff (1999) surveyed patrons of four major performing arts 
organizations in San Francisco and found that there was little overall sensitivity to ticket price 
increases, especially when compared to the greater concern about being able to select specific 
programs to attend (among both subscribers and single-ticket buyers).  However, among those for 
whom pricing was a significant factor, she recommends “a pricing of higher highs and lower lows” to 
be more sensitive to different consumer segments.       
 53 It is unclear whether the expanded use of large data sets, also recommended by Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette (2003, p. 211), will itself solve this problem.  Larger sample sizes in 
audiences surveys are likely to be important, however, in addressing the more technical issue they 
identify of limiting a selectivity bias that may otherwise arise due to the infrequency of individuals 
attending live events, and changes in frequency rates over time (p. 209). 
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attendance (commonly necessitated by data limitations; Withers, 1980, adopting a convention 
prominently used by Baumol and Bowen, 1966, is often cited in subsequent studies), price measures in 
the more case specific studies often more closely relate to what is actually paid by specific groups of 
arts consumers (i.e. “transaction” prices).   
 
 This issue of the measurement of the price of an arts performance deserves further 
clarification.  Ideally, being able to examine the specific prices paid by different segments of an 
audience with varying incomes, education, age, values of time and other characteristics would be 
important in clarifying the price elasticities of demand of different groups and how price elasticity 
varies with the prices charged, especially when various price discrimination strategies are available to 
arts organizations, including some that involve the interaction between ticket purchases and voluntary 
donations that are uniquely available to non-profit organizations.54  However, since that degree of 
detail in pricing and consumer data cannot be obtained, it is often thought that the feasible alternative 
of average price would ideally be calculated as a weighted average of the prices paid (i.e. multiplying 
the percentage of the audience at each specific price level by those prices and summing the products).  
But, as Felton (1989) observes, “companies do not carry out such a calculation, so the average ticket 
price was arrived at by dividing income from ticket sales by the number of attendees,” which she 
laments generated results “that were not always credible,” despite the fact that she had done separate 
calculations for the differentiated consumer categories of subscribers and single ticket holders (p. 
120).  
 
 However, the real problem is not the absence of weighted average price data, but a resulting 
average price (using either approach) that no consumer actually faces, as the following simple 
example illustrates.  If a small audience of 145 people is made up of 25 (17.24 percent of the 
audience) paying $100, 40 (27.59 percent) paying $50, and 80 (55.17 percent) paying $25, both the 
total revenue ($6,500) divided by attendance and the weighted average price will be identical at 
$44.83.  But no attendee paid $44.83, and most of the audience paid only about 56 percent of that 
price while some paid more than twice that price.  Furthermore, either of these price measurements are 
susceptible to indicating a price change solely due a modification in the mix of tickets sold, even if not 
a single ticket price was changed.55  Additional complications could include ticket scalping or 
organized discount selling that can generate transaction prices either higher or lower than the revenue 
received by the organization.56  Also, the varying average prices paid for different performances as 
                                                          
 54 While Hansmann (1980, 1981) are the classic references to the potential interaction of ticket 
and donor price discrimination strategies in non-profit organizations, the role of price discrimination 
in the performing arts, both regarding ticket prices alone as well as with regard to donations, is 
increasingly well established.  See Blaug (1978); Seaman (1985); Cairns (1991); Huntington (1991 
and 1993); Kushner and King (1994); and Courty (2003).  The especially useful results derived by 
Luksetich and Lange (1995) regarding the effect on the price elasticity of demand of incorporating 
both earned and donated income strategies into demand analysis are discussed in more detail in section 
3.2.1.  
 55 However, this is often seen as a manageable problem when using annual time-series data 
(Moore, 1966; MacMillan and Smith, 2001).  
 56 See, e.g. H. Baumol’s (1974) study of last minute discounts on unsold tickets in New York 
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total attendance and the distribution of filled seats by price section varies day- to-day or between 
matinees and evening performances, will not typically be captured if total revenue is aggregated over 
an entire  season and then divided by total attendance (as in the previously noted problem with such a 
measure in Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987). 
 
 Despite these significant weaknesses, some useful information is admittedly obtained in those 
many time-series studies using average price data (as listed in Table 11).  Furthermore, sometimes an 
average price calculation comes closer to revealing consumer transaction prices depending on the 
available alternatives.  For example, if the alternative were to simply compute the average price of all 
seats available in a venue (or a stadium in sports) without any regard for the revenue generated by 
those seats (e.g. in the above numerical example, the crudest of those averages would be $58.33 if an 
equal number of seats were available across all sections), the use of total revenues divided by total 
attendance to derive an average price of tickets actually sold may well be superior, as is argued in the 
sports demand literature by Depken II ( 2001, p. 276).  However, Coates and Harrison (2005) view 
both the “weighted average price of available seating”and the “gates receipts divided by total 
attendance” approaches to the measurement of ticket pricing as having “their advantages and 
disadvantages, and their proponents and detractors” (pp. 285-286).  Their approach was to use both 
measures in their estimation of demand equations for Major League Baseball.57   
 
 Given the expected importance of having more disaggregated and targeted price data, what can 
be said about the results of studies that segmented the audience more carefully, or that focused on less 
aggregated measures of the performing arts?  Caution is always essential in making any 
generalizations about this literature, and that applies here as well.  For example,  Moore (1966) found 
consistently low own price elasticities for Broadway theater tickets even when studying a relatively 
disaggregated segment of the performing arts (aggregated to be sure across seven Broadway houses 
and 18 performances, but at least not focusing on the overall performing arts).  His somewhat 
unconventional use of a list price (i.e. “an average of the cost of the most expensive seats for a regular 
performance of each production;” p. 83) to proxy average price paid can be criticized, but may not 
have seriously biased his time-series results (see fn. 56 above).  And Gapinski (1986) is widely lauded 
for deriving separate theater, opera, symphony and dance estimates of cross price as well as own price 
elasticities using quite disaggregated data specific to thirteen individual arts companies in London.  
Yet he found generally low own price elasticities for each of the individual organizations (varying 
from - 0.05 to - 0.70), and also generally low cross price elasticities (below 0.20 for four theater and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
City, and McCain’s (1987) analysis of scalping in the arts and sports.  Moore (1966), whose use of the 
top list prices at Broadway plays to proxy the average ticket price is novel, recognized this problem in 
noting that “the average list price of seats may easily differ from the average paid price if tickets are 
scalped or discounted, if brokerage fees are charged, or if seats at some price sell slower than 
others”(pp. 83-84).  He argued, as have others, that the various possible errors in accurately measuring 
price can still result in an unbiased index of price used in time-series analysis (p. 83, and his fn. 16).  
 57 What they do stress about the ticket price variable is that it is either measured with error or is 
endogenous, a problem they attack with the use of instrumental variables regression to assess which 
type of price variable is best in estimating attendance (Coates and Harrison, 2005, p. 286).  This 
problem is not stressed in the arts demand literature.   
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opera organizations; lower than 0.30 for two dance companies; an average of 0.54 for the four 
orchestras; but an average of 1.81 for the other three dance companies; see 3.2.4).  However, in 
constructing his nominal price variables Gapinski was forced to resort to dividing attendance into box 
office revenues (including value-added tax), hence failing to fully capture actual transaction prices or 
differentiate among consumer groups.       
 
 Less aggregated studies generally segment audiences in various important ways that allow for 
a more precise examination of pricing, as well as other likely demand determining characteristics.   
Pommerehene and Kirchgassner (1987) segment by income of consumers, with price elasticity for 
high income consumers lower than for average income (but with both being greater than one in 
absolute value, and cinema own price elasticities being uncommonly low - results derived from the 
rarely used almost ideal demand system model).  Seating section is the key for Schimmelpfennig’s 
ballet study (1997), which found generally elastic demand for Orchestra, Grand Tier, and Rear 
Amphitheater sections, with surprisingly high price elasticities even for the more expensive Orchestra 
seats that supposedly serve higher income patrons.  By contrast, the Abbé-Decarroux (1994) results 
for a Geneva theater are more expected, with an important finding of a high price elasticity of - 2.45 
for his “reduced price” consumer group (although not clearly statistically different from 1.0 at the 0.05 
level), but inelastic (and not statistically significant) price elasticity for the “full price” group.  He is 
also unique in explicitly arguing that such results “weaken” the conclusions of other major studies that 
use an overly aggregated average price to derive price inelastic results for the performing arts (p. 
105).58      
 Felton's 1994/95 study of 25 large U.S. orchestras found lower price elasticity for subscribers 
(-0.24) compared to price elasticity for the combined “total attendance” (although still less than unity 
at -0.85).   However, that result contrasted with her pooled time series study of 13 opera companies 
(Felton, 1989), where subscribers appeared more responsive to ticket price changes than single ticket 
purchasers (i.e. her only statistically significant results were for subscribers, although the magnitude of 
the price elasticities varied widely across organizations).  Even though subscriber reactions to ticket 
price changes differed somewhat between her 1994/95 orchestra and 1989 opera samples, she decided 
to limit her 1992 study of orchestra, opera and ballet companies to subscriber demand based on her 
                                                          
 58 Throsby (1990) found supporting evidence in his equations estimating the effects of three 
price levels, three levels of “interest” or “appeal”of a play, and three levels of production standard on 
consumer “valuation” of a play.  These utility rather than demand function results found that the 
strongest influence of price was on the mainly young and less affluent downstairs audience of one of 
his Sydney theaters, whereas his least price sensitive group was the audience of the most conservative 
and “middle class” of his theaters, “accustomed, by and large, to paying top prices for theater tickets” 
(p. 79).  Using data on nightly box office receipts for Midsummer Night’s Dream at Regent’s Park in 
1983, Huntington (1991) shows a kinked demand curve based on different price points, but also 
struggles with explaining generally positive price coefficients (which, as previously noted, he 
attributes to price as a quality proxy). One’s skepticism about deriving an “average price elasticity” 
from price data calculated as revenue per capita is further strengthened by museum studies that find 
significant differences in the perceptions about pricing held by different consumer groups.  For 
example, Kirchberg (1998) found that low income groups regard entrance fees as a barrier fives times 
as much as do those in higher income groups, with education, occupation, and various “lifestyle” 
variables further broadening this gap. 
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conclusion that her previous work with opera data had revealed “that season subscribers do react to 
ticket price changes while non-subscribers do not” (Felton, 1992, p. 2).    
 
 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) impute rather than directly estimate price elasticities 
(see 3.2.3), but derive the surprising result that more experienced French theater-goers actually had 
higher price elasticity of demand (-1.47) compared to those less experienced (price elasticity close to 
unity).  This seems at odds with the tentative evidence that those buying lower priced seats have 
higher price elasticities (see above). But then again, more experienced theater-goers need not be the 
ones buying the more expensive seats (e.g they might be highly educated but underpaid teachers, who 
are well-documented arts enthusiasts).59  More fundamentally, this result is inconsistent with the view 
that price elasticity will be low for an acquired taste like the arts (Throsby and Withers, 1979 et al.; 
see pp. 73-74 below).  In that context, Forrest et al. (2000) find strong evidence for price inelastic 
demand in those regional zones with particularly high educational levels and higher price elasticities 
elsewhere, seemingly inconsistent with the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) finding of 
higher price elasticities for more “experienced” theater attenders who are also likely to be more 
educated.60    
 Segmenting by organization also has generated more varied own price elasticity results than 
were found by Gapinski (1986), with an individual Southern California theater group with different 
venues the focus of Corning and Levy (2002), finding price elasticities varying from inelastic to 
elastic depending on specific venue.  Lange and Luksetich (1984) found higher own price elasticities 
for smaller orchestras than for large budget major orchestras, but their1995 simultaneous equation 
orchestra model (where they also incorporated interactions with donations) found generally low price 
elasticities regardless of organization size (see detailed discussion in 3.2.1).   
 
 Thus, while it can be said that the own price elasticities estimated with more disaggregated 
data are more likely to be greater than one in absolute value (whereas with aggregated data they nearly 
never are), the extent and significance of those findings have sometimes been overstated..  For 
example, Felton (1992) is regularly cited for finding low price elasticities of demand for aggregated 
groups of arts organizations, but significantly higher price elasticities for individual arts organizations 
within those groups (e.g. Throsby, 1994, p. 8).  However, she actually found price elastic demand in 
                                                          
 59 Doubtless the most novel interpretation linked to this finding is that of Köster and Marco-
Serrano (2000, p.8, fn. 7), who cite Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) for the finding that “the 
satisfaction degree is bigger among the occasional attenders than in the frequent attenders,” suggesting 
to them that the satisfaction of the occasional attenders stems more from the “sensation of having 
completed a duty” than from any direct arts consumption “sensorial rewards”.  Köster and Marco-
Serrano focus on the fascinating disparity between what people claim to be their “ideal” free time 
activities and how they actually spend their time. 
 60 Ulilbarri (2005) lends further theoretical support to the idea that more experienced arts 
consumers should have lower price elasticities in his application of an adaptive utility model to 
examining consumer choice in the arts.  His analysis lends further support to the notion that markets 
for arts goods will be segmented, in this case due to the varying experiences of consumers at any point 
in time, with newer consumers being the most sensitive to price discounts (p. 140). See also section 
3.2.3. 
 64
only 21 percent of her orchestras sample, 7 percent of her ballet sample, and 16 percent of her opera 
sample.   Furthermore, while that paper is sometimes portrayed as distinguishing between industry and 
firm price elasticities, her pooled data did not include multiple companies in any one art form in any 
one city (admittedly not possible to do if there is only one local professional opera company or even 
orchestra; Gapinksi, 1986, is a notable exception), and in some cases did not even have more than one 
company of any art form in any one city.  So her results correctly remind us that individual 
organizations' price elasticities should not be confused with an aggregate like “performing arts” price 
elasticity, and that individual firm price elasticities will very widely, but it is not a study well-designed 
to distinguish market or industry price elasticities vs. firm price elasticities.  Furthermore, Felton's 
earlier study of individual opera companies (1989) reported only three opera companies with 
statistically significant own price elasticities (for subscribers only, as noted above), with one being 
elastic (San Francisco), one unity (San Diego), and one inelastic (Houston).  So there is no 
unambiguous finding of price elasticity greater than one even when the focus is on individual 
organizations. 
 
3.1.2   Conceptual Issues in Interpreting the Price Elasticity Results   
 Regardless of how the empirical price elasticity results vary by level of aggregation or with the 
sophistication and “accuracy” of econometric technique, it is surprising how little attention has been 
paid to interpreting these results in light of economic theory.  This is especially true of the casual 
consensus that the demand for the performing arts is price inelastic, but also applies to the periodic 
alternative findings of higher price elasticities.  For example, where there is evidence that those paying 
full price or sitting in more expensive seats might have lower price elasticity than those sitting in 
discounted seats, it might be useful to clarify that there is no inconsistency with the general theoretical 
relationship that for a given demand curve, the price elasticity of demand falls with the price 
(assuming non-constant elasticity demand functions).  Since the demand functions should be different 
for these consumer segments (e.g. high income and education, vs. low income or education, or 
subscriber vs. single-ticket), there is no presumption that elasticity is varying along the same consumer 
demand curve.  
 
 The fact that price elasticity generally varies with price along a given demand curve as faced 
by any seller is indeed critical, however, in interpreting the frequent finding of price inelasticity of 
demand in the arts, inasmuch as the belief that non-profit arts organizations may be purposefully 
charging lower than ticket revenue maximizing prices is a mainstay of the arts economics literature.61  
It has also been explicitly argued that profit-maximizing sports teams strategically underprice tickets, 
                                                          
 61 Of course, the convenient and very commonly used double-log linear equation specification 
(see Table 11) generates constant elasticities that do not vary with price, in contrast to a cubic log 
equation which can generate price elasticities that vary with prices (for an example in sports, see 
García and Rodríguez, 2002).  If the range and level of available performing arts price data is 
“artificially low” due to either non-optimal pricing, or systematic efforts to make the arts “more 
accessible,” perhaps not just as a public service but as part of a longer run strategy of encouraging 
people (especially the young) to develop the kind of human capital that can lead to various forms of 
consumption addiction, we would naturally expect to find relatively low estimated constant price 
elasticities.  
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where such non-revenue maximizing behavior has become a standard explanation for the low price 
elasticities of demand frequently found in empirical studies of sports demand.  For example,  
Marburger (1997) estimates the point price elasticity of demand for baseball as - 0.568 (remaining 
well less than unity even for generous confidence intervals), with a sample of 516 observations over 
20 years, and cites five previous studies of baseball ticket pricing yielding similar results (pp. 378-
379).  Both he and Fort (2004) observe that sports economists have generally ignored (or treated as 
insignificant anomalies) the nearly universal findings of price inelastic demand for live sports events 
(Marburger, 1997, p. 379; Fort, 2004, p. 87).   By contrast, they both jump at the chance to explain this 
paradox as the inevitable result of profit maximizing behavior by sellers of “performance goods,” who 
also receive a share of revenues from a variety of complementary concessions (Marburger), or who 
receive significant revenues from the media broadcasting of sporting events (Fort), and hence find it 
rational to systematically underprice admission tickets as part of a strategy to generate larger revenues 
from all sources.62  
 
 This reaction of explaining the observed low price elasticities  in sports as the result of 
strategic underpricing, as opposed to unique sports characteristics that would make consumers 
inherently unwilling or unable to aggressively seek substitutes as a reaction to price increases, is 
notably different from the reaction of cultural economists to the often similarly low price elasticities 
found in performing arts demand studies.  In fact, it seems that sports economists have generally 
refused to accept any empirical evidence of price inelastic demand, even using such evidence to 
conclude that sports organizations were actually following the seemingly more rational unitary 
elasticity pricing strategy that would be predicted when the marginal cost of filling an additional 
stadium seat is nearly zero (Marburger, 1997, p. 379).63  It was this “error” that Marburger and Fort 
(2004) aimed to correct, although it is clear that their interpretation has still not persuaded all sports 
economists.  For example, Coates and Harrison (2005) express amazement at their finding that 
(regardless of how they define price) the demand for baseball attendance in the U.S. is strongly price 
inelastic. They argue that the significant local market power of all baseball franchises should induce 
them to “operate on the elastic portion of the demand curve,” and consider the quest for an explanation 
for why teams are operating in the inelastic portion of their demand curve “an important question for 
                                                          
 62 Surprisingly, Fort (2004) does not cite Marburger (1997), even though both papers appear in 
the same academic journal and make the same essential point that sports economists had long 
dismissed findings of price inelastic demand or had provided inadequate rationalizations, but that in 
fact there was a perfectly sensible profit maximizing explanation for such results.  Of course, the 
papers differ significantly in the details of making that argument and the empirical evidence provided.   
 63 An especially notable study of the Spanish Football League (García and Rodríguez, 2002) 
finds confirmation of low price elasticities (generally below - 0.5) of demand for all league teams 
when using a linear model and not adjusting for the possible endogeneity of price, which is 
inconsistent with “clubs acting as profit maximizers and costs not depending on attendance in a 
standard monopolistic model” (p. 28).  However, they find good evidence for their contention that 
econometric specification issues should play a bigger role in estimating sports demand inasmuch as 
their cubic specification using instrumental variables to correct for price endogeneity yields 11 teams 
(out of 27) with average price elasticities above one in absolute value, although for all teams the null 
hypothesis of unitary elasticity cannot be rejected.    
 66
future research” (p. 298). While shockingly, they cite neither Marburger (1997) nor Fort (2004), their 
unwillingness to accept the result of price inelastic demand as an inherent feature of baseball, and their 
sensitivity to the level of prices at which such elasticities are estimated,  is utterly typical of the sports 
literature.      
 
 By start contrast, the most common (although not universal; e.g. Lévy-Garbuou and 
Montmarquette, 1996) reaction among arts economists has been to find econometric evidence for low 
price elasticities to be consistent with theoretical expectations and non-econometric survey and casual 
statistical evidence.64  For example, Throsby (1994) makes the argument first made with Withers 
(Throsby and Withers, 1979) and repeated in Throsby (2001, p. 116), distinguishing “immediately 
accessible” (i.e. easy to understand and appreciate) popular entertainments like musicals, “live 
entertainers” and circuses with the higher arts that reflect an “acquired taste” resulting from the 
“accumulation of knowledge and experience” that will generate lower price elasticities among 
established consumers “for whom qualitative characteristics of performances are likely to be 
decisive”(pp. 3; and 7-8).”65  While this argument seems consistent with a view that demand for the 
lively arts is “inherently” price insensitive, it is important to note the Throsby reference to 
                                                          
 64 Examples of such non-econometric evidence would include the common survey finding that 
price is generally not identified as a key concern to most performing arts patrons (e.g. the previously 
cited survey evidence from Scheff, 1999 that arts attenders in San Francisco “have little sensitivity to 
price increases”).  Globerman (1978) found little evidence of accurate performing arts price 
information among the general population surveyed in Ontario, which might be interpreted as a 
general indifference to prices due to their unimportance, although he stressed the prospect that some 
people had been deterred from attending performances by incorrect perceptions of excessively high 
prices, suggesting that price may play a big role in at least a subset of the potential audience.  More 
consistent with the view that price actually plays a surprisingly small role in arts attendance decisions 
is the finding by Kolb (1997) that, despite price being mentioned most frequently by London 
(England) students as a barrier to attendance, a more detailed examination of their behavior diminishes 
the role of price compared to the “entertainment value” of the arts, and the ability of arts events to 
provide opportunities to socialize.  See also Kolb (2002).  From a mail survey of subscribers to the 
American Conservatory Theater in San Francisco (ACT), Ryans and Weinberg (1978) concluded that 
the “availability of a price discount” was not a major benefit sought by subscribers, being far out-
weighed by “makes me more certain to attend.”   See also Kangun et al. (1992) regarding marketing 
strategies for encouraging more college student consumption of symphony concerts.  
 65 The presumed greater availability of effective substitutes for more accessible forms of 
entertainment (the more popularized forms of cinema is another example) compared to the more 
“esoteric” forms of the higher arts would certainly be a key factor that would suggest that demand for 
the performing arts would be less price elastic than the demand for cinema at comparable prices or 
when evaluated at competitive equilibria with limited market power.  The necessity of distinguishing 
the price elasticity of demand at “current” prices from the price elasticity at “competitive” prices is an 
iconic feature of antitrust economics and law enforcement (as memorialized in the “cellophane 
fallacy” of incorrectly presuming that no market power was held by Dupont because its latest price 
increases had seemingly generated considerable consumer resistance, but from already super-
competitive price levels; United States v. E. I du Pont de Nemours & Co., 646,669).  
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“established” consumers rather than all consumers.66  Thus, there is no necessary conflict with 
Globerman’s (1989) reading of the price inelasticity evidence as suggesting that arts organizations 
focus their attention on raising prices selectively to the “especially price-insensitive attendees,” 
including opening night audiences (p.10), although there is a conflict with the previously cited Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) finding of a relatively high price elasticity for more established 
theater-goers in France.      
 
 But the focus on qualitative factors as dominating price factors as an explanation for 
empirically derived low price elasticities does not really address the issue raised by Marburger (1987) 
and Fort (2004) regarding the price levels at which price elasticity is being estimated.  The 
incorporation of various quality factors is also quite standard in sports demand studies (e.g., team 
record, goals scored, and extent of rivalry with opponent in García and Rodríguez, 2002; the key role 
of star players in Berri et al., 2004; the newness of sports stadiums versus the quality of play in Clapp 
and Hakes, 2005).  Yet, Marburger and Fort would still stress the influence of strategically low sports 
ticket pricing in order to maximize a broader definition of profits in generating any low price elasticity 
estimates.  In essence, higher quality will shift a demand curve to the right (which will lower price 
elasticity for any given price) and possibly also steepen its slope (further lowering the price elasticity 
at any price), but it is still the case that the observed price elasticities will be the result of the price 
level either chosen by individual firms with some degree of market power, or the result of the 
interaction of supply and demand forces in more competitive markets.  This point is explicitly 
recognized by Cameron (1990), who demonstrates unusual sensitivity to the issue of cinema pricing 
strategies and price level variations across regions in the U.K., and justifies his findings of high price 
elasticities of demand for cinema by noting that surveys have shown that cinema prices are perceived 
as being quite high in the U.K. (especially in London), and that this would be the expected result of 
the significant market power than he attributes to the retail cinema sector in that country ( Cameron p. 
44; also see fn. 67 below).   
 
 In defense of an “inherently” low arts price elasticity of demand, an alternative to the emphasis 
on qualitative factors dominating ticket prices as the explanation is the universal recognition that ticket 
price is only one component of the explicit expense of attending a live performance (with 
transportation, parking and the complementary expenses of dining and even shopping most commonly 
cited), and an even smaller share of the total expense when the implicit opportunity cost of time is 
added to the explicit expense to obtain the “full price.”67   While an attempt to account for the value of 
                                                          
 66 And as noted above (see fn. 58), Throsby (1990) found in his utility function estimations that 
price was especially important to the young and less affluent audience of one of his theaters, and 
considerably less important to the more affluent and conservative audience of a quite different theater.  
Thus, despite his frequent focus on the inherent price inelasticity of the arts as an acquired taste, he 
would be not disagree that such inelasticity varies across audience segments.      
 67 In fact, Globerman (1989) would extend this point to popular culture as well, noting that the 
admittedly less consistent evidence is that demand is price inelastic for those lower arts as well, 
consistent with the idea that the opportunity cost of time is usually the largest cost of attending any 
live events (his note 14).  However, it is interesting that Cameron (1990, extending his similar earlier 
results) has found relatively high price elasticities of demand for cinema in the United Kingdom (in 
the range of -1.53 to -1.6) using pooled cross-sectional and time series data, but when later explicitly 
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time in demand estimation is sometimes called a test of the “Beckerian theory of time costs” (e.g. 
Ekelund and Ritenour, 1999), an even more genuine effort to incorporate Becker’s theory of 
“consumers as producers” would distinguish between purchasing a ticket for a performance (a market 
good serving as a “productive input”) and actually consuming the individually produced “art 
appreciation” (a Becker “Z” commodity that yields direct utility).  Once that fundamental distinction is 
made, there is no theoretical inconsistency between finding a “shadow price-elastic demand for art 
appreciation” and a “market price-inelastic demand for art consumption” as revealed in ticket price 
data  
(Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996, p. 206; also see 3.2.3 below).  
 
 Another definition of the “full price” of arts consumption that can reduce the economic 
significance of the explicit admission price (and possibly justify a lower price elasticity of demand 
using only ticket prices) is the interaction between admission expenses and voluntary donations.  As 
noted, the potential for price discrimination strategies in the arts is further enhanced by their non-profit 
status that encourages donations.  As argued by Lange and Luksetich (1984), the total price of 
attending a symphony concert includes both the price of the ticket and any contributions of that patron 
to the orchestra.  The key implication is that, e.g., a 20 percent ticket price increase could be perceived 
as only a 5 percent increase in the full price of attending if, for example, a patron spent three times as 
much via donations than via admission expenditures (hence making admission expenses only 25 
percent of the total consumption price).   Thus, a 10 percent reduction in the frequency of attendance 
would be measured as a ticket price elasticity of only - 0.50 even though one could argue that the 
“full” price elasticity was - 2.0.    The complex interaction between these two sources of orchestral 
revenue is further addressed by Luksetich and Lange (1995), who derive the fascinating result (see the 
detailed discussion in 3.2.1) that all sizes of orchestras could increase ticket revenues with price 
increases (although in two of the three size classifications at the partially offsetting expense of 
reduced donations, so that total combined revenues still increase).    
 
 This conclusion that orchestras are excessively under-pricing tickets is consistent with the 
argument above that low estimated price elasticities of demand reflect the level at which arts 
admission is being priced, although it is a variation on the sports literature argument inasmuch as such 
underpricing may not actually be profit maximizing, but represents a mistake in not fully exploiting 
their revenue maximizing potential.  The distinction between profit maximizing ticket prices (which 
will also be approximately revenue maximizing if the marginal costs of filling more seats are close to 
zero) and just “high” or”low” prices is also important in not automatically presuming that seemingly 
high prices (as in Blaug’s study of Covent Garden seat prices, 1978) must suggest pricing in the “price 
elastic range.”   As suggested by the Luksetich and Lange (1995) evidence, even if current price levels 
were viewed as high based on some comparison, they may still be in the inelastic range of an 
organization’s market demand curve for admission tickets.  
 
 Finally, it is useful to remember the textbook list of factors determining price elasticity 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
testing for rational addiction in the demand for cinema (1999), he found neither strong support for 
rational addiction, nor statistical significance in his price variable.  Fernández-Blanco and BaZos Pina 
(1997) estimate an even higher long run price elasticity of demand for cinema in Spain (-3.51), but do 
not address the issue of price levels.    
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variations across different products (always measured as industry or market, and not individual firm or 
consumer segment elasticities): (1) substitution possibilities; (2) budget share; (3) direction of income 
effect; and (4) time.68   Frank (2006) presents a comparison of empirically estimated price elasticities 
of demand for seven very aggregated product groupings ranging from “green peas” (elasticity of - 2.8) 
to “theater, opera”(-0.18, citing Houthakker and Taylor, 1970).   
 
 What is interesting is his explanation for this finding that the price elasticity of the demand for 
green peas is more than 14 times larger than for theater and opera performances.  He cites two factors: 
(1) the likely small real income effect that would accompany any change in price for arts consumers 
who are expected to have much larger than average incomes; and (2) the many more close substitutes 
for green peas than there are for theater and opera performances, a factor that he considers more 
telling than the first factor inasmuch as the real income effects accompanying price changes for such 
small budget items as green peas are also likely to be small, even for lower income consumers (Frank, 
2006, p. 128).   This explanation is consistent with the view that there is something inherent in the 
performing arts that would yield very low price elasticities, i.e. limited substitutes (although human 
capital and addiction issues, or the relatively low portion of ticket prices in some measure of the “full 
price” of attendance, are alternative and supporting reasons that could have been stressed).  Yet again, 
any such explanation ignores the question of “substitutes at what price?”  It also fails to even consider 
(even if one accepts the implicit gross simplification that this aggregate of theater and opera could 
relate to specific local entities with assumed monopoly power69) why such firms would choose to 
voluntarily operate so far from the seemingly rational average price level (i.e., the one approximating 
unity price elasticity when marginal costs approach zero).    
 
 In summary, to the extent that the low estimated price elasticities found in much of the sports 
demand literature can be similarly explained in the arts case as resulting from cleverly conceived (or 
even grossly mistaken) low price strategies by arts organizations, the attribution of low price 
elasticities to some inherent characteristics of the performing arts that would suggest inelastic demand 
at any price, or that would attribute low price elasticities to all consumer segments, or to all 
performing arts organizations (regardless of type, size, location, or competitive posture) would be 
naive and mistaken.  At the same time, theoretical clarifications as to the full price of arts 
consumption, either by distinguishing arts attendance from arts appreciation (especially focusing 
attention on the larger amount of human capital required to produce the latter), or by clarifying the 
possibly low weight that ticket price alone has relative to the full cost of an evening of arts 
consumption (including transportation, dining, the value of time, and voluntary donations) could 
strongly suggest that estimated low price elasticities of demand may indeed provide reliable evidence 
that arts organizations should move to increase admission prices from current levels -  the kind of 
concrete advice that a well-designed demand study should be able to generate.   
 
 Furthermore, if price elasticities of demand for the high arts could be juxtaposed with those of 
the lower arts at “comparable” prices (ideally some measure of competitive price or “break-even” 
prices), there may be sound theoretical reasons to expect more price inelastic demand for the more 
                                                          
 68 This particular listing, while perfectly standard, is from Frank (2006).  
 69 A monopoly presumption that has been challenged by Seaman (2004).  
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“complex” art forms.  However, those reasons could not plausibly focus exclusively on the 
opportunity cost of time, or the ticket price relative to the broader expenses of attending an 
entertainment event, since those ancillary expenses will often be similar for cinema and other popular 
entertainments as for theater or opera.  That fact, when combined with the higher absolute price levels 
for the performing arts relative to, say, cinema (although perhaps not when compared to the prices at a 
rock concert), result in ticket prices being a higher proportion of the full attendance price in the 
performing arts compared to the more popular arts, arguing ceteris paribus for relatively higher, not 
lower, observed price elasticities of demand in the performing arts when compared to the popular 
arts.70              
 
3.1.3  Income Elasticity Differences by Level of Aggregation 
 Despite there being somewhat mixed results on price elasticity, the discussion in 3.1.1 
concluded that more disaggregated studies do tend to find higher price elasticities of demand for more 
theoretically defensible and useful units of analysis (individual organizations varying by type and size; 
identifiable consumer groups varying by seating section, income, subscriber status, or discount vs. full 
price).  The results are even more ambiguous for income elasticity.  Pommerehene and Kirchgassner 
(1987) find greater than 1.0 income elasticities in German theater for both average and high income 
consumers (finding also that higher income people have lower income elasticity than do average 
income people, consistent with the common notion that income is positively correlated with the value 
of time, which lowers the “unadjusted” income elasticities relative to the more defensible derivation of 
“adjusted” income elasticities; see Withers 1980).  However, while they use this differential income 
result in their summary, they warn about the low level of statistical significance in their income results 
and note that “income elasticities are not much larger than one” (p. 48). 
                                                          
 70 A focus on the weight of the admission price relative to the full consumption price would 
suggest that a sport like cricket, where a match can last beyond a day in length, would have the lowest 
comparable price elasticity of demand of nearly all live entertainments (including the performing arts) 
for any opportunity cost of time.  But such a finding should not necessarily lead one to argue that 
cricket is addicting, or that this result is due to cricket being an acquired taste dependent upon more 
complex human capital inputs than other sports or the arts.  Despite the insightful analysis of county 
cricket, Paton and Cooke (2005) do not estimate price elasticities. 
 
 Felton’s results are more indicative of the varying income elasticity derivations in even these 
more refined studies.  Felton (1989) found no statistically significant income elasticities for her 
individual opera companies, and found (1992) income elasticities of either less than one or about one 
for her two largest orchestra groups (again, while this is still fairly aggregated, it at least distinguishes 
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orchestra size).  Felton (1992) did, however, find “luxury” good evidence for her highest and second 
highest budget samples of ballet companies (but nothing significant for opera).  Felton (1994/95) also 
found a higher income elasticity of 1.4 for her “total attendance” group vs. an elasticity of only 0.82 for 
her “subscriber” database for U.S. orchestras.  By contrast, Luksetich and Lange (1995) found no 
statistically significant income elasticities at all in their large market vs. small market study of 
orchestras.  Unfortunately, neither Schimmelpfennig (1997) nor Abbé-Decarroux (1994), who did such 
useful work regarding more disaggregated price elasticities, were able to estimate any income 
elasticities since they lacked income data. 
 
 Superficially, the strongest evidence for income elasticity estimates being notably different 
when less aggregated data is utilized is Greckel and Felton (1987), who derived an income elasticity 
(using regional real per capita income) of 6.134 (statistically significant at the .01 level) in their second 
demand equation for the Louisville Orchestra (1973/74-1983/84).  However, their other orchestra 
income elasticity of 2.658, as well as the 2.26 estimate for the Bach Society (in Louisville), were not 
statistically significant.  Furthermore, this suspiciously high income elasticity of 6.134 is derived in an 
equation with only ticket price and concert hall capacity as control variables.  The authors note that 
several organizational quality variables, as well as promotional expenditures, were dropped due to poor 
performance. However, they do not discuss reasons for omitting some measure of regional age 
distribution or educational level.  Either multicollinearity concerns, or a lack of variability in those 
measures over the relatively brief 10 year period could have been cited, but neither is real per capita 
income likely to vary greatly in a decade.  Even more importantly, that high income elasticity estimate 
dropped to the 2.658 noted above and lost statistical significance when a proxy variable was added to 
account for a four year period in which the conductor of the Louisville Orchestra and his successor 
were widely unpopular (the only statistically significant variable in that equation, but with a relatively 
low elasticity of - 0.301).  Hence, this evidence for higher income elasticities of demand when using 
organization specific data is not compelling.71   
 
  The Greckel and Felton (1987) study is notable as one of only nine focusing on individual 
performing arts organizations.  However, in addition to Abbé-Decarroux (1994) and Schimmelpfennig 
(1997) cited above, Throsby (1990) and Forrest et al. (2000) lacked income data.  Abbé-Decarroux and 
Grin (1992) estimated logit models that included pre-tax monthly personal income, but those estimated 
probability coefficients (of going to performances more than twice per year) were quite small (although 
statistically significant for two of three organizations).   Only one of the Corning and Levy (2002) 
income elasticities for their target theater company across three geographical venues exceeded one 
while also being statistically significant.   Gapinski’s (1984) study of production and demand functions 
                                                          
 71 Carson and Mobilia (1989) also find high standardized income elasticities for Broadway that 
are highly sensitive to seasons, with highly positive income elastic demand for the fall, winter and 
spring seasons, but highly negative income elastic demand during the summer season. Given the outlier 
nature of their estimates (+ 5.78 to - 4.74) and the lack of any modeling foundation compared to, say, 
Moore 1966, who found dramatically different results (although not adjusting for seasonality), it is 
difficult to know how much weight to place on these income elasticity results.  They also found 
unusual evidence of a negative effect of past consumption on current consumption, although their focus 
on weeks rather than years as the relevant time period adds credibility to that result given the well-
known sporadic attendance patterns of many arts consumers (see also 3.2.3 below).     
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for the Royal Shakespeare Company (RSC) does generate a statistically significant income elasticity 
above one (1.33) in an equation with only price and the constant term.  While he is willing to conclude 
that “an RSC cultural experience is a luxury good,” he faced considerable difficulty in eliminating 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems and, even after correcting for those problems, was 
forced to eliminate seven of his eight demand equations “because of intercept or substitute-price 
insignificance” (p. 463).  Thus, the evidence is quite mixed that estimating demand at the individual 
organizational level will reliably result in higher income elasticities compared to more aggregated data.             
 
 In summary, and ignoring the further issue of the proper interpretation of the results (section 
3.1.2), we can conclude that the own price elasticities reported in Table 11 are sensitive to the level of 
aggregation of the data, with the conventional wisdom of a price inelastic demand for the performing 
arts significantly weakened by more refined studies that distinguish individual from groups of 
organizations, and that more carefully segment differing consumer groups and are also able to more 
clearly identify actual transaction prices.  However, the finding that income elasticities of demand for 
the arts are not compellingly high, and are generally inconsistent with the arts being luxury goods, is 
not particularly sensitive to the level of aggregation of the analysis.  Income elasticities, however, are 
more likely to be high in those very few studies attempting to separate the price of leisure from the 
“pure” income effects, most notably Withers (1980), whose “time-allocation” estimates ranged from 
1.43 to 2.78.  The Ekelund and Ritenour (1999) variation, which is not as carefully specified, generated 
a normalized income elasticity of 0.78.   However, while that separation is clearly important to properly 
isolate the “pure” income elasticity effect, neither of those studies controlled for either education or 
some alternative measure of arts experience or training (see 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 below), hence providing 
incomplete evidence regarding the arts as a luxury good  
 
3.2  Are There Unique Challenges to Estimating Arts Demand? 
 
 A persistent theme among cultural economists has been the degree to which the arts represent 
merely another application of standard economic methods as opposed to a truly unique analytical 
challenge.72   References have already been made to the commonality in econometric work of 
unresolved aggregation and product-differentiation problems and the utilization of standard parametric 
linear estimation.  It is therefore not surprising that Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette begin their own 
brief survey of arts demand (2003) by initially suggesting that specifying and estimating arts demand 
“is not essentially different from the demand for more down-to-earth consumer goods and services,” 
and that only after confronting those standard problems should one consider the “specificity of ‘art’” 
(p. 201).   However, regarding the characteristics of art that are especially problematic, they highlight 
those that challenge the following conventional assumptions generally made to simplify empirical 
                                                          
 72 Among many possible references, Frey (2000) provides a carefully reasoned overview. 
Throsby (1994) characterizes Scandizzo (1992) as finding that growth rates for cultural consumption 
are “chaotic and unstable, due to the fact that it is rational to respond to the peculiar cumulative 
features of culture in a seemingly irrational way”(Throsby, 1994, p. 3).  While Throsby then argues that 
“notions of mystery, imagination and the unfathomable creative impulse” are no  doubt present in 
production and consumption decisions in the arts, the analysis of aggregate data is able to find 
systematic patterns basically consistent with standard economic theory.  
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analysis: (1) product homogeneity; (2) established and not dramatically heterogeneous tastes; (3) 
independence of choice among individuals; and (4) quality variations that, where important, might be 
measured more tangibly without raising troubling issues of “aesthetics.”73  
 
 A somewhat related categorization scheme is used here to thematically organize the discussion 
of how particular studies confronted the standard as well as the unique problems of estimating arts 
demand.74    
3.2.1   The Basic Problems: Measurement and Modeling   
 
 The most common research lament deals with the inadequacies of the data.75  Historically, 
cultural economists may have had a strong case that the traditional lack of business savvy among artists 
and arts organizations that hindered coherent data collection and reporting, when combined with the 
tedious but perennial question “what is art?” made their job especially challenging.   Without doubt, the 
seminal impact of Baumol and Bown (1966) was in large part the result of their uniquely rich database 
in addition to the provocative quality of their analysis.  Even then, empirical work in the performing 
arts was nearly impossible prior to the Ford Foundation’s extensive survey (1974),76 followed by 
another by the National Research Center of the Arts (1976), which also stimulated efforts in other 
countries to further improve the quality of their own data.   Therefore, one feature of many topics in the 
arts economics literature is the degree to which basic data gathering and attempts to develop consistent 
standards of measurement have competed for attention with modeling and analysis. 
 
  Conditions have certainly improved in terms of tax-financed studies such as that traditionally 
done by the venerable Arts Council of Great Britain but also extending to other countries (e.g., even in 
                                                          
 73 Shanahan (1978) provides a traditional version of how aesthetics may complicate the 
analysis, but Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2003) are more optimistic.  After conceding that “the 
extent to which aesthetic emotions are amenable to economic analysis and measurement remains to be 
shown,” they cite their 1996 study in support of using the directly reported satisfaction of those 
experiencing an arts event as a surprisingly easy way to confront the problem (2003, p. 211).  This is 
discussed further in 3.2.3 and 3.2.5 below.    
 74 While some papers are quite logically discussed in one of these particular categories, it 
should be clear that at times the variety of issues addressed by any given paper could have qualified it 
for inclusion elsewhere, including in categories not identified in this listing.   
 75 One example of both the problem and the improving conditions (noted below) is the 
Luksetich and Lange (1995) observation that in all of their earlier work on symphony orchestras they 
had been severely constrained by data limitations, including an absence of usable data for more than 
one year.  However, due to the generosity of the American Symphony Orchestra League providing 
them with truly extensive data on a proprietary basis, they were now able to seriously address those 
limitations (p. 51).      
 76  In addition to the descriptive data published by The Ford Foundation (1974) and discussed in 
section 2.1, more extensive Ford data was also critical for some econometric demand analysis (e.g. 
Touchstone, 1980; Gapinski, 1981).  
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the United States, where despite desperate under-funding, the NEA Research Division has frequently 
generated data that have become international benchmarks, as with the periodic Surveys of Public 
Participation in the Arts).  These government efforts have been supplemented by an increasingly rich 
array of private non-profit and university centers devoted to arts research.77  Furthermore, despite the 
frustrations of obtaining reliable data from arts organizations, it is also common for authors of arts 
demand studies to cite the unusual degree of cooperation (sometimes after failed efforts) given to them 
by individual or groups of arts organizations (e.g., Felton, 1989 paying homage to Opera America for 
rescuing her after receiving assistance from only five of 20 personally contacted opera companies; 
Schimmelpfennig, 1997 getting unusual cooperation from the Royal Opera House Covent Garden; and 
Abbé-Decarroux and Grin, 1992, working closely with three major cultural organizations in Geneva).    
                                                          
 77 This phenomenon is especially notable in the United States, where the more modest 
governmental role in arts financing and policy-making has created a void to be filled by such 
organizations. 
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 One dilemma that is not unique to arts economics but is quite prevalent in this literature is that a 
particular data set or research agenda that may overcome one type of missing information problem, or 
that may address one deficiency in previous research, may be incapable of incorporating other critical 
demand determining variables whose exclusion is undesirable in a fully specified demand model.  For 
example, Globerman and Book (1977) use audience survey data and an explicit household production 
model to try to improve the estimate of the income elasticity of demand by directly incorporating the 
role of education in increasing productivity in the consumption of arts activities.  However, they lack 
ticket price data and “borrow” long-run price elasticity results from Houthakker and Taylor (1970) to 
draw certain inferences about the relative productive effect of education on the arts compared to other 
activities in the aggregate.  Lange and Luksetich (1984) obtain data that allow them to derive price 
elasticities that vary across three different types of orchestras, but the lack of consumer income data in 
their regressions raises questions as to the reliability of those results.78   Other examples of studies that 
address previous weaknesses in the literature but cannot escape problems with missing variables 
include: (1) Throsby (1990), who addresses the absence of systematic quality variables in previous arts 
demand studies, but is missing income as well as education data in his analysis; (2) Forrest et al. 
(2000), who effectively incorporate distance traveled into their theater demand analysis but are able to 
use education and age as the only control variables in their equations; (3) Schimmelpfennig, who 
confronts the issue of price elasticity variations as a function of differing seating sections in a ballet 
theater, but has no other control variables and is forced to use a quite restrictive assumption about 
product homogeneity across two different ballets;79 (4) Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, who 
provide an unusually rich analytical framework to assess “learning-by-consuming” supplemented by a 
database with 58 independent variables, but that does not allow the direct measurement of either 
consumer income or arts admission prices; and (5) Lewis and Seaman (2004), who are able to use 
unique data from the U.S. General Social Survey to address the previously ignored topic of sexual 
orientation (and religious affiliation) in arts demand controlling for many other demand determining 
variables, but cannot incorporate any arts pricing or quality variables given that particular data source. 
 
 In addition to data limitations, economists have wrestled with the important issue of whether to 
                                                          
 78 For example, see Green et al. (1992) on the bias created by omitting income in demand 
function estimation.   
 79 The Royal Ballet Summer Season that is examined consists of 16 performances (nine of 
which included in the estimations) of two full-length works (for 1995, Giselle and Sleeping Beauty).  
Schimmelpfennig uses the highest prices for (eventually) three seating categories. Such prices are the 
same for each performance of any one ballet, but that price schedule is higher for Sleeping Beauty than 
for Giselle.  Therefore, he is forced to assume that both ballets are homogeneous in order to get the 
necessary price variation across his observations, an assumption that he recognizes (p. 121) is 
contradicted by the very existence of two different price schedules, but that he views as acceptable for 
his purposes of examining the relationship between actual prices and revenue-maximizing prices.  That 
he finds evidence of elastic “median price elasticities” for both ballets across each of the three 
examined seating areas (with such elasticities especially high for both the highest and lowest priced 
areas) runs counter to the bulk of the evidence about arts price elasticities, and his policy proposal for 
price cuts is similarly unusual, although it explicitly recognizes the link between price level and 
estimated elasticity that is often missing from the arts demand literature (section 3.1.2).  
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model arts demand using a single equation by treating the performing arts market as essentially a 
recursive process in which supply decisions are not determined in the same time period as demand, or 
to model arts demand as one of several equations in which key endogenous variables are determined 
simultaneously, hence requiring more complex estimation techniques.   These measurement and 
modeling issues are exhibited by describing the key features of Moore (1966), Withers (1980), and 
Luksetich and Lange (1995).  Some of the essential features of these papers have been alluded to 
previously, including price measurement issues and the most important results.  The focus is on the 
modeling, including how the available data influenced modeling choices.  Clearly, only the most 
critical features of these papers can be addressed here.80   
 
 1. Moore: “The Demand for Broadway Theatre Tickets” (1966) 
 
 Moore’s (1968) The Economics of the American Theater has not as much influence as Baumol 
and Bowen’s treatise published two years earlier (1966), but it is rightly regarded as a classic in 
cultural economics.  The essence of the demand analysis that was published in 1966 focuses on the 
question of why Broadway attendance had increased so modestly between 1933 and 1963 (20 percent) 
despite an increase of 160 percent in real per capita gross national product, a more than doubling of 
ticket sales for spectator sports, and a more than tripling of spending on the performing arts. 
 
 Moore does not present an explicit utility maximizing framework, but focuses on developing a 
defensible econometric model to estimate critical demand elasticities that may solve his puzzle of 
observed low Broadway attendance growth.   Since ticket prices are fixed in any one time period, an 
explicit time-series model is necessary to derive price elasticity, and a more broadly defined full 
attendance cost elasticity of demand.81  Since the role of income is complicated by its relationship to 
both the price of tickets purchased and other features of the explicit and implicit cost of attendance, he 
also explores those relationships through a cross-sectional audience survey of seven Broadway houses 
and 18 performances.   Using the cross-section results he runs preliminary regressions to isolate the 
effects of income and “time to go home” on the dependent variables: cost of evening, cost of evening 
per person, cost of tickets, and cost of everything but tickets per person.  He also uses the cross-section 
survey results to estimate an income elasticity of 1.03 based on relative frequency of attendance as a 
function of income.   
 
 His time-series model includes three equations related to the ith time period, with A representing 
                                                          
 80 Another modeling issue that has been less prevalent in the arts demand literature, but is 
nevertheless important is the functional form to choose when estimating a system of demand equations 
for differentiated goods so as to make parameter estimation feasible.  For example, both logit and the 
almost ideal demand system (e.g Pommerehne and Kirchgassner, 1987) can be viewed as imposing 
constraints on substitution patterns so as limit the number of parameters that would have to be 
estimated.    
 81 Throsby and Withers (1979, p. 111) observe that time-series analysis is more appropriate “for 
past analysis and for prediction” since time-series data is capable of describing the effect on behavior 
of changes in a variable whereas a cross-section elasticity can only describe  the effects of differences 
in that variable.  
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attendance82, Y income (which he adjusts in estimation to be a “permanent” as opposed to “actual” 
income measure), C the cost of attending the theater, S the number of shows (musicals and non-
musicals), P ticket prices, M a dummy variable for sound movies, T the transportation cost to the 
theater, and O the other costs of attending a Broadway play: 
 
(1)   Ai = f (Yi ,Ci ,Si ) 
(2)       Si = g (Ai ,Pi ,Mi ) 
(3) Ci = h (Pi ,Ti ,Oi  ) 
 
 He then postulates that average attendance per show is probably a constant, so that a long run 
equilibrium condition can be expressed as A = α S, yielding a four equation system with four 
endogenous variables, A, S, P and C.   However, since it cannot be assumed that the market is 
necessarily ever in long-run equilibrium, price is treated as exogenous.  Furthermore, given the lack of 
adequate data regarding travel expenses and other expenses of attending the theater, he assumes that 
such costs, including those related to population movements within the New York area, have no trend 
over his 1928-1963 time period and are uncorrelated with the other variables, allowing him to drop 
equation (3) and substitute price Pi for cost Ci in equation (1).   
 
 These modifications allow him to estimate three basic variations of the model: (1) a “naive” 
approach that assumes that the supply of shows is determined outside the system, estimated both as 
linear (with elasticities defined at the means) and multiplicative (with elasticities given by the 
coefficients), where attendance is regressed on price, income and the number of shows, with a dummy 
variable for movies added in some formulations; (2) a simultaneous equation approach using two-stage 
least squares (again both linear and multiplicative) that does not treat shows and attendance as a 
recursive process; and (3) two-stage estimation, but with the income elasticity constrained to equal its 
value estimated from the cross-section data (i.e. 1.03) as a way to limit the bias in the income elasticity 
estimate created by the absence of population and travel expense independent variables, which are 
likely to be correlated with income.  While Moore (and others, e.g. Throsby and Withers, 1979, p. 111) 
recognize that the use of a cross-section estimated income elasticity to correct for this potential bias in 
the time-series estimation of the relationship between income and attendance is problematic, any 
possible upward bias in the other coefficients caused by this “extraneous estimate” appears to have 
been minor, inasmuch as the price elasticity in this “constrained” two-stage case increases only to 
0.632 (in absolute value) when compared to the 0.558 estimated from the same two-stage equation 
without income being forced to its cross-sectional value.  There is also only a modest effect on the 
                                                          
 82 It was previously noted that Moore estimated price using an average of the most expensive 
seats for a regular performance of each production during his chosen month of February for each year, 
an approach whose weaknesses he recognized but considered acceptable as an unbiased index over 
time (1966, p. 83).  But the derivation of attendance figures was also not without complexity.  
Attendance for an average week in February of each year was estimated by “dividing the total gross 
receipts for musicals and nonmusicals separately by the average top ticket price,” which was then 
multiplied by 1.6, defined as the “mean ratio of the price of the best seats to the average list price of all 
seats during the 1950's,” with the two resulting figures summed to get the total of musical but 
nonmusical attendance (p. 83).  Moore obtained much of these data from Variety magazine, as noted in 
Table 11.     
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“number of shows elasticity of demand,” which rises only to 1.143 in the constrained equation relative 
to its value of 1.07 in the unconstrained case.83           
 
 While there are many aspects of the Moore (1966) analysis that are of interest, the four most 
important results are: (1) as documented in Table 11, the essential price and income elasticities are less 
than one in absolute value, and those results are largely independent of the specific econometric 
specification utilized; (2) the low income elasticity results in all of the time-series estimations were 
surprising to Moore and prompted him to observe that he had not been capable of controlling for the 
opportunity cost of time in theater-going, a factor likely to be especially significant for high income 
patrons; (3) despite the fact that Moore believed that it was a “dubious” assumption to consider the 
number of shows (his equation 2) as being determined “outside the system,” the fact that shifting to 
two-stage estimation increased the price elasticity results only trivially compared to the naive single-
equation cases (i.e. from an absolute value of 0.482 to 0.532 in the linear case, and from 0.453 to 0.558 
in the double-log multiplicative case) has led most later researchers to justify the use of single-equation 
recursive techniques as opposed to developing simultaneous equation systems to estimate arts demand; 
and (4) despite (3), there have been some creative attempts to develop multi-equation models, although 
it is unclear how much they were inspired by Moore’s early formulation.84   
 2. Withers: “Unbalanced Growth and the Demand for the Performing Arts: An Econometric 
Analysis” (1980)  
                                                          
 83 However, the total R2 computed on the basis of attendance with income removed in the 
constrained equation is only .554 in contrast to being .80 in the unconstrained case.  In general, R2 
values are uniformly high across all of the Moore formulations - as high as .878 in the naive linear case, 
and no lower than .626 in any other case (i.e. the two-stage least squares semi-log model).   
 84 One paper that was certainly influenced by Moore (1966) is Kelejian and Lawrence (1980) 
which is often cited despite its only quite preliminary regression results.  This is due to their audacious 
seven equation model of Broadway theater demand that proposes to estimate: (1) tickets demanded; (2) 
the number of tourists; (3) the amount of crime; (4) aggregate New York region income; (5) theater 
sector income; (6) the average tax rate imposed on city residents; and (7) the city population.  They 
only reported preliminary results for the tickets demanded equation as a function of the number of 
tourists, the population in the city versus the suburbs, the price of tickets, the amount of crime, and a 
trend variable, and no further results were ever revealed.   While not citing Moore (1966), Jenkins and 
Austen-Smith (1987) develop and test a five equation model with dependent variables theater price, 
program mix, arts council grants, local authority grants, and quantity of tickets sold.  As noted above, 
their statistically significant positive ticket price elasticity result was clearly enigmatic, although they 
also generated some useful results on the demand effects of income vs. education, as well as modest 
early results on quality (program mix).  This work is further discussed below regarding those issues, as 
well as in the concluding summary regarding the effects of using more sophisticated econometric 
techniques.  The somewhat different simultaneous model developed by Luksetich and Lange for 
orchestras (1995), also does not cite Moore (1966) although reflecting some of its features.  Krebs and 
Pommerehne (1995) cite Moore (1966), and test three hypotheses about the behavior of arts consumers, 
public donors (via decisions made by bureaucrats and politicians), and theater managers, but estimate 
equations for arts visitors per capita, real government subsidies, and the quality of performances (i.e. 
share of popular works) using standard OLS to estimate linear equations.        
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 This paper, which reflects the Moore (1966) concern about the potential understatement in the 
income elasticity of demand caused by time costs, as well as by the apparent practical appropriateness 
of using single equation estimation even in the face of potential simultaneity problems, continues to be 
among the most influential in the arts demand literature.  This is especially true when combined with 
the expanded commentary about arts demand estimation methodology in the closely related Throsby 
and Withers (1979, chapters 3 and 7), which also reported results derived from the same modeling 
using Australian data.  As with Moore (1966), it was motivated by a question beyond the mere 
mechanics of demand estimation: Could the financial strains of the performing arts identified by 
Baumol and Bowen (1966) be overcome by growing prosperity in the overall economy?85   Economic 
growth creates two well-known but competing effects: (1) rising consumer incomes that should 
increase the demand for all normal goods, and provide an even greater demand shift for luxury goods 
with income elasticities above unity; and (2) an increase in the price of time spent in consumption that 
would create incentives to substitute away from especially time-intensive activities.86   
 
 The basic model is a straightforward application of basic economic theory postulating quantity 
demanded as a function of relative prices and income.  It is adjusted to reflect the realities of using 
aggregated data applicable to the entire performing arts (theater, opera, ballet, modern dance, 
symphony concerts and chamber recitals) for the period 1929-1973 (largely from the U.S. Survey of 
Current Business along with basic wage, employment, income distribution, and price index data from 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Series D626).  Hence, the general estimating equation, 
defined for all time periods t,  is: 
 
(4) (Q / Pop) = f (PA, PS, I, D) 
 
where Q/Pop is the number of attendances per capita in the population, the P terms are the price of 
attendance and the price of substitutes respectively, I is income, and D is a measure of the distribution 
of income (defined to increase with inequality favoring the wealthy).  Expected partial derivatives are 
positive for all variables except “own price.”   Withers’ normalization of the attendance dependent 
variable by dividing by population became conventional in many arts demand studies.  
 
 Withers’ critical contribution was to adapt the Owen (1969) approach to adjusting hourly wage 
rates by the unemployment rate so as to better measure “leisure price,” and then utilize the Becker 
(1965) concept of “full income” (defined over all available hours, not just working hours) so as to 
impute leisure time as part of this full income, while incorporating the price of leisure into the 
                                                          
 85 This issue was also addressed in the section 2.3 discussion of possible changes in audience 
overlap behavior over time, and the possible effects of changing overall population demographics on 
performing arts audiences (linked to the so-called Cwi hypothesis).   
 86  The classic references to these important concepts are Becker (1965) and Linder (1970), 
although Withers cites Owen (1969) as the inspiration for the method of separating pure income from 
leisure price effects in work-leisure choice models.  As noted by Withers (1980, fn. 2), Baumol (1973) 
later addressed these competing effects and recognized their importance to his unbalanced growth 
model.  
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consumer price index deflator.  This generates the alternative “time allocation” estimating model 
defined for all time periods t: 
 
(5)  (Q/Pop) = f (PA, PS, PL, F, D) 
 
with the new variables PL defined as the price of leisure, and F as full income.   In turn, those two 
variables are defined as: 
 
(6)   PL = w (1 - UR), where w is the hourly wage rate and UR is the unemployment rate, and  
full income is the standard Becker formulation: 
 
(7)  F = TC PL + TW w + Y, with TC and TW defined as hours of consumption and hours of  
work (1 - TC) respectively, and Y defined as property income.  Furthermore, the adjusted price index 
FPI is derived as: 
 
(8) FPI = k(CPI) + (1 - k) PLI, where CPI is the standard consumer price index, PLI is the  
“leisure price index” and k is the weight of non-leisure income in full income.  The expected signs on 
the first partial derivatives in equation (2) are the same as in the non-time allocation model of equation 
(1) for own price, substitute price and income distribution (D), and negative for the two new leisure 
price variable (PL), while positive for the full income variable (F).  The arts are considered a priori to 
be a “superior time-intensive good” in this formulation. 
 
 Withers utilizes single equation estimation, justified in part by the Moore (1966) demonstration 
that two-stage least squares tests had almost no effect on the results compared to single equation 
estimation, but also due to his belief that the performing arts market is inherently recursive in structure, 
with price in one time period affecting attendance in that same period, but any supply of new 
performances having an observable effect no earlier than the next time period due to the “advance 
planning and announcement of production and seasons and their prices that is typically required in this 
industry” (Withers, 1980, p. 737).87  Thus, ordinary least squares is used with the double-log 
transformation to generate direct elasticity estimates from the coefficients (and also due to prior 
econometric evidence that this form is preferable for non-necessities in single good estimation, pp. 737-
738).   
 
 Withers also emphasizes the use of real rather than nominal value variables to avoid money 
                                                          
 87 As discussed above in part 2.3 in the context of assessing the debate about arts booms, 
Heilbrun (1984, 1996) stressed the difficulties in smoothly increasing the quantity supplied of arts 
services and emphasized the role that periodic supply shifts can play in later stimulating observed 
increases in arts attendance.  However, those observations are never linked in the econometric literature 
to the issue of whether to use single or simultaneous equation methods.  In addition to the regular 
citation of Withers (1980) to justify single equation estimation, it is sometimes noted that Houthhakker 
and Taylor (1970) used single equation models in their static-adjustment estimation of expenditure 
functions for theater and opera (as part of their more general analysis of consumer demand in the 
United States), which while incorporating various lag structures into the analysis did not feel compelled 
to adjust for any simultaneity problems.    
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illusion and to impose a homogeneity constraint, and cites the use of per-capita terms as necessary to 
“neutralize changes of scale in the population” in order to “examine allocation of the average budget” 
(p. 738).  In order to adjust for the aggregation problem that this creates, the income distribution 
variable D is important (measured as either factor share or Gini coefficient), and also allows for the 
testing of the notion that greater equality is “bad” for arts demand.  Four other features in the Withers 
estimation are notable: (1) to reflect the possibility of “habit persistence” and only partial adjustment to 
change within any one time period, as suggested by Houthakker and Taylor (1970), both the 
“conventional” and the time-allocation estimation models are adjusted to incorporate a lagged 
dependent variable; (2) in the face of finding no “convincing” way to incorporate dynamic quality 
changes in the performing arts, the possibility of unexplained variance and coefficient bias is 
recognized, although possibly limited to the extent that “performance quality is predominately 
determined by innate performer ability” (p. 738); (3) to adjust for possible unexplained taste changes 
over time, estimation is done over the largely pre-World War II period 1929-1948 and the post-war 
period 1949-1973, as well as for the integrated period 1929-1973; and (4) given the aggregative nature 
of the data, the measure of the price of substitutes was especially problematic; the choice of the 
“reading and recreation component of the consumer price index” (available only from 1935; for 1929-
1934 estimates from Owen (1969) were used) also was influential in many later arts demand studies.        
 
     Table 12 reports the most important results for the three time period equations estimated with  
both the conventional model and the time allocation model (minor variables and statistics are omitted). 
The dependent variable is the performing arts attendance rate (i.e. attendance divided by the 
population), with t-statistics cited below the coefficients.  The consumer price index deflator is 
applicable to the conventional model, while the full price index deflator applies to the time allocation 
model.  Income in the conventional model is personal disposable income per capita (PDI).  The more 
complex full income in the time allocation model is the sum of PDI and “per capita leisure income,” 
constructed by using the average weekly working hours from historical data and assuming that personal 
maintenance time is fixed at 80 hours per week (with the remainder of weekly hours spent on 
consumption, defined as a weighted average for those in and out of the labor force).  While income 
distribution was defined using Gini coefficients in other regressions (not reported by Withers), that “D” 
variable is defined in Table 12 as the wage and salary share in of national income (so that higher values 
indicate less inequality in income distribution). Price and income coefficients are elasticities.   
 
 There are two broad reasons for the popularity of these results and their frequent citation by 
cultural economists: (1) the largely successful decomposition of the effect of rising income in the time 
allocation model into a relatively high “full-income” effect offset by a smaller real leisure price effect 
is consistent with a priori expectations that the arts can indeed be considered luxury goods that are 
time-intensive in consumption; (2) the inelastic (less than one in absolute value) price elasticities in the 
more  structurally sound time intensive model (which increase to approximately unity or only modestly 
elastic in the conventional model) are also consistent with the a priori notion that the performing arts 
are an “acquired taste” that require sufficient commitments of unique investment in human capital to 
fully appreciate, arguably making other forms of entertainment relatively poor substitutes.  Of course, it 
must 
 
Table 12 
Withers (1966) Results for Performing Arts Demand (United States, 1929-1973) 
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 Price Income Full In Leisure P Sub P In Dist Lag DV 
1929-73 Conventional -0.90 
(-6.44) 
1.08 
(9.01) 
  0.68 
(2.03) 
0.11 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(2.16) 
1929-73 Time 
Allocation 
-0.67 
(-4.60) 
 2.74 
(2.30) 
-1.61 
(-1.45) 
1.06 
(2.52) 
-0.12 
(-0.27) 
0.31 
(3.07) 
1929-48 Conventional -1.07 
(-2.71) 
0.64 
(3.71) 
  0.80 
(1.70) 
-0.63 
(1.30) 
0.41 
(3.24) 
1929-48 Time 
Allocation 
-0.62 
(-2.16) 
 1.43 
(1.97) 
-0.59 
(-1.07) 
0.62 
(1.94) 
0.16 
(0.29) 
0.41 
(5.21) 
1949-73 Conventional -1.19 
(-6.38) 
1.55 
(7.16) 
  1.25 
(1.48) 
-0.59 
(0.77) 
0.19 
(1.26) 
1949-73 Time 
Allocation 
-0.65 
(-2.35) 
 2.78 
(1.46) 
-1.03 
(-1.09) 
1.35 
(1.50) 
-1.15 
(-1.08) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
Note: The equation order and variable labels are modified from Withers Table 1 to facilitate 
comparison of conventional and time allocation results.  Constant term coefficients are not reported 
above, nor are the results of the “depression dummy,” the auto-regression parameters, or summary 
statistics.  R2 is exceedingly high in all equations (.97 and above for both versions of the full period and 
pre-war period equations, and .94 and .86 in the conventional and time allocation estimations of the 
post-war period equations.  The results are adjusted for first-order serial correlation using the Gauss-
Newton algorithm (Withers, 1980, p. 739). 
again be emphasized that these price elasticities are applicable to an extremely aggregated measure of 
the performing arts, and do not apply to specific organizations in specific product and geographic 
markets, nor does their interpretation in Withers (1980) reflect any sensitivity to the issue of the level 
of prices at which such “industry-wide” elasticities are estimated (see part 3.1.2 above).   
 
 Interestingly, perhaps because the use of the reading and recreation component of the CPI as the 
measure of the price of substitutes (“Sub P”) has often been viewed as primarily a tolerable concession 
to data limitations (spawning similar measures in other studies), the cross-price elasticity evidence has 
not typically been stressed.  This is notable since, despite the limitations of that price measure, the 
magnitudes of those positive cross-price elasticity estimates (although with only modest t-statistics) are 
generally  higher (ranging from 0.62 to 1.35 in the time allocation model) than the magnitude of the 
cross-price elasticities estimated by the perennially cited study by Gapinski (1986).  Of course, 
although Gapinski’s cross-price elasticities (when viewed collectively by art form) were generally no 
higher than 0.53 for symphony and as low as 0.12 for theater, his data were much more disaggregated 
than those used by Withers (1980) so that he was able to also estimate cross-price elasticities faced by 
individual arts organizations (three of which were indeed quite high), and the substitute prices were 
much better defined as the prices charged by the other art forms, although in the case of the individual 
organizations, not the prices charged by the other organizations within the same art form (see 3.2.4 
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below).88   These features of the Gapinski (1986) results, along with the fact that the primary purpose of 
that study was to address the degree of art form substitutability, while Withers (1980) was primarily 
focused on clarifying the income effects of arts demand, explain the inattention paid to the cross-price 
elasticity results in the latter study. 
 
 Another major feature of the Withers (1980) study that has been relatively ignored is his 
summary conclusion that his results potentially weaken the case of government support of the 
performing arts on the grounds of financial distress.  That is, the high income elasticities only partially 
offset by the elasticity of the price of leisure in the time allocation model (and in fact the modestly high 
“unadjusted” income elasticity of 1.55 in the conventional model for the most recent time period), 
when combined with the relatively low price elasticities of demand, suggested to Withers that “the 
potential for continued growth on private market support for the performing arts should be recognized” 
(p. 742).   It is ironic that this conclusion would be downplayed inasmuch as the very title of his paper 
announces his interest in exploring the unbalanced growth issue in the performing arts.  On the other 
hand, any possible optimism for the future of the performing arts resulting from Withers’ findings must 
indeed be tempered by: (1) the confirmation that a higher price of leisure does indeed complicate the 
boost that rising incomes can provide to arts demand suggests that continued increases in the price of 
leisure combined with a potential widening disparity between the time-intensiveness of the live 
performing arts versus other substitute forms of entertainment may well lead to stagnating private 
demand for the performing arts (as generally evidenced in the data examined above in 2.3); and (2) a 
more sober recognition that low price elasticities of demand at the national “industry” level may have 
little relationship to the price elasticities actually faced in localized markets by individual arts 
organizations (see fn. 90 below), and at best, a recognition that such low price elasticities may merely 
suggest that arts organizations might be able to raise revenues by increasing ticket prices above current 
levels until they move into the price elastic range of their demand curves, again moderates the degree 
of optimism that these results can generate.89   
 
                                                          
 88 This aspect of the Gapinski (1986) results can easily be missed.  For example, in an otherwise 
enlightening overview of the methodological issues involved in defining substitute goods and services 
for cinema, Fernández Blanco and BaZos-Pino (1997) observe that Gapinski “shows that the best 
substitute for a theater play is not a film, but a different theater play” (pp. 62-63).  In fact, the substitute 
price for the two theaters in the Gapinski database is the average of prices of opera, symphony and 
dance only (Gapinski, 1986, p. 21).   
 89 Another feature of the Withers results that is sometimes forgotten is that when his model was 
applied to both Australian and Canadian data in Throsby and Withers (1979), the results were not as 
strong statistically.  In the Australian case, while the ticket price elasticities  were largely consistent 
with the American results, no significant income effect was found using either the conventional or the 
time allocation model (pp. 115-117).  While Throsby and Withers attribute some of these problems to 
weaknesses in their Australian data, it is interesting that those data are at least less aggregated than in 
the U.S. case (i.e. applying to seven major professional performance companies, although over a 
shorter time period of 1964-1974; p. 115). Any degree of freedom and related problems were even 
more severe in the Canadian data, and the model could not be estimated in that case at all (Throsby and 
Withers, 1979, p. 112).    
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 Despite the frequent citation of the Withers (1980) analysis of the decomposition of the income 
effect, it has spawned almost no direct efforts to replicate the results, further improve the model, or 
apply the model to better data.90  Nevertheless, it is common to rationalize estimated low or statistically 
insignificant standard income elasticities by referring back to the Withers (or less frequently the more 
extended Throsby and Withers, 1979) analysis, and also to explain in part any evidence for a stronger 
estimated effect of education relative to income as a result of the conflicting forces associated with 
changes in income (see 3.2.2 below).    
 
 However, Ekelund and Ritenour (1999) represents a modest attempt to focus on this problem 
and isolate the effect of the time costs on U.S. symphony concert demand using a less aggregated unit 
of analysis than Withers, although still an aggregation of anonymous individual orchestra data as 
supplied by the American Symphony Orchestra League (ASOL) for 1973 to 1992 as supplemented by 
other data sources.91  They estimate a single linear OLS equation, traditionally citing both Moore 1966 
and Withers 1980 as justification for using a recursive model, which they suggest may be even more 
justified for orchestras than for Broadway (admirably, they also independently test for possible 
simultaneity bias and find none in their data ).  They regress annual per capita symphony orchestra 
concert attendance on ticket price (annual earned income divided by annual attendance), the price of 
audio recordings (their price of substitutes, calculated similarly as total annual revenues divided by 
recordings sold), annual real disposable income, and their key variable, the cost of time (as measured 
by the annual average real hourly wage rate).   Only the coefficient on the substitute price variable 
behaves poorly (negative in sign rather than positive, and significant at only the 0.10 level).  The own 
price coefficient is negative and strongly statistically significant (although low in magnitude consistent 
                                                          
 90 Although on occasion, a study will include some variable paying homage to Withers (1980), 
but never in the context of a formal time allocation model that attempts to separate pure income and 
leisure price effects.  For example, Corning and Levy (2002) include “leisure” defined as the 
construction industry wage rate multiplied by (1 - unemployment rate) in California along with as many 
as 33 other variables in their conditional maximum likelihood estimates for three different Southern 
California theater locations. Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is negative but not statistically significant in two 
equations, and significant at the 0.05 level, but perversely positive, in the third equation.  They explain 
that the construction industry wage the only such variable available on monthly basis (Corning and 
Levy, 2002, note 4, p. 234). 
 91 Ekelund and Ritenour acknowledge this aggregation problem by noting that results may be 
different if city or SMSA data were to be used for specific orchestras.  As direct evidence of this 
prospect, they cite an anonymous reader whose own analysis of panel data for five different U.S. 
orchestras in five different cities found positive not negative effects of the wage variable (the measure 
of the opportunity cost of time), but with only marginal statistical significance, as well as no economic 
or statistical significance from the income variable - both results at odds with those reported by 
Ekelund and Ritenour using aggregated orchestra data (see their fn. 12, p. 897).  While the authors note 
that such intercity tests would also require inclusion of independent variables beyond income and the 
wage rate to account for potentially significant intercity differences (including substitutes uniquely 
available to a particular city or region), they concede the potential importance of such alternative tests 
of the “Becker time cost hypothesis”( their fn. 12).   
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with a low ticket price elasticity of demand), while income has a positive effect on attendance per 
capita (but with a normalized coefficient suggesting less than unit elasticity) and the wage rate (value 
of time) has a negative coefficient (significant at the 0.05 level).    
 
 Despite its modeling limitations and remaining aggregation problems (fn. 91), the Ekelund and 
Ritenour (1999) results are consistent with the fundamental idea that any positive income effect on arts 
demand (which is already smaller in their study than in Withers, and not comparable to the Withers full 
income concept) will be partially counterbalanced by the time intensive nature of live performances 
and the opportunity cost of that time. They are duly cautious in evaluating their findings, but 
interestingly tend to stress the threats to the arts resulting from their results in contrast to the more 
optimistic assessment provided by Withers (1980).   
 
 3. Luksetich and Lange: “A Simultaneous Model of Nonprofit Symphony Orchestra Behavior” 
(1995)   
 
 As with Moore (1966) and Withers (1980), Lukestich and Lange (1995) had a broader purpose 
for their research than just estimating demand functions.  They wanted to test various hypotheses about 
the motivations and objectives of non-profit performing arts enterprises (using orchestras as an example 
based on extensive data made available by the ASOL) drawing heavily on Hansmann (1980, 1981) for 
theoretical inspiration.  They had previously employed two-stage least squares methods to estimate 
orchestra demand in Lange and Luksetich (1984), first estimating their ticket price variable as a 
function of the exogenous variables in both a demand and a supply equation prior to inserting it into 
their second stage demand equations for three different orchestra sizes.92  Their key findings in (1984) 
were: (1) price elasticities (evaluated at the means) vary by orchestra size, becoming more elastic as the 
size of the orchestra falls, with major orchestra demand quite inelastic and metro orchestra demand 
modestly elastic (urban/community orchestra demand was modestly elastic but not statistically 
significant); (2) the price elasticities became less elastic with the inclusion of a donor price variable 
(measured as total donations divided by attendance), although the donor price elasticities themselves 
were not statistically significant (negative and no higher than -0.212 in value); (3) their total sample 
price elasticity estimate of about -0.48 both with and without donor price was notably close to 
estimates from the major prior studies; and (4) the authors conclude that “in general,” when comparing 
the OLS and the 2SLS results, there is support for the use of the 2SLS approach and the elasticities of 
the non-price determinants were stable regardless of procedure.93   
 
  The superior database for the 1995 paper allowed for a more thorough exploration of the 
relationship between factors under managerial control and various orchestra performance measures, 
                                                          
 92 A related paper (Lange et al., 1986) confirmed that equations for orchestras of different size 
and classification should be estimated separately; see also Luksetich and Lange (1995, p. 52).  
 93 However, the case for the superiority of the more complex approach is not overwhelming.  
The authors note that the estimated equations of “price” from the single-equation estimation of 2SLS 
varied widely regarding the adjusted R2 results across the orchestra sub-samples, possibly suggesting 
that the instrument price in the second stage is not necessary because the firms are not price takers so 
that no supply curve exists (Lange and Luksetich, 1984, p. 43).   
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which they modeled as a six-equation system with attendance, average price, administrative expenses, 
orchestra quality (using non-administrative orchestra spending as a proxy, which is an expansion of the 
“wages” variable they had used in 1984), number of concerts, and donations simultaneously 
determined.   The model is estimated using two-stage least squares regression with the second stage 
estimated using pooled cross-section, time-series techniques with estimates corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  Of particular interest are their observations about the unique  
aspects of the industry that must be incorporated into the analysis (pp. 52-53): (1) After noting that a 
standard market clearing equilibrium constraint is not helpful, they contrast orchestral production  
measured as concerts (specifically, the total number of concerts in the home metropolitan area divided 
by the metro area or county population) with the actual consumption of cultural experiences, measured 
as actual attendance(specifically, total home attendance divided by the home metropolitan area or 
county population);94 (2) Since orchestras rely on donated revenue as well as earned ticket revenue, 
they may actively try to encourage “voluntary price discrimination” by generating a pricing strategy 
that is not focused on the ticket market alone; furthermore the reaction of patrons regarding their donor 
decisions may be influenced by the ticket prices they pay, making a “total per performance market 
clearing price” impossible to compute; (3) The equation estimating the number of concerts should not 
be viewed as a supply equation given the local market power that individual orchestras are likely to 
have; hence a well-defined supply curve does not exist and cannot be estimated; (4) However, since 
orchestral managers may well have an objective of maximizing attendance, the number of concerts 
directly affects the total availability of seating for orchestral services; and (5) Therefore, their 
econometric model includes a partitioned set of jointly determined variables, distinguishing variables 
under the control of management (ticket prices, the number of concerts, performance quality, and 
administrative expenses) from the simultaneously determined variables under the control of consumers 
(concert attendance and donations). 
 
 Because Luksetich and Lange (1995) is perhaps the best example of estimating arts demand as 
part of a multi-equation simultaneous equation system using two-stage least squares estimation 
techniques, and due to the implications of the findings, their empirical results are reported in detail.95  
                                                          
 94 While one implication of this distinction is to avoid having the same dependent variable in 
their demand equation as in their concert production equation, it is also potentially consistent with the 
separation of production decisions and consumption decisions that was important in justifying single-
equation estimation of arts demand equations due to an absence of simultaneity bias.  By viewing the 
provision of concerts as no more than the “opportunity to consume cultural experiences” (Luksetich 
and Lange, 1995, p. 52), they come close to suggesting a recursive rather than the simultaneous process 
that they actually propose.  However, as seen with the listed characteristic (5) below, they reject a 
recursive process by effectively complying with the spirit of the frequent characterization of live 
performances (in sports as well as the arts) as creating the simultaneous production and consumption of 
the “experience” (in contrast to a painter whose work is created at a different time than it is viewed), 
and further add the decision to make donations as also simultaneously determined.   
 95 The most comparable study is Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987), who applied two-stage least 
squares regression analysis to their five equation system using English provincial theater data (price, 
program mix, national grants, local grants, and demand), although also reporting OLS results for 
comparison.  As noted previously, their estimated price elasticity was perversely positive and 
statistically significant, and was explained as likely to reflect quality perceptions.  Their results were 
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To appreciate the full specification of their model, Table 13 reports the six equation estimation results 
for the major orchestra case (27 orchestras over the eight year period 1979-1986, yielding 216 pooled 
observations).  Since the double-log specification was not used, elasticities were derived at the mean 
values (reported after the table).  The same equations were also estimated for the 11 metropolitan 
orchestras in their sample and for the 15 “small market” (classified in their 1984 study as 
urban/community orchestras).  Elasticities for those orchestras are also discussed.  
 
 In addition to the interesting specification of the independent variables in each of their 
equations (a surprising omission in the demand equation is any measure of regional educational level), 
the most  
important findings relate to the low price elasticities of demand for each orchestral group. While this is 
a familiar result with aggregated data (although here at least segmented by orchestra size), it has 
especially  
interesting implications for orchestral full income maximizing (ticket plus donation) pricing strategies 
and for the interpretation of price elasticity results when arts and sports organizations have multiple 
interrelated revenue sources (part 3.1.2 above).  
  
Table 13 
Simultaneous Equation System Results for Major Orchestras 
(Adapted from Luksetich and Lange, 1995, Table II) 
Dep. Vars: Attendance Price  Admin Exp Quality Concerts Gifts 
Ind. Vars.:       
Price   -7.01 
  (3.85) 
    173 
  (3.01) 
   - 126 
   (0.26) 
  -0.1E2 
   (2.17) 
   -50 
   (4.66) 
Quality - 0.8E-3 
  (2.58) 
0.1E-3 
(4.56) 
   0.06 
  (4.70) 
    -0.3E-7 
   (0.16) 
   -.2E-2 
   (2.14) 
Concerts    379 
 (4.62) 
-7.59 
(2.63) 
  -5842 
  (2.41) 
   -53706 
    (3.59) 
     
Gifts  0.5E-2 
(4.27) 
    1.13 
   (1.04) 
     0.47  
    (0.07) 
   0.2E-4 
   (2.09) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
also of interest regarding income and education elasticities as discussed below (part 3.2.2). Kelejian 
and Lawrence (1980) failed to implement their elaborate seven equation simultaneous system equation 
model, and reported only one equation estimated using standard OLS techniques.  Other important 
multiple equation studies such as Gapinski (1986) and Pommerehne and Kirchgassner (1987) do not 
use simultaneous equation estimation techniques.  Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) also estimate their 
three equations with OLS, but do use instrumental variables to adjust for endogeneity in their theater 
quality equation (and lagged endogenous variables in the demand, quality, and public subsidies 
equations).     
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Admin.  -0.3E-3 
(1.50) 
      4.69 
    (8.74) 
   0.3E-6 
   (0.26) 
   -0.03 
   (3.32) 
Attendance         -2.06 
   (4.26) 
Pop. 18-24   -20 
 (3.24) 
     
Pop. 25-34   10 
(2.36) 
     
Pop. 35-49   -11 
(2.36) 
     
Pop. 50 +     2 
(1.46) 
     
Income - 0.2E-3 
 (0.19) 
     0.1E-2 
 (0.53) 
Develop.        1.20 
 (8.89) 
Advertise.   0.05 
 (2.42) 
     
Players        -0.3E-2 
   (10.50) 
 
% Nat. Pop.     32 
(2.07) 
  136190 
  (1.87) 
    -0.49 
    (3.61) 
 
Ind. Buy. Pow.       362 
   (2.73) 
       
Radio TV Rec.       -1941 
   (1.32) 
  
Guests        2113 
   (1.74) 
  
Grants Yes  0.07 
 (5.90) 
-0.1E-2 
(2.47) 
  - 0.05 
   (0.10) 
    4.16 
   (1.38) 
    0.4E-5 
    (0.07) 
   0.17 
  (4.30) 
Grants No  0.8E-2 
 (0.92) 
-0.2E-2 
(8.29) 
    1.54 
   (6.62) 
   -0.22 
   (0.11) 
   -0.2E-4 
    (2.82) 
  -0.06 
  (2.02) 
Seat Capacity  -0.06 
(2.26) 
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Gift Price        -1128 
   (4.28) 
Fed. Deduct.          -34 
   (1.22) 
Fed Tx Ch. 82           95 
   (6.78) 
Fed Tx Ch. 86          138 
   (6.10)     
Dev./Gift (t-1)           47 
   (0.76) 
Constant     382 
  (3.11) 
  3.26 
 (5.65) 
   1035 
  (2.47) 
   16069 
    (4.39) 
    0.36 
   (14.00) 
   1922 
   (4.77) 
Buse R2    .66  .62    .73     .71     .82     .76 
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses.  Definitions of variables previously undefined: 
Price = income from home performances/total home attendance; Gifts = total fund raising income from 
individuals/metro area or county population; Income = median household income in home region; 
Advertise.= total advertising, promotion and marketing expense/home region population; Develop.= 
total development and fund-raising expenses/home region population; Players = total numbers of 
musicians regularly under contract; % Nat. Pop.= Home region population/national population; Ind. 
Buy. Pow.= index of local market buying power; Radio TV Rec.= Dummy variable = 1 if orchestra had 
radio/TV concerts or recording sessions; Guests = Dummy variable = 1 if orchestra spent more than 10 
percent of artistic expenses on guest conductors and/or artists; Grants Yes = government and 
foundation grants requiring services/home region population; Grants No = same as Grants Yes, but not 
requiring services; Seat capacity = seating capacity for regular subscription series per home region 
population; Gift price = (1- highest state marginal tax rate); Fed. Deduct.= Dummy variable = 1 if 
federal income taxes are deductible from state taxes; Fed. Tx Ch. 82 = Dummy variable = 1 for federal 
income tax changes imposed in 1982 and for later years; Fed. Tx Ch. 86 = Dummy variable = 1 for 
federal income tax changes in 1986; Dev./Gift (t-1) = Develop./Gifts lagged one year. Values in real 
terms; 1982 = 100.         
 Regarding the individual components of the demand equation, ticket price performs well, but 
with a price elasticity (when evaluated at the mean price) that is soundly inelastic at -0.33 (p. 56). 
Surprisingly, quality has a negative effect on per capita attendance (and with a reasonable t-statistic), a 
result that cannot easily be explained away inasmuch as measuring quality by artistic personnel and 
total concert production expenses per concert is not an unreasonable proxy (although less direct a 
measure than the ones used by, e.g. Throsby (1990); see 3.2.5).  However, production and artistic 
expenses (and related measures) were shown by Tobias (2004) to be a less reliable (but not negative) 
predictor of expert opinions regarding the quality of ensembles in theater than in ballet and opera (no 
orchestra results were reported), and all such spending by all art forms exhibited significant 
diminishing marginal returns.  So the adequacy of this proxy remains unconfirmed (even assuming that 
the public were to share such expert opinion).  The result that the number of concerts per capita in the 
region is a strong predictor of regional attendance per capita is consistent with previously cited 
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arguments that variations in the sheer availability of artistic resources is critical to explaining 
attendance variations (Heilbrun, 1984, 1996; Gold, 1980; Khakee and Nilsson, 1980), but in a model 
expressly designed to correct for simultaneity bias, it is surprising that attendance does not also appear 
as an independent variable in the concert equation.   
 
 Consistent with earlier discussions of the frequently enigmatic behavior of age variables in 
descriptive audience composition and participation studies, the percent of the regional population that 
is youngest performs as expected (strongly negative), but the next youngest group (age 25-34) has a 
positive effect on per capita attendance while the percentage of those age 35-49 has a nearly identical 
opposite negative effect.  Furthermore, the oldest group has only a weakly positive effect on regional 
orchestra attendance.   The familiar finding that income (at least when not divorced from the 
opportunity cost of time) often exerts only a weakly positive effect on attendance, ceteris paribus, 
appears here as well, and is perhaps especially noteworthy given the absence of the additional 
multicollinearity problem that would have been created with an education variable.  
 
  Finally, some variables that are rarely incorporated into arts demand equations suggest that 
such omissions may introduce specification errors when omitted.   Conditional grants (“Grants Yes”) 
have positive effects on attendance (and a t-statistic of nearly 6.0), although unrestricted grants 
(“Grants No”) has no real effect.  On the other hand, total advertising, promotion and marketing 
expense (“Advertise.”) appears to be economically significant, but when translated into elasticity terms 
is only .06, a result the authors suggest is a reflection of the limited size of the market for symphony 
services (p. 63).  But this explanation fails to address the enigma of why advertising should have such a 
small incremental effect when it would seem that more active advertising campaigns could be 
especially effective in at least modestly expanding exactly that kind of market.96  While not addressed 
by the authors, the Buse R2 (the more appropriate goodness-of-fit measure for generalized least squares 
models) of .66 for the demand equation is notably lower than the R2 results reported by Withers (see the 
notes to Table 12 above), but that is an expected result of using the more complex simultaneous 
equation modeling compared to the standard single equation time-series approach.   
 
 Perhaps the most noteworthy results of the Luksetich and Lange (1995) analysis are those 
alluded to previously.  Not only are the implied price elasticities low for all three orchestra types (in 
addition to the -0.33 for major orchestras, those elasticities are -0.42 for metro and -0.16 for small 
market orchestras), but the interactions between the ticket price and gifts per capita further clarify that 
orchestras have been following an excessively low price strategy.  That is, even when adjusting for the 
possibility that higher ticket prices would induce arts patrons to partially reduce the donated portion of 
their “full price” of attendance, orchestras would generate more total income if they were to 
substantially increase average ticket prices (even ignoring more targeted price increases that might be 
justified in the audience could be further segmented).  For major orchestras, the mean elasticity of gifts 
per capita to ticket price is -1.19 (p. 56).  But, even considering that interaction between revenue 
sources, the authors calculate that the major orchestras could double the average ticket price from its 
                                                          
 96 And if such advertising were devoted in part to simply providing accurate information about 
programs and prices (including discount options), the problem Globerman (1978) cited of people 
generally having overstated perceptions of performing arts prices could be partially alleviated. See also 
3.2.3 below. 
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current mean value in order to maximize ticket revenues, but more importantly, could increase ticket 
prices as much as 62 percent and still maximize the sum of ticket plus donated revenues (p. 58).    
 
 Of particular importance is their calculation that following such an average ticket price increase, 
the resulting average ticket price elasticity of  demand at those higher prices is still well within the 
inelastic range at -0.65, fully consistent with the sports literature result that the optimal price for such 
“performance firms” is to actively price in the inelastic range of their demand curves, hence explaining 
the “paradox” of low price elasticities estimated in empirical demand studies.97   Furthermore, since the 
objectives of non-profit arts organizations are arguably not limited to maximizing total revenues, or as 
Luksetich and Lange (p. 66) emphasize, “adopting a pricing policy aimed at encouraging donations 
from patrons,” but may also include the more “traditional” public-spirited objective of encouraging the 
consumption of art and broadening its distribution, low price ticket strategies in the arts may be more 
fundamentally entrenched than even these results would suggest.98 
 
 Such conclusions cannot escape the limitation of having been derived from an aggregation of 
results over multiple orchestras (27 in the case of major orchestras) in differing local markets with 
various competitive factors incapable of being fully incorporated into demand analysis, along with 
price elasticities evaluated at essentially an average of an average (the average regional price derived 
from local prices that were themselves total revenues divided by attendance).  Nevertheless, the results 
of this ambitious six-equation model are among the most provocative in the empirical arts demand 
literature. 
 
3.2.2   The Multicollinearity Problem: The Case of Education vs. Income  
 
 The review of the non-econometric evidence and related analysis presented in Tables 6 and 7 
demonstrated why the conventional wisdom developed that education is likely the most important 
single variable in explaining variations in performing arts demand.  However, regression based models 
                                                          
 97 Metro orchestras appear to have come closer to their optimal pricing strategy, requiring only 
about a 10 percent price increase to maximize combined ticket and donation revenues (the price 
elasticity of gifts is quite small for those orchestras), while small market orchestras are in the unique, 
but bizarre, position of being able to maximize ticket revenues with only 31 percent price increase, but 
would actually generate even higher combined ticket and gift revenues if they were to raise ticket 
prices by 57 percent (the result of having an estimated positive elasticity of gifts with respect to ticket 
prices).  See Luksetich and Lange (1995, p. 60).  
 98 Alan Peacock has reacted to the Luksetich and Lange (1995) implication that there is strong 
case for raising ticket prices by making the point that such a strategy would be inconsistent with the 
goal of encouraging arts participation (comments at a seminar presenting a very preliminary version of 
this chapter).  Of course, O’Hagan (1996) observed that any such goal of broadening arts consumption 
beyond its traditionally elite audiences has seemingly failed and should be recognized as potentially 
insincere (see part 2.3 above). And Luksetich and Lange themselves primarily use their findings not to 
recommend ticket price increases, but to conclude that orchestras must have had more complex 
objectives than just to maximize total income, such as encouraging donations in their own right for 
whatever reason.   
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have not generally succeeded in strongly confirming this result.  While the typically high correlations 
between education and other key independent variables (class, occupation, age, and even ticket prices 
in some models99) is a key reason, that multicollinearity problem is not the only complication.100   
Competing measures of education, distinctions between arts training and general education, and 
conceptual conflicts over the transmission mechanisms are also to blame.  
 
 In fact, the severity of multicollinearity varies greatly across arts demand studies.  Jenkins and 
Austen-Smith (1987) lament the high standard errors for their social class, education and income 
variables, noting that when class alone is included in the demand equation along with ticket price and 
arts quality (defined as less esoteric programming) its coefficient is highly significant both 
economically and statistically (p. 169).   On the other hand,  Lewis and Seaman (2004) found that both 
education and income were the strongest predictors of arts attendance in their logit models (and that 
“parents’ education” also performed quite well).  And paradoxically, Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992) 
worry that the positive correlation between age and income will complicate their analysis of risk, age 
and arts attendance through the effect that higher prices of arts performances would independently have 
on the age structure of audiences (p. 136).  Yet they later note that the covariance matrix (not reported) 
does not show any collinearity between respondent age and income, concluding that “the effect of age 
on attendance can therefore be considered as independent of income” (p. 138).   In fact, since it is 
exceedingly rare for any arts demand study to actually report a covariance or correlation matrix (as in 
the case just cited), the magnitude of multicollinearity problems and how they vary using different 
measures of education and other variables is not easy to access. 
 
  As hinted in the finding that parents’ education was also a strong positive predictor of arts 
                                                          
 99 For example, due to the high correlation between incomes and prices over time, Goudriian 
and de Kam (1983) could not get statistically significant elasticity estimates for both in their time-series 
demand equations for theater and concerts without imposing a constraint on the income elasticity from 
their separately estimated cross-section equations. While they are aware of the weaknesses to that 
approach (citing Kuh and Meyer, 1957 on problems with extraneous estimates), they observe that 
“there was no alternative to get significant results”(p.39). 
 100 While the positive correlation between education and income is most typically viewed as a 
challenge for empirical analysis, it sometimes strengthens arguments regarding controversial 
propositions in performing arts demand.  For example, Throsby (2001, p. 116) supports his view that 
income elasticities are generally higher for the arts than for many other commodities by citing the 
“luxury nature and leisure content of some arts consumption” but also due to the “association of tastes 
with education and hence (at one remove) with income” (p. 116).  Not only is this proposition 
questionable based on the quite mixed results regarding estimated income elasticities, but it seems to 
suggest that such high income elasticities depend, at least in part, on our inability to separate those 
effects empirically.  Notably, it was the ability of Throsby and Withers (1979) and Withers (1980) to 
separate the value of time from the “pure income” effect that has provided the strongest evidence for 
the arts as a luxury good as commonly defined.  Thus, the failure to be able to further differentiate that 
pure income effect from education would be an ironic “ally” in the case for the arts as a luxury good.  
Of course, from a purely forecasting perspective, any combination of causal factors that would make 
income a more reliable predictor of arts consumption would be welcomed in that different context.      
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attendance (Lewis and Seaman, 2004), the issue of  how to measure education and whether to 
distinguish it from arts specific training at home, arts specific training in school, or just from past 
experience is highly problematic.  As McCaughey (1989) asserts, “the reasons for the positive 
association of general educational attainment with participation in the arts are not fully understood; and 
how specifically arts education fits into this association is not clear” (p. 48).   For example, Orend and 
Keegan (1996) and Relish (1997) stress the socialization or network effects of education in affecting 
arts participation rates, while Globerman and Book (1977) put education into a consumer production 
function model, although with only limited success in isolating a unique “consumption efficiency” 
effect on arts demand.  It is also possible that education reduces search costs and generates more 
accurate perceptions of performing arts prices, a possible link to attendance established by Globerman 
(1978); see 3.2.3 below. 
 
 The Globerman and Book (1977) contribution is unique.  While education is most commonly 
cited as merely a taste determining variable, cultural economists are perfectly comfortable with viewing 
education as one form of specific consumption capital affecting relative shadow prices, and hence the 
constraints, facing arts consumers.  However, in part since either a taste or a relative price explanation 
can justify the inclusion of some type of education variable in an arts demand function (see below), no 
one else has actually tested for an explicit education consumption efficiency link to arts attendance.  
Because their model introduces important distinctions that are also useful to understanding the later 
discussion of learning-by-consuming versus rational addiction in arts demand (see 3.2.3), regardless of 
the eventual strength of their empirical results, it is worth describing in some detail.     
 
  Globerman and Book begin with a model directly adapted from the new theory of consumer 
behavior, with utility dependent upon a set of fundamental commodities Z1 to Zn, each produced 
according to a household production function Zi = fi ( (Xi , ti ) E), where X is a vector of purchased 
market goods combined with the consumer’s own time inputs, t, applied to any one Zi, subject to the 
productivity effects of the consumer’s educational level E.101   The key insight is that education can 
change both the relative (shadow) prices of the Zi commodities through its impact on the marginal 
products of X and t in the production function, as well as changing consumer real incomes (although 
not limited to the expected effects on money incomes; see below).  Therefore, education creates both a 
pure substitution effect and a real income effect on the demand for commodities.  The demand for 
commodity Za (e.g., arts appreciation) is written: 
 
                                                          
 101 Although the frequency of referring to the constraint rather than the taste explanation  
markedly increased following Stigler and Becker (1977), Globerman and Book (1977) did not have 
access to that paper or to the West and McKee followup (1983).  They cite instead three earlier 
foundation contributions to the consumer as producer model (Grossman, 1972; Michael, 1972; and 
Michael and Becker, 1973).    
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(9) Zad = da (Y/P, Pa / P)  
 
where the arguments are real income and the relative price of arts appreciation. Consequently, the 
effect of additional education on Za can be expressed as: 
 
 
 -                   -                     -        - 
(10)    Zad = ηa (YC) +  εa (Pa - P) 
 
where the superscript tildes are the percentage changes per unit of education, ηa and εa are the arts 
commodity’s income and own price elasticity applied to the relative percentage change in the arts  
commodity price versus all other prices, and the YC term is the percentage change in “consumption 
income” (i.e. the value of the additional units of the commodity as a percentage of “full income,” or 
wT, where T is the total time available for both working tw and household production, G ti over all 
commodities) resulting from a unit increase in education.  Globerman and Book (1977) warn that 
equation (10) abstracts from any effects of education on money income via increases in overall “market 
production efficiency” (see their note 7), but focuses instead on resulting increases in consumption 
income due to the productivity effect on time and market good inputs.  This complicates the empirical 
testing of the household production model. 
   
 The consumption of arts appreciation Za cannot be observed, but arts attendance via ticket 
purchases can, of course, be measured and serves as the typical dependent variable in arts demand 
equations.  Since arts performance attendance is one of the X market inputs in the household 
production consumer choice model, Globerman and Book (1977) must address the derived demand for 
Xa as it is affected by education, which they represent as: 
 
(11) Xa = (Zad - MPa ) + Wt a (Xa - ta)  
 
where all terms except Wta , the production share of time, are expressed as percentage changes per unit 
of education (omitting the superscript ~ notation from (10)), and MPa is the percentage change in the 
production of Za per unit of education.  Assuming a homogenous production function and that more 
education does not affect the ratio of factor prices, the (Xa - ta) term in (11) can be rewritten as 
 σ (MP Xa - MP ta ), where σ is the elasticity of substitution in production, yielding what can be renamed 
as equation (11').  When equation (10) is substituted into equation (11' ) along with some 
rearrangement of terms, Globerman and Book obtain the full derived demand for Xa expression: 
 
(12)  Xa = ηa YC - MPa +  εa (Pa - P) + Wta σ (MPXa - MPta) 
      
where all terms except ηa, εa and Wta σ are again expressed as percentage changes per unit of education 
(without the ~ notation from (10)).  The first right-hand term in the gross increase in the demand for Za 
due to the effect of education on non-market real income; the second term is the change in the 
production of Za given initial input quantities; the third term captures the effect of “commodity bias,” 
or the differential productivity effects of education on Z commodity relative prices; and the last term 
captures “factor bias” or the differential effect of education on the marginal products of the inputs in 
the Za production function.   
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 Indicative of the complexity of empirically isolating a consumption productivity effect of 
education, Globerman and Book clarified a few more steps in moving from the theoretical to an 
empirical model (adapting Michael, 1972).  Firstly, it is assumed that education raises the marginal 
productivity of each factor by the same percentage (i.e. factor neutrality), so that the last term in 
equation (12) is reduces to zero; and that education also raises the overall productivity of all Z 
production functions by the same percentage, so that the third term in (12) also reduces to zero.  
Secondly, since the overall change in consumption real income YC per unit of education is defined as 
the increase in the output of all Z commodities holding factor input levels constant, YC can be written 
as a function of Z expenditure shares S, and marginal products MP, across all Z goods   
 
(13) YC = Σ Si (MPi)  
 
with YC and MP continuing to be defined as percentage changes per unit of education. Finally, by again 
invoking the commodity neutrality assumption, the MP’s are equal across all Z commodities, and since 
the sum of all expenditure shares must be 1, Globerman and Book (1977) get their usable version of 
equation (12) in terms of real consumption income and the Za income elasticity of demand, ηa: 
 
(13) Xa = YC (ηa - 1) 
 
with the following key predictions regarding how observed arts attendance Xa varies with the income 
elasticity of demand for Za: Xz > 0, = 0, or < 0 as that income elasticity η is >0, = 0, or <0.102   That is, 
attendance at the live performing arts will be positively related to education via its unique consumption 
productivity effects if the income elasticity of the demand for the fundamental commodity arts 
appreciation, Za is greater than unity, ceteris paribus.   
 
 Globerman and Book test this key implication by estimating income-expenditure curves from 
cross-section data derived from audience surveys at a sample of 100 professional and semi-professional 
arts performances in Ontario over a three moth period in late 1973/early 1974. They recognize that in 
contrast to a population or participation survey, their audience survey need not be representative of the 
more general population (one of the modifications and extensions of their study that might have 
fruitfully been attempted).  The Engel curve fitted to the data has the functional form: 
 
(14) Xi j = f i (YC i, Hi , Ri , Ai, Si, Mi ) 
 
with the dependent variable defined as the number of times in the previous 12 month the ith individual 
attended a live performance of the j th art form (theater, classical music, dance, and opera), as well as 
two comparative forms of entertainment, movies and sports events.  While the theoretical model calls 
for a dependent variable defined as expenditures, Globerman and Book feared that errors in respondent 
recall would be lessened if only frequency of attendance was required and not further details about 
                                                          
 102 Furthermore, the magnitude of the change in consumption income YC can be expressed as ξ 
YcE = ξ a E / (ηa -1), where the left-side term is the elasticity of consumption income with respect to 
education E, and ξ aE is the elasticity of expenditure on the market good Xa with respect to education 
(see, Globerman and Book, 1977, p.20). 
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prices paid. 
 In going from the “consumption income” concept of the theoretical model to a measurable 
income measure, they wanted to use the individual’s permanent income but were forced to rely upon 
the more typical current year income.103  They use two measures of human capital: H1 = number of 
years of formal education, and H2 = a discrete binomial variable = 1 if the individual had taken arts or 
arts related courses.   A dummy variable R = 1 for those living within metropolitan Toronto; A is the 
age of the respondent, included to control for other forms of human capital such as health or age 
specific taste differences.104  Two other (0,1) control variables are included: S = 1 if male, and M = 1 if 
married (included largely to reflect their expectation that single people are more likely to attend dance 
and music events, and married people theater events). Finally, while equation (13) applies to the 
income elasticity of the commodity, Za, data limitations require that the income elasticity from the 
fitted demand curve applies to expenditure on the market good Xa.105     
 
 While it was important to fully describe how the education/consumption efficiency hypothesis 
can be tested (and to set the stage for related discussions in 3.2.3), the Globerman and Book (1977) 
empirical results can be streamlined since there is really only one critical point about those results in 
this context.  Two equations were estimated (one using H1 and one using H2) for each of 6 types of 
performances (X1 = theater, X2 = dance, X3 = music, X4 = opera, X5 = movies, X6 = sports).  The 
critical independent variables are those human capital measures (years of schooling H1; and art specific 
training H2), but even more importantly for the efficiency in production hypothesis, the elasticity 
results for income, Y, which must exceed one (based on equation (13)) in order for education to be 
viewed as making its contribution to increased arts attendance via a household consumption 
                                                          
 103 To reduce any resulting downward bias in the estimated income elasticity coefficient, they 
excluded students and all respondents under age 16, as well as respondents from the lowest income 
categories (< $7,000 Cn).  They also grouped the sample respondents by income class to average out 
the transitory component of income, but were forced to truncate the highest open-end income interval 
(they used the lower end boundary of $20,000 for this $20,000 and greater group). See Globerman and 
Book (1977, p. 22).  
 104 While not referring to the mixed age results of the more descriptive non-econometric 
literature, their note 14 observation that the effect of age on arts attendance is “difficult to predict” 
since age can capture both positive human capital effects as well negative health effects, is apropos.  
Gray (2003) ignores the health complication, but cites age as likely to have a negative effect on arts 
participation due to a rising implicit opportunity cost of an evening out with age, countered by the 
positive effect of age on creating “additional consumption skills” (his Table 1, p. 358).   
 105  The difficulty of ever obtaining data related to the more unmeasurable Z commodities is an 
inherent challenge to empirically applying the otherwise insightful household production model.  But 
Globerman and Book cite Michael (1972) as showing that if each unit of the market good X is used 
exclusively in the production of one Z commodity, the income elasticity of the market good is equal to 
the weighted average of the income elasticities of the commodities which use that good, with the 
weights equal to the share expended on each commodity (see their note 18).  Arts performance 
attendance Xa is the type of market good that can plausibly be viewed as applying only to one Z 
commodity, i.e. arts appreciation Za.  
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productivity effect. 
All but one reported equation had very high adjusted R2 (exceeding .831, with the sole exception the 
music equation using H2 at .556, still high for cross-section data).  As reported in Table 14 below, the 
estimated mean elasticities on the human capital variables were positive (and generally statistically 
significant at either 0.05 or 0.01), with the average for the four art forms being 0.726 for the years of 
formal schooling variable and 0.504 for the binary variable for arts specific training.   
 
 However, only the opera equations had estimated income elasticities modestly greater than one 
(1.052 with H1 and 1.081 with H2), and the overall arts average income elasticity estimated at the mean 
was 0.877 (it was an average of 0.86 in the movies and sports equations).  Thus, despite the fact that 
this average income elasticity is higher than many that have been estimated (see Table 11, and 3.1.3), 
Globerman and Book interpret these results as “not particularly impressive support for the household 
production model” (p.25). However, they note the downward biases in the income elasticity 
coefficients that they could not fully avoid (see fn. 103 above), and the fact that (even as of 1977), there 
were other studies with income elasticities estimated to exceed 1.0 (and more since then; see Table 11).   
 
 Other complications that were noted above might also suggest that, while the estimations were 
not able to confirm the education consumption efficiency effect, it is likely to exist (Globerman and 
Book, pp. 27-29).  For example, if education raises overall market productivity and money income, the 
resulting higher opportunity cost of time will induce some substitution away from time intensive arts 
activities and bias the income elasticity downward (an effect, of course, that was later clarified by 
Withers, 1980, in generating a pure income elasticity that was indeed higher than 1.0 even though the 
standard income elasticity was not statistically different from 1.0; see 3.2.1).  The other theoretical 
complication that could hide the identity of the consumption efficiency effect in the arts is that 
education may not be commodity neutral (i.e., in fact, differentially affecting the productivity of 
competing Z commodities), and thus by changing the relative prices of different Z commodities cause 
some substitutions away from Za and hence reduce the derived demand for arts attendance input, Xa 
(also reducing the observed income elasticity of demand for arts attendance among the more highly 
educated).  This is analogous to the fundamental distinction between absolute and comparative 
advantage in trade theory.  Education may improve the consumption efficiency of arts appreciation Z a 
by making arts attendance Xa significantly more productive, but be even more potent in increasing the 
marginal products of X and t in producing competing Z commodities.  In summary, this analytically 
noteworthy attempt to  clarify exactly how education affects arts demand may have ultimately 
generated only weak confirmation of the consumption efficiency phenomenon. But despite its being 
relatively ignored in the later literature, it clarified important complications in the modeling of arts 
demand that continue to be critical to properly interpreting the empirical results.      
  
  Regardless of the exact causal connection between education and arts consumption, the various 
classifications of formal schooling (e.g. high school, some college, graduate school) that are identified 
in audience and participation surveys (see Tables 1, 2, 6 and 9) are common measures of “education” in 
econometric studies.  The specific way such formal education enters those equations depends on the 
data being used and the unit of analysis being studied.  In what might be called “Type A” (aggregative) 
studies, the aggregate attendance or participation behavior of the population is known, but the data are 
not based on the attendance patterns of specific individuals with known personalized demand 
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determining characteristics.106  The dependent variable is typically some version of attendance at 
specific arts organizations normalized by the regional population in which they are located (whether a 
time series case study or a pooled or cross-section study of some aggregate of such organizations). 
Consequently, the education independent variable must reflect the aggregative characteristics of the 
population in that region (e.g. “percent of the population with a college degree,” or “median years of 
schooling,” etc.).  Type A studies come closest to estimating well-specified demand functions, since 
they are often capable of also incorporating key demand determinants such as ticket prices charged by 
specific organizations, prices of substitutes, and less commonly proxies for the quality of the 
organizations.  However, Gapinski (1981) and Bajic (1983) contain only community demographic 
variables.  While Goudriian and de Kam (1983) estimate a Type A time-series demand model with own 
price, substitute price, income and a community tax variable, they lacked comparable age or education 
data.  But their cross-section data allowed estimation of income and education elasticities, and those 
results are reported in Table 14 (see “Type P” studies below).   
 
 The same measurement issues arise regarding income in Type A studies (i.e. “percent of the 
                                                          
 106 As usual, the variability in databases can create anomalies. For example, Bajic (1983) had 
access to subscriber lists (not audience survey data) for both the St. Lawrence Theatre and the Toronto 
Free Theatre. While this provided information on the residential location of individual subscribers and 
hence allowed the construction of an independent variable measuring commuting distance to the 
theaters, there was no personalized information on education or income - hence requiring the 
construction of an aggregated measure of education and income per “zone.” See Table 14.     
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population earning above $30,000,” or “per capita disposable income,” etc.), but some localized 
measures of income are typically incorporated into those demand equations.  Another complication is 
that measures of occupation are sometimes used instead of income. Since the average incomes in such 
occupational classifications differ in predictable ways, such variables are essentially proxies for 
income, but nevertheless complicate the interpretation of whether the results demonstrate that 
education is more or less powerful than income in determining arts attendance behavior. Wealth might 
also be a better measure than income, but as noted by Ekelund and Ritenour (1999; their fn. 4), it has 
not been a factor in arts demand studies due presumably to severe computational problems.107  
                                                          
 107  This is accurate, and measurement problems have also plagued the rare attempt to introduce 
permanent rather than transitory income (e.g., Globerman and Book, 1977, p. 22).  However, Lévy-
Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) are forced to resort to rather poor wealth proxies in the absence of 
income data (e.g. “owns more than one automobile;” “owns a microcomputer”).  And the evaluations of 
popular music and classical music audiences, and sports versus arts audiences by Prieto-Rodríguez and 
Fernández-Blanco using bivariate probit estimation (both in 2000) are unique in introducing “other 
income” variables linked to wealth (i.e. two dummy variables = 1 if a survey respondent has property 
rents or yields from bonds and shares, respectively).  The bonds and shares dummy was positive but not 
significant in both the popular and classical music equations of the music study, and was positive for 
music, and negative for live sports and cinema while also lacking significance in the sports study. By 
contrast, the property rents coefficients were uniformly positive across both studies, but only 
statistically significant for classical music.  A social security benefits dummy variable was generally 
negative across all equations of both studies but only came close to significance in the cinema equation 
of the sports study (it also had a weak positive coefficient for classical music in the music study). The 
more successful aspects of these studies are discussed in 3.2.4.       
 
   Alternatively, in “Type P” ( personalized) studies, the attendance or participation behavior of 
particular individuals can be matched to their unique demand-determining characteristics.  Dependent 
variables can be continuous (e.g. “number of arts events attended,” or “number of attendances”) or 
binary (e.g. “1 if attended at least one time, 0 if did not attend at all”).  In Type P studies a wider 
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variety of educational variables can be included beyond the usual formal education measures, and in 
fact, distinctions can be made between own education, parents’ education (sometimes distinguished by 
gender), specific types of education (e.g. art training at home versus at school), or diverse measures of  
exposure to various art forms or practical training in those fields.   Of course, in both types of studies, 
correlations between any of these education type variables can be high with variables other than 
income (or occupation), such as the age variable that concerned Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992).  
However, Type P studies may be especially prone to multicollinearity problems to the extent that they 
are capable of including a larger number of education type variables, which may themselves be highly 
correlated. 
Type P studies are never capable of incorporating price variables (including any related to possible 
substitutes), or any variables that relate specifically to the types of available arts organizations or their 
quality.  At best, a variable can be inserted such as “lives in city over 50,000” (Lewis and Seaman, 
2004) to try to capture some of those localized “fixed effects.”  In this sense, Type P studies are not 
estimations of well-defined demand functions as economists conceive of them. 
 
 Table 14 below summarizes the econometric studies that include some measure of both 
education and income, sorted by type of study, definition of variables, results, and control variables.  
Among the most notable results are that Gapinski (1981) viewed his own elasticity estimates as only 
tentative, but paid homage to the Ford (1974, Vol. II) non-regression based findings (Table 7 above) by 
noting their general similarity to his results.  More importantly, the overall results of the 12 studies 
provide relatively weak confirmation that education measures reliably outweigh income measures as 
determinants of arts demand.  Only five of the studies (41.7 percent) find evidence for the dominance 
of education. Strong pro-education evidence is in Ganzeboom (1989) and Peterson et al. (2000).  
Gapinski (1981), Gray (2003), and Lewis and Seaman (2004) provide modestly strong evidence that 
education outweighs income, while two studies generate opposite results favoring income (Bajic,1983; 
Bonato et al.,1990).  Although Globerman and Book (1977) focus on the separate issue of whether the 
role of education is consistent with the household production model, their estimated elasticities are 
higher for income than for education, providing some evidence against the education dominant 
hypothesis.    
 
 The remaining four studies yield ambiguous results.  Goudriian and de Kam (1983) do not 
calculate education elasticities making direct comparisons difficult, but their t-statistics on the 
education variable are very high.  Meanwhile their income elasticities are only high when age and 
education are dropped from the equations.  Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987) generate a higher 
education demand elasticity in their two-stage least squares equation but a lower elasticity relative to 
income using OLS.  But in either case, the standard errors are quite high when both variables are 
included along with “social class” (i.e. the number of males in “English social class I”) in the relevant 
region.  The income coefficient in Dobson and West (1989) is negative, but the standard educational 
variable is also weak and statistically insignificant.  Their strongest results are for two general 
education substitutes: childhood participation in non-school theater performances as opposed to school-
related performances, as well as childhood theater participation rather than just exposure to the theater, 
both strongly influence adult theater attendance.108  Finally, Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992) do not 
                                                          
 108 Dobson and West (1989) also provide relatively rare econometric evidence regarding the 
audience overlap issue (section 2.2 above), when they find that attendance at dance performances, but 
not at music or opera performances, strongly increases attendance at the theater.  However, consistent 
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utilize a formal education variable, but find similar evidence to that of Dobson and West (1989) that 
“arts training” variables perform well (although their variables do not distinguish between home and 
school exposures). But they also find fairly strong evidence for the importance of income (although less 
strong than the arts training variables).   Table 14 provides more information about these 12 studies that 
were summarized above.. 
 
Table 14 
Econometric Evidence Regarding The Roles of Education versus Income 
Type A Studies: Education related Results Income  Results Other Ind 
Vars 
Gapinski 1981:  
(Estimates unstable, 
so results tentative, 
although “agreeing” 
with Ford (1974)) 
(1) % with at least 
4 yrs. college 
(2) median years 
of education 
 
Elasticity 
(2) at 
sample 
mean = 
0.543 
(1) % > $25K 
(2) mean inc. 
per fam 
member 
Elasticity  
(2) at 
sample 
mean = 
0.359 
% > 61 or < 
21 
Median age 
SMSA pop. 
Bajic 1983:  
(D.V. = # theater-
goers in each of 2 
Toronto theater 
zones deflated by # 
HH > $10K zone) 
# of college 
graduates across 
28 zones deflated 
by # HH >$10,000 
each zone 
Box-Cox 
Elasticity: 
0.21 and 
0.36 for 2 
theaters 
# of HH > 
$20,000 in 
each zone 
deflated by # 
HH/$10,000 
each zone 
Box-Cox 
Elasticity 
0.84 and 
0.50,  2 
theaters  
Distance in 
miles from 
subscriber 
residence  to 
theater (Elast. 
- 0.43; -0.48  
Jenkins & Austen-
Smith 1987:  
(Edu  and Inc 
elasticities low stat 
sign. when with 
“Class” variable)  
# full-time students 
15 or over in 
schools for theater 
sub-region 
   
2SLS 
Elast. 
1.079; 
OLS 0.065
Avg full-time 
male weekly 
income local 
county /same 
England 
2SLS 
Elast 
0.264; 
OLS 0.541 
Ticket price 
Program mix 
Audience         
social class 
(E = 0.211) 
Bonato et al. 1990: 
(Time-series study 
using Italian data 
1964-1985) 
# of holders of 
secondary school 
cert. or univ. 
degree per 100,000 
pop. 
Elast: 
- 0.09 
  0.12 
- 0.40  
none stat 
significant 
Income per 
capita in real 
terms  
Elast: 
0.89 
0.93 
1.03 
t- stats 
range 1.6 
to 2.2 
Real price 
Real movie pr.  
TV 
subscribers     
per pop. 
# Perfs./pop 
Tourist / pop 
Type P Studies:      
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
with the generally ambiguous non-regression results, they explain this as the result of Atlanta dance 
companies often utilizing theater space, so that “physical familiarity” along with possible “advertising 
information” may partially explain this unique result (pp. 111-112).  For broader overlap evidence, 
including regarding sports, see section 3.2.4. 
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Globerman & Book 
1977:  
(4 P.A. forms + 
movies and sports; 
2 equations each)  
(1) # of yrs. edu  
      or  
(2) 1 = arts or 
related courses 
Avg arts 
elasticity 
(1) 0.726 
(2) 0.504 
Current yr. 
income 
Avg. arts 
elasticity 
0.877; 
movie &  
sport 0.86  
Region 
Age  
Gender 
Marital status 
Goudriian & de Kam 
1983:  
(Cross-section only; 
time-series lacked 
income or education 
variables; estimates 
for Theater: Th, and 
Concerts: C) 
# Total of yrs. of 
formal education 
of all household 
members 
Elasticity 
not 
calculated; 
but t-stats 
> 11.3 for 
theater & 
concerts  
Disposable 
household 
income 
Elast. at 
mean Th: 
0.382 but  
0.105 w.  
ed & age. 
Elast C: 
1.016 but 
0.482 w. 
ed & age 
Total of ages 
of all HH 
members 
Dependent 
Var 
= Aggregate 
attendance to 
Th + C / # HH 
members > 6 
yrs old 
Dobson & West 
1989:  
(Study of theater 
attendance in Atlanta 
based on 406 
returned 
questionnaires) 
(1) 1 = child 
participation in 
school performs. 
2 = child 
participation in 
non-school 
performs. 
(2) Level of 
education 
(3) Child 
“activity” in the 
theater 
(4) Child 
“exposure” (taken 
to) the theater 
(5) Type School 
(1) strong 
+ effect of 
non-
school vs. 
school 
(2) + but 
not stat. 
significant 
(3) strong 
+ effect 
(4) + but 
not strong 
(5) not 
stat. sig.  
Level of 
family 
income codes 
from 1-5, 
with 1 > 
$50,000 and 
5< $20,000 
Stat sig 
but 
negative 
effect 
Age 
Time of year 
Rural v Urban 
Perform night 
Type of play 
Theater size 
Gender 
Ethnicity 
Frequency of  
 attendance at  
 Dance, 
Music, 
 Opera, Rock     
Concerts 
 
Ganzeboom 1989: 
(Reports “full” 
sample results for 
U.S. and Hungary, 
and “urban” results 
for U.S., Hungary,  
Netherlands) 
(1) Formal 
education level 
(2) Parents’ 
education level 
Urban 
standard 
coefficient 
(1) U.S. 
0.23; NL 
0.24; H 
0.31 
(2) insig.   
(1) Log 
household 
income 
(2) Coded 
economic 
status of 
occupations 
(1) U.S. 
0.10; NL 
0.05 not 
sig; H 
0.12 
(2) insig. 
After formal 
education in 
importance: 
Cultural           
socialization 
Occup. culture
   status 
Age  
Urbanization 
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Abbé-Decarroux & 
Grin 1992:  
(Logit models of 
opera, concerts, and 
theater in Geneva) 
No formal 
education variable.  
(1) “Experience” = 
1 if exposed to live 
arts as child via 
parents or school 
(2) “Art”= 1 if 
studied art form  
Both (1) 
and (2) 
strongly + 
and stat 
sig. in all 
equations 
except (1) 
for theater 
Monthly 
personal pre-
tax  income  
Positive . 
for all 3 
forms; 
stat. sig. 
for opera 
and 
concerts 
 
3 Age range 
 dummy vars. 
Gender 
Peterson et al. 2000: 
(Focus on age but 
extensive analysis of 
7 art forms including 
art museum, jazz, 
and musical) 
 
(1) Highest level 
of formal educat. 
coded 1-13, with 1 
= 7th grade or less 
to 12 doctorate & 
13 professional 
(2) Father educat., 
same coding 
Complex 
results but 
(1) is  
generally 
strongest  
variable 
all eqns. 
(2) + and   
usual sig. 
HH income 
coded 1-8 
with 1 = 
$10,000 or 
less to 8 > 
$100,000 
Often 2nd 
strongest  
var. for 
some age 
groups & 
art types; 
but can 
fall to 6th 
place 
Age 
Gender 
Race 
Marital status 
# Children 
Health status 
Metro          
Gray 2003:  
(Participation study 
using 1997 SPPA 
and logistic models) 
(1) Education: 3 
levels 
(2) Art/music 
lessons 
(3) Age as proxy 
for consumption 
skill; also (Age)2 
Varies 
across art 
forms: 
generally 
(1) + and 
strong vs. 
income;  
(2) + but 
weaker 
than (1); 
(3) mixed 
Household 
income: 3 
levels 
Varies 
across art 
forms: 
generally 
rises with 
income 
but 
weaker 
than (1) 
educat. 
Minor 
children 
Gender 
Race/ethnic 
Hours worked   
per week;    
also squared    
Lewis & Seaman 
2004:  
(Logit study of 
museum, dance and 
classical music 0,1 
attendance focusing 
on sexual orientation 
and religion; data 
from 1993 and 1998 
General Social 
Survey U.S.)  
(1) Own education 
measured in years 
(2) Parents’ 
education in years 
for the better 
educated parent 
(1) Had 
highest 
standard 
odds ratio  
for all art 
forms 
(2) Strong 
+ effect all 
equations 
 
 
(1) Income in 
tens of 
thousands of 
1993 dollars 
with dummy 
for top open-
ended range 
       or 
(2) Dummies 
for each 
income range 
(1) 2nd  
highest 
standard 
odds ratio 
all eqns.  
(2) Had 
little effect 
on results 
 
 
 
Lesbian, gay,    
bisexual 0,1 
Age; (age)2 
Gender 
Marital status 
Children 0,1 
City > 50,000 
Religion 
Black & 
other minority 
Year 1998 
       
3.2.3  The Taste Cultivation Problem and Human Capital: Habit Formation, Learning-by-Consuming 
and Rational Addiction  
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 While certainly not limited to the arts, cultural economists have always stressed that current arts 
demand (whether for live performing arts services or the stock of tangible art works) is especially 
influenced by past arts exposure, and that inter-temporal dynamics should be incorporated into a well-
specified demand model.  Nevertheless, except for indirectly addressing this issue via the inclusion of 
age, education, or childhood exposure (e.g. Morrison and West, 1986) independent variables in part 
because they serve as proxies for “experience” in consuming the arts, explicit inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables as separate determinants has been relatively rare.  Only Houthakker and Taylor 
(1970), Goudriian and de Kam (1983), Oteri and Trimarchi (1990), Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) and 
Urrutiaguer (2002) include a one-year lagged endogenous dependent variable, and in each case it was 
strongly positive and statistically significant.109  Carson and Mobilia (1989) define the lag differently. 
Their much shorter weekly lagged dependent variable has negative effects on current attendance, a 
result they explain as capturing the effect of infrequent arts consumption such that very recent 
attendance actually reduces the likelihood of attending again in the current period (see fn. 71 above).     
 
 With a longer lagged dependent variable of even one year, what seems to be captured is not  
                                                          
 109 Krebs and Pommerehne attribute the difference between their estimated low short run price 
elasticity (-0.16) and the higher long run elasticity (-2.6) to the stronger impact of their one-year lagged 
attendance variable (actually mislabeled as a lagged quality variable their equation 1A, p. 26).  They 
interpret this result, following Houthakker and Taylor (1970) as reflecting “habit formation,” although 
their partial adjustment model (where consumers are assumed to partially adjust to long run 
equilibrium) is not identical to their predecessors’ “stock adjustment” model (see Krebs and 
Pommerehne, p.25, and their note 25, p.30).   
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infrequent and discrete arts consumption patterns, but a proxy for the cumulative effect of some version 
of what might be called the cultivation of taste.  What is not always appreciated is that there are 
multiple versions of this phenomenon, with each having somewhat different implications for our 
understanding of arts demand and for optimal arts marketing strategies.110   
 
                                                          
 110 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) emphasize the two most interesting reasons 
identified by Pollak (1970) for a distinction between long and short run demand functions, ignoring his 
more institutional “contractually fixed commitments” explanation (Pollak, p. 745). Thus, while Pollak 
originally did have a three-fold classification scheme (as is the case presented in the chapter discussion 
herein), only two approaches are cited by Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette.  They clarify the simple 
“habit forming” phenomenon identified by Pollak (his third case) as a “deterministic approach,” by 
which any type of habit formation or the creation of consumption capital, whether myopic or 
farsighted, is considered an inevitable reality of the human condition (p. 28).  This is contrasted with 
Pollak’s second approach stressing the ignorance of consumers about their own preference orderings 
“outside the range of ...past consumption experience” who rely upon personal experience through “a 
time consuming learning process” (quotations from Pollak, p. 745).  Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 
(1996) also cite two other antecedent related approaches (note 2), but seem to have been the first to 
actually use the phrase “learning-by-consuming.”      
 The most “passive” explanation for past consumption affecting current and future consumption 
is simple habit formation, the behavioral inertia so characteristic of much of human behavior 
(Houthakker and Taylor, 1970; Pollak, 1970; see fn. 110).  If habit formation is the primary reason for 
the strong performance of lagged dependent variables in arts demand equations, arts managers should go 
to great lengths to introduce the arts to young audiences with regularly scheduled targeted programs to 
get them into the habit of attending, even independent of any particular human capital formation effects.  
In fact, the important role of specific consumption capital is closely associated with the third approach 
described below called rational addiction.     
  
 Another version of taste cultivation has become known as learning-by-consuming, in which 
consumers are characterized as uncertain about their utility functions but learn their own subjective 
preference structures through a process of consumption experiences generating either positive or 
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negative feedback (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996; Brito and Barros, 2005; Ulibarri, 2005).  
Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992) present a “hybrid” type of learning-by-consuming model, in which 
consumers already have well-defined utility functions (with older consumers being especially risk 
averse), but poor knowledge about the product characteristics of different suppliers which can be 
clarified by positive and negative feedback from a kind of “lottery” of actual consumption. These 
models can have implications for the programmatic choices of arts managers (usually biased toward less 
esoteric and risky programming; e.g. Abbé-Decarroux and Grin, 1992).  As described in some detail 
below, Globerman (1978) presents a search model that has some similarities to both passive habit 
formation and a broader interpretation of learning-by-consuming that relies upon a process of price 
discovery rather than taste discovery,   
 
 Finally, past consumption can positively influence present and future consumption through 
rational addiction (Stigler and Becker, 1977; McCain, 1979, 1981, 1995; Spinnewyn, 1981; West and 
McKee, 1983; Becker and Murphy, 1988; Villani, 1992; Cameron, 1999; Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette, 2003).  The key assumption here is consistent forward looking behavior where 
consumers maximize an intertemporal utility function and are willing to sacrifice current utility for 
future utility by making investments in human capital (either general education, or more targeted 
training).  The opposite of myopic habit formation, this model actually requires the least of arts 
managers, who in the extreme need only maintain generally high quality standards so as to not endanger 
the perception that the arts are one of those goods capable of yielding future utility rewards resulting 
from sacrificing current consumption  to invest in the creation of human capital capable of translating 
mere occupation of a seat in a performance hall into genuine artistic appreciation.    
   
 Houthakker and Taylor (1970) remains the classic “state-adjustment” dynamic model linked to 
habit formation, estimated using OLS as part of a comprehensive study of consumer demand in the 
United States (reporting results for 82 separate spending categories).  While they also reported results 
for motion pictures and spectator sports, their estimated equation for “legitimate theater and opera” is 
often cited, both for the specific derived short run versus long run “relative price” elasticities (i.e., -
0.1827 and - 0.3109 respectively) as well as for their conclusion that while theater and opera are subject 
to habit formation, it “wears off quite rapidly” (p. 131).  The theater and opera equation, with a per 
capita expenditure definition of the dependent variable is (absolute value of standard errors in 
parentheses): 
 
(15)  q t = 0.6057q t-1 + 0.00089 Îx t + 0.0052 x t - 1 - 0.0031 Îp t - 0.0018 p t -1 
       (.0632)        (.00031)           (.00008)         (.0031)         (.0006) 
 
where q = per capita personal consumption expenditure for the good in question; x t = total per capita 
personal consumption expenditures in year t (in 1958 dollars); Îx t = (x t - x t - 1) ; p t = relative price in 
year t of the good in question (1958 = 100), calculated as the implicit deflator for that good divided by 
the implicit deflator for total personal consumption expenditures; and Îp t = (p t - p t - 1 ).    Their 
equations for all spending categories were estimated over the period 1929-1964 using the Survey of 
Current Business as the principal source of data.  While not as frequently cited (especially the long run 
estimate), they also derive short and long run elasticities with respect to total expenditures, which are 
0.7407 and 1.2604 respectively.     
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 The Globerman (1978) approach to indirectly isolating the effect of past consumption on present 
consumption is novel in the arts demand literature.  He investigates the determinants of public 
perceptions about performing arts prices, including the role played by past attendance in generating 
more accurate price perceptions that can be viewed as stimulating attendance.  Because this causal link 
occurs without any clarification of one’s utility function (as is typical of studies that call themselves 
learning-by-consuming approaches) or postulation of an intertemporal utility function implying current 
investment sacrifice for future consumption benefits (as with rational addiction), it might be viewed as a 
“default” habit formation model.  In might also be viewed as a more traditional price search model in 
contrast to the “utility function search” model of Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996; see also 
Brito and Barros, 2005).  Despite this potential link to habit formation, the Globerman (1978) approach 
admittedly shares a key characteristic with a more broadly defined learning-by-consuming framework.  
Whether additional consumption clarifies the product characteristics of arts performances among older 
audiences with already established risk averse utility functions (Abbé-Decarroux, 1992), the actual 
prices that must be paid to access those product characteristics (Globerman, 1978), or the form and 
content of the utility functions defined over various product characteristics (Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette, 1996), current and future consumption are linked to something learned from past 
consumption.111 
 
 The lesser known Globerman (1978) analysis is not normally discussed in this context, but is  
relevant to whether the interdependence of consumption across time periods can be considered “taste 
cultivation” and whether accrued human capital is the primary link of education to arts demand.   He 
utilizes a population in-home survey of 1,004 Ontario adults (16 and over) stratified by five broad 
regions conducted as part of an arts attendance study (in contrast to an audience survey in Ontario 
during a similar time period that served as the database for Globerman and Book, 1977; see 3.2.2).   
Interview questions included frequency of attendance at arts performances and movies, as well as a 
related one regarding accessability of such events to the respondent’s home: “How often are live theater, 
ballet, opera, and symphony concert performances given that are readily accessible from where you 
live?”  The percentage of those answering “almost all the time” or “fairly often” is not independent of 
actual attendance patterns and varied widely by art form: theater (40 percent); concerts (27 percent); 
dance (21 percent); and opera (10 percent).  Two questions were also posed regarding price awareness 
for each art form: (1) “What do you think is the lowest priced ticket for a performance in this area?” and 
(2) “What is the amount you normally spend on a ticket?”   
 Movie prices were by far the most well-known with an 81 percent answer response rate for both 
lowest and normal price questions.  Performing arts response rates were generally slightly higher for the 
more easily answered normal price question and unsurprisingly varied directly with both the frequency 
of actual attendance and the stated degree of ready accessibility: theater (65 percent response); concerts 
(45 percent), dance (34 percent; although 35 percent gave an answer to the lowest price question), and 
opera (24 percent).  Furthermore, variances around the mean perceived lowest and normal prices tended 
                                                          
 111 Interestingly, Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992), who do not use the term “learning-by-
consuming,”contrast perceived product quality with actual product quality as it is clarified by 
their “theater-going as a lottery” model, whereas Globerman (1978) contrasts perceived minimum price 
with actual price as it is clarified by additional searches, as measured by actual attendance (see below).  
Also, Abbé-Decarroux and Grin speak of their effort to clarify the determinants of  “entertainment 
habits” (p. 125), reminding us that efforts to classify different studies are perilous.      
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to decline with mean attendance frequency, with the lowest price variances occurring for the most 
frequently attended movies (mean frequency of 5.89 per year), and the highest variances for the least 
attended opera (mean attendance 2.49).  While theater maintained this inverse relationship with the 
second lowest variance of perceived prices while having the second highest attendance frequency, 
concerts and dance reversed their expected orderings. 
 
 Globerman (1978) postulates a simple price search model with the amount of search activity 
varying positively with household income Y, car ownership (a dummy variable = 1), proximity to 
Toronto (a dummy = 1 if the respondent lives in the city), and highest formal level of education, E.      
If the dependent variable is defined as the estimated lowest ticket price and that perceived lowest price 
is negatively related to the amount of search, the coefficients on each of these independent variables 
should also be negative.  Also, to control for the possibility that respondents might be answering the 
hypothetical questions about minimum price with very different types of performances in mind (e.g. a 
highly professional theater group in contrast to amateur productions), the ticket price cited as that 
normally paid by each respondent was also included to control for this potential quality bias. The 
expected sign on this estimated coefficient is positive. He also later introduces age and number of 
household children under age 16 as further control variables. 
 
 But what links this study to the taste cultivation problem is the inclusion of one final independent 
search variable: the individual’s actual frequency of attendance, F, which should then also be negatively 
related to the lowest price perception.  This variable is used as a proxy for a more theoretically desirable 
direct measure of the net benefits of making an additional price search, which Stigler (1961) originally 
linked to the existing dispersion of prices and the marginal cost of an additional search, as well as to the 
importance of a product in the searcher’s utility function.  Since these more direct measures of the net 
benefits of searching are unavailable, frequency of attendance was substituted.   As recognized by 
Globerman and as further elaborated upon by Seaman (1981), this does introduce more circularity to the 
argument when linked to attendance than would be ideal.  That is: q = f (p*), where p* is perceived price 
and q is attendance (defined as frequency within the past 12 months); p* = f (search); but search = f (q), 
making q = f (q), since Globerman did not have differential time period data to make that relationship 
the more typically lagged qt = f (q t - 1).  As stated by Globerman himself, when applied to policy advice 
his findings could be interpreted as “to stimulate attendance through lower search costs arts managers 
should stimulate increased arts attendance” (note 14, p.39).     
 
 However, some version of such circularity is endemic to dynamic models of demand in general.  
No matter how well-specified and no matter what the exact causal connection, all such models (with the 
possible exception of rational addiction, where managers can be viewed as having more passive 
marketing roles) can be interpreted as imploring organizations to increase attendance by increasing 
attendance.  Furthermore, the Globerman (1978) finding that higher levels of formal education are  
related to lower perceived minimum arts prices (statistically significant for theater, and ironically also 
for movies) is suggestive of an important and generally ignored link between education and attendance 
that requires neither a “taste development” explanation, nor even a beneficial productivity effect in a 
household production context (as in Globerman and Book, 1977).   In fact, while his results were “far 
from robust” and adjusted R2 s averaging .3635 suggest important omitted variables (p. 35), his price 
search equations were statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level and the signs on all key 
variables were as expected, including the attendance proxy for the net benefits of incremental search 
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(and especially significant for the actual normal price paid quality control variable).  At least, the further 
examination of the role played by incorrect price perceptions as an “unobserved barrier” (Globerman, 
1978, pp.37-38) to higher arts attendance, and the role that past attendance (and other factors affecting 
the net benefits of search) can play in overcoming that barrier, whether viewed as generating a habit of 
arts attendance or the result of a learning-by-consuming process, would seem fruitful.      
  
 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) has become the most cited example of the learning-
by-doing approach, probably because Abbé-Decarroux and Grin (1992) focus the primary attention of  
their earlier related analysis on the role of risk and how it affects age and arts consumption in a model 
with defined preferences (see also fn. 110).  The further elaboration by Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (2003) of how this approach differs from rational addiction (2003) is especially 
enlightening and will be incorporated into the description.  Their approach to the dependence of current 
consumption on past consumption does not include a lagged endogenous dependent variable in their 
estimated equations, but focuses instead on the contrast between the various predicted effects of key 
variables in testing their learning-by-consuming model (1996, p. 39).  Consistent with the discussion to 
this point, they confirm the methodological challenge of how best to incorporate past consumption into 
studies of current consumption by observing that despite the general consensus among economists and 
sociologists that such effects are important for a wide variety of goods, “it is seldom possible to directly 
verify this assertion...using individual data and after controlling for many wealth, price and taste 
variables” (pp. 27-28).   
 
 Their approach fully accepts the non-Beckerian premise that changes/differences in behavior can 
be linked to taste changes/differences rather than subtle constraint variations and incorporates two key 
elements.  (1) Any new experience of a good reveals an unexpected positive or negative “increment in 
his taste” for the good, with this increment treated ex ante as a zero mean random variable.  (2) The 
concept of someone developing a taste for an art form, e.g. the theater, can be viewed as having 
experienced repeated pleasant surprises when attending plays and hence revises expectations upward.   
Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) claim three theoretical advantages for this representation: (1) 
it is compatible with an assumed strong heterogeneity of tastes and the independence of individual 
choices; (2) it allows for extensive differentiation of cultural goods further magnified by the “unique 
nature of each ‘cultural’ experience provid[ing] new possibilities for surprises and implies long learning 
periods;” and (3) it  maintains intertemporal separability of the utility function conditional on past 
consumption by viewing consumers as having uncertainty regarding their preferences that prevents them 
from rationally anticipating the future taste (utility) that will be acquired over time (p.28).  While these 
are indeed three features of their model, only the second might be viewed as a clear “advantage” 
inasmuch as e.g., the also reputable rational addiction approach would not require strong taste 
heterogeneity or intertemporal utility function separability. 
 A more concise and simplified description of their model designed to facilitate its comparison 
with rational addiction approaches is provided by Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette in their later 
overview of arts demand (2003), and the description below borrows from both their (1996) and (2003) 
contributions and where different, adopts the simpler (2003) notation (also at times modifying it slightly 
for added clarity).  The utility function includes the quality adjusted quantities for all goods i = (1,..., r) 
whose consumption “may give rise to non-systematic cultivation of taste” (1996, p. 28): 
 
(16) U = u (s1 x1, ... sr xr) 
 110
 
where xi = the quantities consumed of market goods and the si weights represent “subjective qualities” 
anticipated before the decision is made to consume the xi goods, which depend on previous consumption 
experiences.  A similar utility function can be defined for each time period.   If we now define xa as the 
particular market good, attendance at an arts performance,  the effect of consumption experiences 
yielding additional information about the subjective quality of that good, sa, can be represented in period 
t as (dropping the a subscripts on both s and x to simplify) 
 
(17) s t = Et - 1 (s t) + g t ,         if x t > 0  
  
where Et -1 represents the expectation operator before period t’s choice, and gt is the “taste surprise” 
experienced in period t (i.e. Et -1 (gt) = 0)    This can be called the “experienced taste for arts 
consumption in period t.” As noted above, consumers who find themselves “developing a taste” for 
music (for example), will generally experience pleasant surprises, i.e. g t > 0 is more common than the 
reverse.  
Consumers are viewed as basing their expectation of taste solely on their past experiences (and not as in 
the more “standard” efforts to introduce quality into arts demand functions as the result of reading 
subjective arts critic reviews, or based on other a priori objective criteria such as repertoire 
classification; see 3.2.5 below).  Therefore, taste expectations are identical across all time periods (as 
noted, preserving the intertemporal separability of the utility function).   
 
 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette then define the taste constant Frisch demand function (i.e. 
marginal utility of income or wealth constant in contrast to Marshallian demand functions) for the arts 
for any time period and for any particular consumer as: 
 
(18) sx = D [λ p/s]  
 
where sx is the quality adjusted quantity of art consumption, λ is the marginal utility of “anticipated 
wealth” and is invariable over a consumer’s life cycle, and p/s is the shadow price of arts consumption 
defined as the explicit price p normalized by the perceived quality of the experience s.  Lévy-Garboua 
and Montmarquette view the non-observable λ as “easily linked to socioeconomic variables when 
current income is not known,” and indicate that the demand functions will be linear if the period utility 
functions are simply quadratic (1996, p. 30).   
 
 Equation (18) clearly suggests that a good such as arts attendance that is assessed by a consumer 
as having a high quality s will have a low “personalized price.”  However, analogous to the household 
production model of the new consumer theory when the marginal product of any unit of attendance is 
quite high in producing “arts appreciation,” this greater potency of each unit of attendance in generating 
quality s also implies that less quantity of the good x is required to achieve a given utility level (see 
utility function (16) which is defined in terms of sx).  This generates a key insight from the learning-by -
consuming approach, and allows Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette to “impute” a price elasticity of 
demand from their empirical analysis even though they are missing a price variable in their vast 
database. 
That is, if the price elasticity of x > 1 in absolute value, the experience of consuming the arts will have a 
positive effect on current consumption when the good was “enjoyable overall,” but a negative effect 
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when it was not enjoyable overall (1996, p. 30).  They clarify this relationship by modifying the demand 
function (18) so as to isolate the marginal effect of quality on the quantity of the arts consumed, Mx/Ms, 
which they derive after several steps to be: 
 
(19) Mx/Ms = - x/s (1 + e) 
 
where e designates the price elasticity of demand for x.  This directly implies that (Mx/Ms)(s/x) = - (1+ e), 
i.e. that the elasticity of arts attendance with respect to perceived arts quality (which they call the “taste 
elasticity”) = - (1 + own price elasticity of demand for arts attendance).  That elasticity will > 0 if e < -1, 
i.e. if the price elasticity is elastic.  If the price elasticity is inelastic (e > -1), the quality (or taste) 
elasticity of the demand for the arts becomes negative, and unitary price elasticity implies generates a 
zero quality elasticity.  As interpreted by Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, this allows them (“if the 
model is correct”) to measure the price elasticity of demand with their extensive French Ministry of 
Culture survey data when the model measures accumulated experience and taste for consumption (1996, 
p. 30).  As noted above in 3.2.2, normally price elasticity is not capable of being estimated in Type P 
studies due to the absence of ticket price data. 
 
 Since Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) report estimated coefficients for as many as 26 
independent variables in a single equation (probit, OLS and tobit estimations are performed), and some 
of their empirical results are reported elsewhere in this chapter, the focus here is not on the generally 
non-surprising evidence about the role of their many demographic and socioeconomic variables on 
either the probability or the frequency of attending the theater.  Their distinction between unconditional 
and conditional  versions of consumer choice is also ignored here. The focus instead is on their core 
evidence supporting their version of dynamic demand analysis and their imputed demand elasticity 
results.  Since the Ministry of Culture survey was rich in opinion type questions, some of the key 
empirical results refer to those variables.  For example, the authors view opinions referring to greater 
appreciation of the actors and the quality of the text of the play as indirectly measuring the taste for the 
theater.  Two of their constructed variables, were designed to measure taste more directly.  They used 
the “appreciation scores” from 0 to 10 that respondents had assigned to a list of 56 (23 theatrical writers 
and 33 actors/directors), and designated high scores of 9 and 10 as indicating “evidence of a taste for the 
theater” (p. 39).  But they then found that writers were seemingly treated differently than actors and 
directors (based on the performance of these variables in their estimated tobit model), so they identified 
a taste for reading as a substitute for live theater among those who show a strong preference for writers, 
and vice versa for those giving especially high ratings to actors and directors.  They found support for 
this view in the negative effect of reading journals and magazines on the frequency of theater 
attendance.   
 
 They found that the variable measuring the percentage of actors and directors known was the 
best measure of “the degree of familiarity with or experience of” the theater, and they designated a 
person who claimed to know more than 80 percent of the names put to him as knowing the theater well. 
They found it noteworthy that the performance of their variable designating knowledge of writers 
performed more poorly than their variable measuring knowledge of actors and directors, and concluded 
that “it is necessary to have attended the theater personally in the past in order to know the actors and 
directors whose talent can only be appreciated on the stage and in action” (p. 39).  They thus identify 
this variable as their key measure of previous theater attendance and predictor of current attendance (and 
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based on their tobit estimation the probability of someone knowing more than 80 percent of the actors 
and directors not attending the theater falls from 0.49 to .02.  
 
 This finding then becomes the key to their imputing a price elasticity from their survey data, 
assuming as they concede that they are correct to use variables like the knowledge of actors and 
directors as indicators of subjective quality (s in the equations above) and that their model makes sense.  
They estimate the price elasticity of demand (see their note 7) for this experienced group of theater 
consumers as -1.47 based on an application of equation (19) above and the assumption that the average 
experienced consumer knows 85 percent of the actors and directors (yielding in their model an s value = 
0.85), and that this type of consumer attends the theater an average of 3.87 times per year (so that x = 
3.87).  These parameters along with the estimated logit coefficient of 2.1262 on their knowledge of 
actors and directors variable (interpreted from above to be Mx/Ms), yields the calculation (not explicitly 
shown):  
 
(20)  (MX/Ms) (s/x) = - (1 + e) = 2.1262 (0.85/3.87) = - 1 - e, or 0.467 = -1 - e, or finally: e = - 1.467. 
 
A similar calculation yielded the lower price elasticity of about - 1.0 for the less experienced theater-
goer.  
Given the rarity of price elastic findings in the performing arts, especially as noted previously for an 
audience segment that is being characterized as having a strong cultivated taste for the arts, it is easy to 
question the many steps and assumptions required to impute this result.  But Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette view this result as fully expected from their model when one views experienced theater-
attenders are those who have “completed their learning process” after experiencing many cases of 
pleasant surprises generating high s values, high quality adjusted quantities of arts consumption and low 
personalized prices in equation (18) above.  In their view, had theater experiences generally led to 
unpleasant surprises and a reduction rather than increase in the subjective quality assessments, the result 
would have been price inelasticity.     
  
 Various findings of the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) study have been referenced  
elsewhere in this chapter.  The focus in this section has been on their approach to incorporating dynamic 
factors into demand analysis and dealing with the taste cultivation methodological challenge. Their 
approach of endogenizing the discovery of consumer utility functions via a learning-by-consuming 
process and testing the model without the use of a lagged consumption variable is unique, and is not the 
only empirical approach that might be taken.  For example, Brito and Barros (2005) model the dynamics 
of demand and prices in a learning-by-consuming model and suggest that the standard empirical 
approach of using such a lagged consumption variable is fully consistent with their version of that 
model.  In addition, the above discussion has put into context the frequent citations of Lévy-Garboua 
and Montmarquette (1996) as confirming the importance of quality in arts demand, even though there 
are no explicit quality variables in their equations (see the overview in 3.1. and the more detailed 3.2.5), 
as well as their controversial finding that the price elasticity of demand for theater is higher (at -1.47) for 
more knowledgeable and experienced theater-goers than for other consumers (e.g see 3.1.1, and fn 59).  
This finding of price elastic demand is not only inconsistent with other empirical evidence when 
consumers are segmented and separate elasticities estimated, but is not an inevitable result of learning-
by-consuming processes inasmuch as Brito and Barros (2005) derive an expectation of both low income 
and own price elasticities (p.104) due to the way that flows of cultural good consumption interact with 
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the decay of the stock of culture in response to an exogenous “shock” in the relative price of cultural 
goods in their particular dynamic model (pp. 97-98).112  
 
 In contrast to the learning-by-consuming approach, the rational addiction model combined with 
specific consumption capital in a household production framework has a different modeling setup and 
can generate different implications, some of which were described earlier in the section 3.2.2 discussion 
of Globerman and Book (1977).  Despite its popularity in the arts literature stemming largely from 
Stigler and Becker (1977) and the intuitive appeal of its simplified version suggesting that past 
consumption generates productive human consumption capital than makes future consumption 
“cheaper” in terms of generating the less observable but clearly important final product “arts 
appreciation,” attempts to verify a more technically precise version of this framework have not always 
succeeded.  For example, while applied to cinema rather than the performing arts, Cameron (1999) finds 
his results in testing for this phenomenon problematic and offering “little support” for the rational 
addiction model (p. 619).  This is in large part due to the additional requirements that must be met in 
finding evidence for addiction in the more technical version of that model.  That is, the household 
production element of the rational addiction model generates an important distinction between shadow 
price elasticities linked to arts appreciation and market price elasticities related to observed arts 
attendance (see below).  But the intertemporal non-separability of the utility function feature of the 
model (stressing the importance of making conscious intertemporal shifts in consumption by investing 
in human consumption capital creation now in anticipation of being  more capable of enjoying the arts 
or other goods later) stresses the rate of time preference of consumers, i.e. their ability to be far-sighted 
rather than short-sighted.  In this context findings of “too-high” a rate of time preference is inconsistent 
with the premise behind the rational addiction framework.113  Tests for rational addiction also involve 
investigating the relationship between the interest rate and the discount rate, as described below.  
 
 Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2003) assist in understanding the rational addiction 
perspective by contrasting it to their learning-by-consuming approach using notation that will be 
familiar from the prior discussion (and borrowing from the original contributions of Spinnewyn, 1981; 
Stigler and Becker, 1977;  and  Becker and Murphy,1988).  A brief version of their description is 
summarized here focusing on the implications for the interpretation of the low estimated price elasticity 
results that have generally been found in empirical arts demand studies.  They postulate two 
commodities, X and y, where X is “art appreciation” (not to be confused with x, which as in the 
learning-by-consuming model designates arts performance attendance), and y represents other 
commodities, over three time periods t = 1, 2, 3, and a time additive utility function: 
 
(21)   U (X1, y1) + β U (X2, y2) + β2 U (X3, y3) 
 
Rather than using the production function approach to transform arts attendance x into arts appreciation 
                                                          
 112 It is striking that Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) is not cited, even though the Brito 
and Barros (2005) analysis does not clearly  build upon that earlier model and results..  
 113 McCain (2003, p. 448) notes that efforts to empirically test the rational addiction model have 
not been “entirely satisfactory,” and that at times findings of high rates of time preference have been 
found to be “implausible” by advocates of the rational addiction model.   
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X whereby X = f (x, t), with t as time devoted to producing X (see Globerman and Book, 1977; 3.2.2),    
x can be transformed into X via the s quality parameter as utilized in the learning-by-consuming 
approach.   Thus, for t = (1, 2, 3):  
 
(22)  Xt = s t x t   
 
(23) s t = s t - 1 + r x t-1       for t = (2, 3) 
 
with r>0 representing the beneficial effect of music-specific capital (be it from consumption or training; 
see e.g. Smith, 1998).  Individuals maximize utility given (21), (23) and a wealth constraint: 
 
(24)  W = Σρt - 1 (pxt + yt)    for t = (1 to 3) 
 
where ρ is the interest factor and p is the price of arts attendance.  Importantly, the first order conditions 
for maximizing utility generate shadow prices Πi for X, arts appreciation, that vary by time periods 1, 2, 
and 3 as follows: 
 
(25) Π3 = p/s3 
 
 Π2 = p/s2 (1 - pα3) 
 
 Π1 = p/s1 [1 - pα2 (1 - α3) - p2α3] 
 
with α = rxt/st defined as the rate of addiction, or the rate at which the “taste” for art increases with the 
consumption of art, and is always viewed as positive although it might vary over the life-cycle, most 
typically rising at young ages and eventually declining (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 2003, p. 
205).  
Under normal conditions the relative shadow prices of arts appreciation, X, will decline over time. 
 
 There are two especially important implications of this framework: 
  
 (1) While it might be thought that with a declining relative shadow price of art appreciation over 
time, the quantity of X will grow as well. However, that will only definitely occur when the discount 
rate related to the rate of time preference does not exceed the interest rate (ρ).  More impatient 
consumers, therefore, may actually reduce their consumption of arts appreciation over time even in the 
face of a declining relative shadow price. 
 (2) As is true of any variation on the household production consumer choice framework, even if 
consumption of the unobserved art appreciation X rises over time, there is no guarantee that the 
observed attendance at arts events x will similarly increase over time.  As usual, this is because with the 
cultivation of taste, s is increasing hence making each unit of x more productive in generating a unit of 
X.  Since less x can generate a give X, the net result is uncertain, although again, x is more likely to rise 
the lower is the discount rate and the higher is the interest rate.   
 
 Finally, this critical distinction between arts appreciation X and arts attendance x provides one of 
the theoretical justifications (discussed above in section 2.1.2) as to why one might expect an inherent 
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bias toward relatively low price elasticities of demand for arts attendance relative to other goods (at 
comparable explicit prices).  That is, there is a distinction between the shadow price elasticity of X in 
any time period (E) and the market elasticity of arts attendance (e).  Following the Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (2003) summary of the literature on this relationship, these two elasticities can be 
written for time period 1 as: 
 
        3  
(26) E11 = e11 + Σ E αt  p1 E x1 αt 
       t=2 
 
That is (redefining this in absolute value terms for clarity), the shadow price elasticity is always higher 
than the market price elasticity due to the effect of positive addiction.  The first E term following the Σ 
term is defined as the elasticity of the expected future addiction rate (in t) to current price, and the 
second E term is defined as the elasticity of current arts appreciation to the expected future addiction 
rate (in t), with the first elasticity expected to be negative and the second positive, but having a 
complementary influence on the absolute value of the resulting elasticity.  The key summary point again 
is that there is nothing inconsistent between having a price-elastic demand for art appreciation X and a 
market price-inelastic demand for arts attendance x (Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 2003, p. 206).  
Note that this is a quite different reason for getting low ticket price elasticities (holding prices constant) 
than others discussed in section 2.1.2 such as the distinction between the “full price” of attending an arts 
performance and the ticket price component.   
 
 In summary, while many arts demand studies have improved the performance of their estimated 
equations by including a one-year time lagged dependent variable capturing the effect of past 
consumption on future consumption, that is not the only, or even necessarily the preferred way to 
capture the dynamic effect of taste cultivation in arts demand analysis.  Even if such a lagged variable is 
introduced, the underlying theoretical justification for its inclusion is a complex subject, with competing 
approaches having somewhat different implications, especially for arts management strategy and the 
future growth of performing arts demand.   
 
3.2.4  The Product and Geographic Market Problem: Substitutes (and Complements) 
 
In addition to the unresolved issue of whether the arts are price inelastic luxury goods,   
Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2003) have found no definitive evidence in the literature regarding 
close substitutes for the performing arts.   Reflective of this dilemma is that neither Moore (1966) nor 
Luksetich and Lange (1995) include any substitute prices even though they had reasonably 
disaggregated data that might have allowed some proxy for the prices of localized alternative forms of 
not only “entertainment,” but other art forms beyond either Broadway theater or symphonic music. 
While Withers (1980) estimated fairly strong cross price elasticities (0.62 and 1.35) for his famous 
“reading and recreation component of the CPI,” the t-statistics were not especially strong, and a time-
series study of the aggregate performing arts in the United States is not well-adapted to capture localized 
competitive effects, or to distinguish among the sub-categories of the performing arts.   
 
 Corning and Levy (2002) target the dilemma perfectly, when they observe that the most direct 
competitors of their three southern California theater venues are the Santa Barbara City College Theater 
Group, the Ensemble Theater Company, and Civic Light Opera, but “unfortunately insufficient price 
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data were available to construct a useful variable” (note 5, p. 234).114  They were thus forced to fall back 
on the Throsby and Withers (1979) and Withers (1980) inspired “recreation component of the CPI” and 
found that none of their four series variations (admissions, recreation, and recreation services averaged 
across U.S. cities, or recreation in western urban areas) had any “measurable effect in any configuration 
and was dropped” (p. 227).        
 
 Some suggestive evidence on substitutes was developed by Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette 
(1996), although no variable in their vast database really captures the price of substitutes.  Confusingly, 
they identify among their “price and quality” variables “POPSUB,” which they claim reflects 
respondents’ “‘opinion’ on substitute prices of other forms of recreation” (Table A.1. p. 45).  However, 
in explaining its negative coefficient in their theater demand equations, they clarify that variable as 
really reflecting the perceived quality of available substitutes (although they also call it “the inverse of 
the price of substitutes;” p. 41).  That is, this variable reflects one of the reasons given by survey 
respondents for not attending the theater, among which is “other recreations or other types of performing 
arts are more attractive than the theater” (p. 41).  While this definition does not allow any separation of 
the effect of the broadly defined “other recreations,” nor does it clarify whether quality, price or some 
other dimension was most central to being “more attractive,” it does have the merit of incorporating art 
forms other than theater as substitutes. The relatively strong negative coefficients for this variable are 
suggestive that the relevant product market cannot be defined as narrowly as “just theater,” even though 
this evidence is not derived from direct cross-price elasticity of demand information.115   This 
conclusion would also be supported by their finding of a negative effect of regular magazine and journal 
reading on the frequency of live theater attendance, suggesting that those two forms of intellectual 
stimulation and entertainment are partial substitutes (see section 3.2.3 above).     
 
 In fact, as reflected by this reading versus live theater result, evidence regarding substitutes and 
complements need not stem solely from cross-price elasticities.  Available quantities of potential 
substitutes, or proxies reflecting technical improvements in the quality of such substitutes, may be 
revealing indicators of substitution relationships even when not justified as alternative measures when 
                                                          
 114 In a non-regression case study of marketing strategies for the Los Angeles Music Center, 
Kaali-Nagy and Garrison (1972) identified eight potentially competing Southern California attractions: 
Marineland, Busch Gardens, Disneyland, Knott’s Berry Farm, the L.A. Zoo, the San Diego Zoo, 
Huntington Library and the L.A. County Museum.  
 115 Industrial organization and antitrust economists would hasten to observe that at least 
“antitrust market” analysis often requires that cross-price elasticities of demand be estimated for more 
than just one potential substitute and weighted by the relative market shares of each good. The relative 
importance of fixed and variable costs for the products being investigated is also useful to allow a 
comparison of so-called own price “critical-elasticity” benchmarks with most likely “actual” own price 
elasticities derived as a function of the weighted sum of cross-price elasticities. Thus, the importance of 
any one cross-price elasticity is difficult to fully evaluate in isolation, and the “required”  magnitude of 
the cross-price elasticity necessary to consider that good a “close substitute” for another will also vary 
with market expenditure shares.  Furthermore, the ongoing issue of “substitutes at what price” is again 
relevant (See section 3.1.2).    
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substitute price data are unavailable.116   Those non-price variables are discussed following Table 15.  
The types of price (or expenditure) variables utilized in arts demand studies to capture cross-price 
elasticity effects are documented in Table 15 and identified by study and results..  Some version of 
movie prices dominates,117 followed by various recreation or entertainment price indices.  It was not 
always presumed that arts and entertainment alternatives would be substitutes for the high arts, and the 
inclusion of such variables should ideally be viewed as attempts to determine the nature of those 
relationships rather than just confirm the consistency of the empirical evidence with consumer choice 
theory (in contrast to the dismay at generating positive and statistically significant own price elasticities; 
see Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987).   Nevertheless, Felton’s (1992) explicit expression of neutrality 
regarding the expected signs of such variables is rare (i.e., “it was deemed equally likely that the two 
[alternative arts] experiences would be substitutes or complements,” p. 4), and most discussions of the 
empirical results reflect the expectation that gross substitution should dominate.118  The entries in Table 
15 are not listed chronologically by study, as with previous similar tables, but by the proximity of such 
measures to the performing arts and their degree of disaggregation.  Some studies had hoped to estimate 
additional cross-price effects, but lacked sufficient observations in the cross price variables to include in 
regression equations (e.g. in Felton, 1992, the cross-price effects of ballet and opera prices could not be 
estimated).  
 
Table 15 
Measures of Alternative Prices in Arts Demand Equations 
                                                          
 116 However, finding useful and effective data on either the price or quantity of substitutes can 
prove elusive, as exhibited by Fernández Blanco and BaZos-Pino (1997), who considered many 
alternative price and quantity measures of video and television competition with cinema before resorting 
to a single binary variable to reflect the expanded availability of public television in Spain after 1984 
when the state television monopoly ended.  Other variables such as the number of television sets, home 
video recorders, supply of television programming, or price of video rentals either could not be 
constructed due to data limitations or performed badly in preliminary regressions.  These types of 
measures would also be potentially relevant to the live performing arts.  
 117 The enthusiasm for cinema prices in performing arts demand equations is not reciprocated in 
cinema demand analysis, where performing arts prices never appear.  One possible reason, beyond mere 
measurement problems and data availability, is that while cinema and theater may appear to be excellent 
substitutes, the greater availability of cinema in all parts of a country compared to the more concentrated 
location of theater in only the major urban centers, may reduce the practical degree of such 
substitutability.  This was argued for the case of Spain by Fernández Blanco and BaZos-Pino (1997, p. 
62).   
 118 At times, this expectation was clearly dependent on the particular measure being used. For 
example, while Felton (1992) was quoted for her neutrality regarding the expected relationship between 
two types of performing arts alternatives, that view was not present in her paper with Greckel (1987), 
where they dropped their “poor” measure of substitute prices (i.e. the entertainment component of the 
CPI) not only due to weak and statistically insignificant coefficients but because in most equations the 
“the sign of the coefficient was negative, indicating complementarity instead of substitution” (p. 64).    
 118
A. Alternative Prices: Dependent Variable (Study) Results 
Symphony subscription 
price 
# Subscribers to large Ballet 
companies, and separately to 
small Ballet companies 
(Felton 1992) 
Large companies: + and stat. sig. at .05 
Reference cross price elasticity = 0.67; 
Not significant for small 
Average price of 12 
other local companies 
including those within 
the same art form  
Quantity of tickets sold to 
residents and tourists by each 
of 13 local arts organizations; 
2 theater, 2 opera, 4 
symphony, 3 ballet and 2 
modern dance (Gapinski 
1988) 
No cross price effects were significant for 
any of the 13 companies 
Average price of other 
local companies 
excluding those within 
the same art form 
Quantity of tickets sold by 
each of 13 local arts 
organizations; same as 
Gapinski 1988 (Gapinski 
1986) 
Cross price elasticities 
2 theaters: 0.18; 0.09 
2 opera: 0.13, 0.15 
4 symphony: 0.44, 0.55, 0.65, 0.53 
3 ballet: 0.28, 0.21, 1.10 ; 2 Modern 
dance: 2.28, 2.06 
Average real cinema 
ticket price 
Performing arts tickets 
sold/100,000 pop 
(Bonato et al., 1990) 
Negative; statistically insignificant 
Real movie ticket price Ticketed attendance for 
various art forms 
(Touchstone, 1980) 
Theater: + (t stat 0.90) 
Symph: + (t stat 1.70) 
Ballet: + (t stat 1.12 
Opera: - (t stat -1.35) 
Cinema price index and 
Composite good price 
index in theater 
equation; Theater price 
index and Composite 
good price index in 
cinema equation 
Expenditure share of theater; 
expenditure share of cinema 
(Pommerehne & Kirchgassner 
1987) 
Close to zero cross-price effects for both 
theater and cinema expenditure equations 
Average nominal 
cinema price 
unadjusted as well as 
adjusted for regional 
variations; 
Entertainment and 
recreation price index 
Attendance / population for 
the Royal Shakespeare 
Company in London 
(Gapinski, 1984) 
Weak performance on all variations of 
cross-price measures; not included in 
reported demand equations 
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Movie theater price 
Price index of leisure 
goods 
Paying performing arts 
(mostly theater and opera) 
visitors per capita German pop 
(Krebs and Pommerehne, 
1995) 
Neither significant, or wrong sign; 
dropped 
from final equations 
Price of audio 
recordings 
Symphony attendance / 
population 
(Ekelund & Ritenour, 1999) 
Negative; statistically significant only at 
0.10  
Entertainment 
component of the 
consumer price index 
CPI  
Attendance at subscription 
concerts for 2 Louisville 
music companies  
(Greckel & Felton, 1987) 
Negative and very low statistical 
significance; dropped from study 
Recreation component 
of the CPI; 4 variations 
including localized 
regional version 
Tickets sold for performances 
at 3 venues of the Pacific 
Conservatory of the 
Performing Arts (Corning & 
Levy, 2002) 
All versions insignificant; dropped from 
equations 
Reading and recreation 
component of the CPI  
Attendance / population for 
aggregated performing arts 
(Withers, 1980) 
Cross price elasticity  
0.62 to 1.35 in time allocation model; 
modest t statistics 
All personal 
expenditures for 
education and 
recreation 
Number of attendances / 
population in time series 
model, theater and symphony 
(Goudriian & de Kam, 1983) 
Close to zero and insignificant: theater; 
Expend elasticity = 1.5 symphony (t = 
4.19) 
  
 A review of Table 15 makes clear that only Withers (1980), and Gapinski (1986) had any real 
success in capturing positive cross-price effects for the performing arts, with Withers being the only 
remotely successful application of an aggregated recreation or entertainment price index.  However, 
Felton (1992) generated evidence of a positive cross price effect of symphony prices on large budget, 
but not small budget ballet companies, and Goudriian and de Kam (1983) found evidence of a positive 
effect of education and recreation expenditures on symphony, but not theater, attendance in their time 
series model (they did include a substitute price term in their cross-section equations).  Despite its 
relative popularity, various versions of movie prices performed very poorly (only Touchstone, 1980, 
came close to an expected result in her symphony equation and the coefficient in the opera equation was 
negative).  In fact, it can be safely concluded that there is no empirical evidence that movies are 
effective substitutes for the performing arts.  Ekelund and Ritenour (1999) were troubled by the 
unexpected negative coefficient on their price of audio recordings variable, and stressed that it was 
statistically significant at “only” the 0.10 level.    
 
 While Gapinski (1986) has understandably received all of the attention, it is noteworthy that his 
earlier attempt to find cross-price effects between cinema and recreation price indices and attendance at 
the Royal Shakespeare was not successful (Gapinski, 1984), and his later study of resident versus tourist 
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demand using the same 13 arts companies as in his 1986 study (and with a more inclusive variation of 
his 1986 substitute price variables) also failed to generate any significant results.  It is interesting that 
the Gapinski substitute prices that omitted any “intra-art form” components (1986) were more 
successful than the versions that included such intra-art form prices (1988), although the two studies 
were not otherwise identical.  Also, it is puzzling that citations of Gapinski (1986) almost always claim 
that he found evidence of substitution across art forms and stress the fact that his cross-price elasticities 
are greater than 2.0 in some cases, despite the fact that the cross-price elasticities are below 0.20 for four 
of his 13 companies, and 0.65 or lower for all but three of his companies (with two of the dance 
companies being as low as 0.21 and 0.28).119  Furthermore, Gapinski himself stresses that the two 
modern dance companies having those unusually high cross price elasticities are those with the lowest 
attendance and most “heavily contemporary” of all the companies in his study (p. 22), and that the 
“clearest pattern to emerge” is that “a price change by a single company alone has minor impact on a 
second company” and that the “greatest attendance response to a price maneuver occurs for the initiating 
firm itself” (p. 23), which is especially noteworthy given the quite inelastic own price elasticities that 
average less than -0.30 for all art forms (see Table 1, Gapinski, 1986).  However, among the rarely 
discussed results are his projections of the effects of price changes by rivals acting together rather than 
unilaterally (p.24), with one of his examples being a loss of 4,800 patrons annually for one of his 
theaters (THE2) if all other non-theater companies reduce their prices by 10 percent (an attendance 
decline that he argues is almost twice what could be generated by own price changes by THE2 itself).120  
 However, despite these clarifications regarding the full variety of Gapinski’s 1986 results, the 
overall message of his path-breaking and sophisticated study is that price interdependencies among 
performing arts firms in specific geographic markets are potentially important, and that the focus should 
clearly be on further efforts to find evidence of the degree to which “the lively arts substitute for the 
lively arts.”  To date, no successful replications or extensions of the Gapinski (1986) analysis have 
appeared.  
 
 There is little direct cross-price elasticity evidence regarding one aspect of complementary 
goods, i.e. the effect that higher prices for transportation (for given distances from the venue), parking, 
child care, dining and other components of the full price of an arts performance visit.  While the roles of 
the value of time and the time intensity of attending the arts, and the percentage of the ticket price in the 
full price of an arts experience in interpreting the own price elasticity evidence were thoroughly 
discussed in section 3.1.2, the prices of such complementarity activities are rarely included directly in 
                                                          
 119 The rare exception of a more accurate portrayal of the Gapinski (1986) results is Abbe-
Decarroux (1994), who laments the inability to find sufficient real income and substitute price data to 
include in his seven year, 64 productions demand function for Geneva theater, but notes that various 
studies have found that performing arts demand is income insensitive and Gapinksi (1986) found that it 
is also substitute price insensitive (note 6, p. 103).  
 120 
 It is possible, but unlikely, that all other firms would independently change price by roughly the same 
magnitude, and Seaman (2004) provides evidence that successful collusion, whether on price or other 
issues, has no doubt been rare in the performing arts.  While Seaman (2004) calls for renewed interest in 
horizontal firm interaction in the performing arts, the more balanced version of Gapinski’s 1986 results 
suggests the magnitude of that challenge.  
 121
arts demand functions.  Two exceptions are of interest.  Carson and Mobilia (1989) uniquely insert the 
past and current consumer price index for the New York region in addition to theater ticket prices in 
their study of Broadway attendance, and find strongly negative effects on both prior and current 
attendance (a “CPI elasticity” as high as - 3.9).  They surmise that this general CPI (which is not limited 
to the recreation or entertainment components that are used as proxies for arts substitutes) is capturing 
higher prices of the complementary goods used with arts attendance (which they believe is an especially 
credible explanation given the luxury good evidence that they also find during the non-summer 
seasons).  However, this interpretation is certainly not confirmed by hard evidence, and no subsequent 
results are reported for any components of the CPI focused on transportation, restaurant, or child care 
prices that would support that view.   Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) include a variable 
“opinion on cost of transportation and children” that, while based on perception, seems much more 
targeted.  And in fact coefficients of this variable in their frequency of theater-going OLS equations 
(both within the last four years and during the last year) are negative with t-statistics of - 2.79 and - 2.87 
(the result is weaker in their tobit equation for attendance during the last year), consistent with such 
services being complements to arts attendance.        
 
 While success in identifying relevant substitutes (or complements) for the various performing 
arts has clearly been limited using cross-price data, some insights have been generated using non-price 
measures of the availability of potential substitutes.  The Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) 
finding of a strong adverse effect on theater attendance of perceptions of high quality of such available 
substitutes was discussed prior to Table 15.  Bonato et al. (1990 had no success with their cinema price 
variable (Table 15), but did find strong negative effects of the # of television subscribers on the tickets 
sold in the performing arts in Italy (both normalized by population).  Interestingly, this television effect  
was not present in the Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) study of the overall performing arts in Germany 
using thirty years of data (1962-92), but by contrast was found by Pommerehne and Kirchgassner (1987) 
for the theater expenditure share in Germany between 1964-84 with their “share of households with TV 
set variable” (which has an even stronger negative effect on the cinema expenditure share) .  However, 
Pommerehne and Kirchgassner also find enigmatic results in that the number of new movies coming 
into cinemas has a positive effect on theater expenditure shares (modestly significant at the 0.10 level), 
although the number of movies played on TV has the expected negative sign (although not statistically 
significant).121   Given the dearth of evidence regarding the reverse effect of the performing arts on 
cinema demand (see fn. 103), they also find interesting evidence that the number of theaters has a 
negative effect on the cinema expenditure share, with a t statistic of -2.16 (Table 3, Pommerehne and 
Kirchgassner, 1987).   
 
 Further non-econometric evidence is provided by Heilbrun (1997) that the popular arts have had 
notable negative effects on the high arts by examining the press coverage of both art forms over time in 
the New York Times.  Waterman et al. (1991) focus on a different aspect of changing tastes and 
technologies by stressing the complementarity that can exist between the media arts and the live 
performing arts by virtue of the electronic transmission of live performances that can build audiences, 
                                                          
 121 Their finding that the number of movies played on TV actually has a significant positive 
effect on the cinema expenditure share (with a t statistic of 4.27) suggests surprising complementarity, a 
result that they rationalize as TV movies stimulating people “once again” to visit the cinema 
(Pommerehne and Kirchgassner, 1987, p. 51).   
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and Helibrun (1993) would also stress the importance of the live performing arts taking advantage of the 
technological developments that have been important to the media arts, even if not being as optimistic as  
Cowen (1996) and Cowen and Taborrok (2000) about these potentially complementarity relationships.    
 
 The relative success of Gapinski (1986) in studying the particular geographic area of London 
raises an issue not really addressed by the Table 15 results: what is the geographic scope of the market 
for the performing arts?  Substitutes or complements in the form of television programming or other 
forms of the media arts, for example, can extend the geographic scope of the relevant market far beyond 
any localized geographical region.  But any such competition from other live performances (not limited 
to the arts) or even from attending the cinema rather than watching movies at home, raises the issue of 
the proper geographic as well as the proper product market.   
 
 The presumption is certainly that any such competition would be highly localized.  Yet the 
significant role for tourists found by Gapinski (1988) for the London performing arts (a variable also 
considered but not utilized in Kelejan and Lawrence, 1980, but one not found to be significant by 
Bonato et al., 1990), hints at an important highly mobile audience that may be capable of shifting arts 
consumption across much broader geographical areas.  Seaman (2004) includes a survey of the literature 
on this topic which stresses the possibility of larger geographic markets.  For example, Moore (1968) 
found that 30 percent of the audience for New York theater is from beyond metro New York City, and 
Escaleira (2002) concludes that no relevant local markets exist for symphonic music in Portugal due to 
the prevalence of private and government sponsored touring companies. Seaman (2004, p. 186) also 
cites discussions with opera experts that identify cross-regional competition for sponsorships and press 
coverage that makes the program choices of widely dispersed opera companies potentially 
interdependent.  Verhoeff (1992) confirms the negative effect that distance has on performing arts 
attendance in the Netherlands (see also Zuzanek and Lee, 1985, applied to London Ontario), but also 
found surprising variability in the distances that people travel to performances when controlling for 
theater size and quality, with one case requiring extending the distance to nearly 70 kilometers to 
capture 90 percent of the audience and with only five percent of the audience living within the nearest 
zone (p.76).   And the Waterman et al. (1991) study of the role of the media and the arts above stresses 
the role of electronic transmissions of arts performances not just in expanding audiences, but in 
specifically reducing the cost and location barriers to participation in the arts, with unstated but 
suggestive implications regarding the geographic area over which arts organizations compete for such 
audiences.    
 
 Despite this suggestive evidence that the geographic scope of effective performing arts markets 
need not be as localized as generally assumed, Forrest et al. (2000) provides the most sophisticated 
econometric evidence regarding the important negative role of distance traveled in performing arts 
demand.   Not uncommonly, their demand analysis was prompted by a more fundamental question, in 
their case the search for a justification for government subsidies to the performing arts that would not 
depend primarily on difficult to quantify externality and public goods arguments (a variation on the 
questions motivating Moore, 1966, and Withers, 1980, and perhaps as noted in the Introduction, an 
underlying current moving much of the private arts demand literature).  They apply a zonal travel cost 
model to data regarding the Royal Exchange Theater in Manchester, using cross-sectional analysis to 
avoid the necessity of finding long runs of box office data in order to generate sufficient real price 
variations. Their price variability is derived from the notion that all potential consumers face different 
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effective prices due to the varying transportation costs they face in traveling to the venue.   
 
 Their goal is to use such travel cost data (along with education, auto ownership, social class, and 
retired versus working population control variables) to estimate demand functions (using a “visitor rate” 
dependent variable defined as the number of people attending from each of 20 zones divided by the 
adult population of each zone) so that consumer surplus estimates can be generated in order to evaluate 
whether, given high operating costs and the difficulty of engaging in “spatial price discrimination,” 
regional repertory theater can be viewed as “commercially non-viable but socially valuable” (pp. 383-
384).   Using distance as a proxy for travel costs, they also assume that an increase of 2.66 km is 
equivalent to an increase of £1 in the cost of attendance, and that symmetrically a £1 increase in ticket 
prices is the equivalent of shifting the population of each zone outwards from the theater by 2.66 km.   
They then calculate for each of 20 zones i the change in total visitor numbers V with respect to a change 
in ticket price T (where V was derived from their visitor rate (VR) demand function dependent variable 
by multiplying VR by the adult population in each zone), such that dVi / dT = 2.66POPi (dVRi /dDi), 
where POP is the adult population of each zone and Di is the distance from each zone location to the 
theater.  Elasticity is then calculated (for i …19, since zone 19 was omitted due to predicted visitors from 
the regression equation being negative for that zone) as: 
 
(27) ( GdVi / dT) ( T / GVi         
 
 Using a mean ticket price for the week evaluated of £9.50, they estimated a price elasticity of 
demand of -1.24, which they interpret as being reasonably close to the revenue maximizing pricing 
strategy when marginal cost in the non-capacity constrained case is nearly zero.  Interestingly, 
calculations of elasticity for individual zones (with prices different from the mean) showed inelastic 
demand in areas with the largest values for their educational level control variable but elastic demand 
elsewhere (another example of the importance of segmenting audiences in estimating demand 
elasticities).  Hence, they conclude that, absent the ability to price discriminate based on the location of 
their customers, the theater is seriously constrained in generating additional earned revenues, since price 
increases would not increase total revenues and price reductions would generate at best very modest 
additional revenues (at a mean price elasticity of -1.24) and the implied additional attendance would 
quickly create capacity constraint problems.  Thus, the combination of their related finding of 
reasonably large consumer surplus benefits and the limited ability of the theater to generate more earned 
revenue leads Forrest et al. (2000) to conclude that the current government subsidy level was 
justified.122 
 
                                                          
 122 They also addressed the issue of the possible endogeneity of residential location, whereby 
people with strong arts demands would locate in close proximity to arts venues. While it is widely 
assumed in the literature that arts attendance will be higher for those living in urban areas or in locations 
with relatively large populations, since access to the arts is higher in those areas, that issue is rarely 
addressed as a simultaneity problem.  They argue that this problem creates a downward bias in their 
estimate of consumer surplus with unknown magnitude (Forrest et al., 2000, pp. 394-395).  Bajic (1985) 
also finds some evidence of theater location being a factor in the housing choices of those with 
especially strong theater demand in Toronto (a narrow segment of high income and highly educated 
consumers), but that this result is hardly typical of arts consumers, much less the general population.  
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 Finally, there is a small literature that addresses this issue, not by inserting the prices or 
quantities of consumption alternatives into a regression equation on arts attendance, but by using 
econometric techniques to address essentially an audience overlap or co-patronage question: “Are high 
arts and popular arts (or sports) consumers the same people?”   These studies by Prieto-Rodríguez and 
Fernández-Blanco (2000) regarding classical and popular music, Fernandez-Blanco and Prieto-
Rodriguez (2000) regarding live sports and the live arts, and Montgomery and Robinson (2005) also 
regarding sports and the arts generate conflicting but intriguing results.   
 
 Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-Rodríguez (2000) use a bivariate probit model to explore the 
popular/classical music relationship (including rarely used dummy variables that capture interactions 
between occupation and education and occupation and age).  They are motivated in part by the learning 
process models of Abbé-Dacarroux and Grin (1992) and Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996), and 
by the frequently cited non-regression based findings by Kurabayashi and Ito (1992) that there is a 
negative correlation for both sexes between two types of popular music and Japanese music (suspected 
to be due in large part to their very different musical scales), and a negative correlation for males 
between classical and popular music consumption.  They use data from a very large (6,632 person) 
survey in Spain (the Structure, Conscience and Class Biography Survey, ECBC-91) that is broadly 
similar to the U.S. General Social Survey (GSS) used by Lewis and Seaman (2004) but with some 
important limitations.  It combines information about individual socioeconomic characteristics with data 
regarding leisure time activities including both popular (but only as a combined category of pop, rock, 
folk and crossover formats) and classical music consumption (although not distinguishing attendance at 
live performances from listening to recordings for either broad type of music).    
 
 They estimate a probit equation for both types of music by regressing a (0,1) dependent variable 
for “fondness” of music (= 1 if listening frequency was either daily or weekly, and = 0 if never, 
annually, or monthly) on 51 socioeconomic and geographic location independent variables that can be 
divided into about five actual “categories” of variables (hence only arguably exceeding the 26  
independent variables used in the largest Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette equation, 1996).  They 
conduct two important types of tests: (1) an examination of the correlation between the estimation errors 
corresponding to each group (i.e. 0.489, significantly > 0) leads them to “reject the hypothesis that 
classical music fans and popular music fans belong to independent groups” and to stress instead the 
complementarity between both types of music due to an “innate” taste for music within both groups (pp. 
153-155); and (2) a comparison of the performance of the socioeconomic factors in both equations so 
identify any unique characteristics of both audiences.  They find that no significant gender, marital or 
urban location differences between both audiences, and a surprisingly strong common link to higher 
education (perhaps consistent with the omnivore evidence inspired by Peterson, 1992), although parental 
education has only a strong positive effect on classical music.  Other notable differences include the role 
of age (negative and non-linear on popular music audiences, but perhaps to be expected from the earlier 
discussion, only significantly positive for classical music in the 30-45 year old group); a strong positive 
effect of white collar occupations on classical music only, but a strong connection of students, 
“employees” and the unemployed with popular music (although housewives and the retired are big 
listeners to classical music).   Despite the distinguishing characteristics of the two audiences, the Prieto-
Rodríguez and Fernández-Blanco (2000) analysis is a notable contribution in support of the high and 
low arts as complements instead of substitutes. 
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 Whether this complementarity extends to sports versus the high arts is more ambiguous. 
Applying essentially the same analysis from the same database, Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-Rodríguez 
(2000) once again find significant positive error covariances among three uses of leisure time and hence  
reject the hypothesis that those who attend live sports events (or who visit the cinema) and those who 
listen to music (but importantly not distinguished between popular and classical) belong to independent 
groups.  Thus, they conclude that live sports do not really seriously compete in time allocation against 
the consumption of music or cinema.  However, this conclusion is weakened by the asymmetry between 
questions regarding actual attendance at sporting events (and cinemas) and merely listening to music, 
and by the lack of a distinction in this study between popular and classical music.  Furthermore, as also 
stressed by Montgomery and Robinson (2005), their finding of substantial gender and educational 
differences between sports and non-sports audiences tends to undercut their basic conclusion, and there 
are also more differences regarding occupation, marital status and family responsibilities, and city size 
than were present in their study of popular vs. classical music.   
 
 Hence it is not surprising that Montgomery and Robinson (2005), using less restrictive 2004 U.S. 
survey data from the Performing Arts Research Coalition (PARC, with 8,000 respondents), find more 
ambiguous relationships between sports and the arts as well as some notable complementarities among 
various types of arts events (a result in contrast to the Gapinski 1986 emphasis on intra-lively arts 
substitutability).  In short, using an approach similar to that of Prieto-Rodríguez and Fernández-Blanco, 
but using “attendance frequency” and “percentage of total events attended” measures of the dependent 
variable instead of a dichotomous approach (hence also dropping the bivariate probit estimation 
technique), they find: (1) there are significant differences in the demographics of audiences for different 
types of recreational events, but “little evidence that arts and sports compete for audience,” including 
some evidence that highly socially active individuals who attend sporting events are more likely to also 
attend arts events (here agreeing with Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-Rodríguez); however (2) when total 
event attendance is held constant and shares of attendance at various events are examined, arts events 
are found to be complimentary while other events including sports are substitutes for the arts.  Yet, their 
overall finding is that (contrary to the relatively weak cross-price elasticity evidence documented in 
Table 15), by far the most important live arts competitor is the cinema, which is the strongest competitor 
with all types of events (amateur and professional sports, live rock, live comedy, nightclubs, dance, 
opera, theater and orchestra).    
 
 In summary, despite the conflicting and often insignificant results stemming from empirical 
efforts to clarify the substitution and complementary relationships affecting the performing arts, and the 
remarkable lack of any effort to replicate or extend the seminal, although actually conflicting, findings 
of Gapinski (1986),123 there is some noteworthy research under way with the potential to greatly 
improve our understanding of these issues.                      
 
3.2.5  The Product Quality Problem 
 
 With the possible exception of  the annual generic homage to The Nutcracker, the performing 
                                                          
 123 The only exception might be Gapinski himself, although as noted, his 1988 related study of 
the effect of tourism on performing arts demand in London failed to find cross-price (or even own price) 
effects.  
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arts (and even more so the visual arts) would seem to represent the quintessence of differentiated 
products. Yet, the challenges in developing adequate databases seemed to focus early attention in arts 
demand and audience studies on more measurable variables and away from the problematic issues of 
capturing arts quality or production differentiation effects. Therefore, Throsby’s attempt to 
systematically address this issue (1990; a reprint of a 1982 paper) in a study of three Sydney theater 
companies over four years represented an important step in filling this void.  He developed  both an 
objective measure of individual plays (repertoire classification), and so-called technical variables 
(standards of source material, production, acting, and design) that actually depended upon the subjective 
assessments of press reviews (as translated into a 1-5 cardinal scale from very poor to very good).  This 
objective versus subjective distinction is a useful way to categorize later efforts to test for quality effects 
on arts demand.   
 
 Of course, the ultimate way that consumers react to any objective characteristics of plays, or 
outside subjective assessments of their quality, can be viewed as subjective in the sense that the effects 
on behavior can most easily be viewed as affecting marginal rates of substitution (i.e tastes) rather than 
through any effects on constraints (although a Stigler and Becker, 1977, framework could translate this  
into relative shadow price changes and hence constraint variations).  Nevertheless, there is a clear 
distinction between a dummy variable equal to one if the play was written before 1900 (Throsby’s 
definition of a “classic”), and a variable constructed by some weighting of often conflicting press 
reviews (or in the future, perhaps a weighting of press reviews with internet blog chatter).  Throsby 
(1990) also introduced an innovation that surprisingly has not been replicated, i.e., the aggregation of his 
quality variables into what might be considered a single multidimensional rather than a series of 
unidimensional quality measures.  In fact, while he had limited success with any one of his individual 
quality measures, it was his aggregation of the technical standards variables that yielded his strongest 
results. Others have, of course, subsequently included multiple individual quality variables (see 
especially Urrutiaguer, 2002, below) but have not aggregated them into a single variable with its own 
estimated coefficient as did Throsby.124  
 
 There is another critical distinction in the arts quality literature: whether the primary focus is on 
a time-series or pooled analysis of the quality of a large number of individual plays, ballets, operas, or 
symphonies performed by a small group of arts organizations, or on the overall quality of a large 
number of arts organizations themselves.  Two things are clear: (1) the most studied art form by far is 
theater (Throsby, 1990; Jenkins-Austen Smith, 1987; Dobson and West; 1989; Abbé-Decarroux, 1994; 
Corning and Levy, 2002; and Urrutiaguer, 2002; with Krebs and Pommerehne, 1995, a mixed case that 
primarily focused on theater but with a database that also includes opera and other art forms; and (2) the 
overwhelming focus is on attendance per performance for a small number of organizations related to 
                                                          
 124 A slightly different use of the uni versus multi-dimensional distinction is to treat the focus on 
only the repertoire, in particular the relatively common scaling of that repertoire along some version of 
the single criterion of highbrow versus lowbrow (see the listing below) as a unidimensional approach, in 
contrast to the inclusion of both a repertoire type variable along with some scaling of drama/music 
critics, programmers or even public granting agency evaluations, which can be called multidimensional.  
An unpublished anonymous manuscript under review makes this distinction.  Using this definition, 
Throsby (1990) set the standard for the use of a multidimensional approach even if he had never also 
included his aggregated quality variable as described below.  
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quality variables applied to the individual repertoire as opposed to the overall quality of those 
organizations.  This is perhaps a natural result of the Throsby (1990) model, which makes the 
Urrutiaguer (2002) extension of that model to a cross-sectional analysis (using data for two years) of the 
overall quality of 87 French public theaters an especially novel contribution.  Interestingly, the few 
studies that did not focus on theater (Greckel and Felton, 1987 on 2 music institutions in one city; 
Felton, 1989 on opera; and Luksetich and Lange, 1995 on symphony orchestras) primarily used non-
Throsby type variables that did apply to the organizations themselves (the overall artistic budget in the 
case of Luksetich and Lange; summary statistics such as the number of performances or the number of 
programs, or totally unique variables linked to personnel or venue relocations in the case of Greckel and 
Felton).  Only Felton (1989) used a non-theatrical programmatic quality variable (a measure of the 
popularity of individual operas).   
 
 The Throsby (1990) model postulates a subsidized nonprofit theater management choosing price, 
season length, and quality attributes of its productions, so as to maximize a utility function containing 
those quality attributes and the percentage of seats in its venue that are filled with paying customers.  
The budget constraint requires that expenses equal the sum of earned (ticket revenue) and unearned 
(subsidy) income.  Specifically: 
 
(28)  Ys = f (S, C),  
 
with Ys = number of available seats per time period, essentially the supply equation; 
S = season length; and C = seating capacity of the venue; and hence Ys = S C for a single season in any 
one location.  
 
(29)  Yd = f (P, S, C, q),  
 
the demand equation, with Yd = number of paid attendance per time period, with L = Yd / Y s defined as 
the load factor, which is the percentage of the capacity filled each time period. P = average price per 
seat; and q = n-vector of quality characteristics.   
 
 Data were available from three Sydney theater companies regarding total paid attendance, 
average real price, season length (defined as number of performances), venue capacity, and types of 
productions presented.  For each theater, the following equation was estimated: 
 
(30)  Ya S = f (P, C, q), 
 
where Ya = paid attendance per performance, which when multiplied by S (the number of performances 
per season) yields a dependent variable = total season paid attendance.   
 
 The key innovations were in generating the variables to include in the quality characteristics 
vector.  Five characteristics q1 ... q5 were defined as repertoire classification, standard of source 
material, standard of production, standard of acting, and standard of design respectively.  The repertoire 
classification variable, q1 could be defined using objective criteria based on four groupings of plays that 
would be essentially noncontroversial: A =  a“classic” written before 1900; B = written after 1900 by a 
well-known author (from the audience perspective); C = written after 1900 by little or unknown authors 
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(from the audience perspective); D = entertainment, revue, and musical.  Class D was defined as the 
omitted benchmark if all three other repertoire classifications enter the equation (as seen in Table 16, 
this applies only to the Nimrod theater, theater 2), and a dummy variable was created for each of the A, 
B, and C groupings which was set = 1 if a play fell into that particular class, and 0 if it did not.  
 
 The development of variables q2 through q5 was more challenging and was based on an 
assessment of the “subjective” opinion of press reviews defined as how well any play met high 
standards  defined over those four “technical” dimensions.  A cardinal scale 1 to 5 was created with 1 = 
very poor; 2 = poor; 3 = fair/average; 4 = good; and 5 = very good.   Importantly, he also summed the q2 
through q5 variables to obtain a single “composite standard” (the Throsby term, p. 73; or a 
multidimensional standard as defined above).  This was rationalized as an attempt to overcome some of 
the variability in individual assessments, but can be justified on its own merits as reflecting something 
akin to the overall impression that a play would make on a viewer who may not even be thinking in 
terms of the four separate criteria.   This entirely separate variable (defined as “sum” = Gq i , for i = 2 to 
5) was substituted for the individual q2 through q5 variables in an alternative specification of the model 
for each of the three theaters.  While Throsby himself viewed this analysis as exploratory and 
preliminary (and the results were mixed), the influence of these estimations warrant full reporting in 
Table 16, although coefficients are rounded to two decimals and the column headings are slightly 
modified compared to the original Table 1.  Except for the repertoire dummies, the double-log 
specification was used.  
 
Table 16 
Demand Function Estimates for Three Sydney Companies, 1974-1978  
                   (From Throsby, 1990, Table 1)                             
                                                      Repertoire Class       Technical Standard 
T Con Price Cap Cl A Cl B Cl C Mat Prod Act Set G R2 
1 1.67 
(3.2) 
-0.41 
(-0.7) 
  0.04 
(0.7) 
 0.18 
(0.7) 
-0.09 
(-0.4) 
0.90 
(2.2) 
0.21 
(0.6) 
 .21 
1 1.14 
(2.0) 
-0.20 
(-0.3) 
  0.03 
(0.5) 
     0.87 
(2.1) 
.21 
2 -0.85 
(3.3) 
0.66 
(1.9) 
0.92 
(11.4) 
-0.01 
(-0.1) 
-0.04 
(0.7) 
-0.12 
(2.2) 
0.12 
(0.8) 
0.20 
(1.1) 
0.20 
(1.1) 
0.30 
(1.8) 
 .51 
2 -1.38 
(5.1) 
0.58 
(1.9) 
0.94 
(13.2) 
-0.04 
(0.6) 
-0.05 
(0.9) 
-0.12 
(2.3) 
      0.88 
(4.2) 
.51 
3 0.43 
(1.3) 
0.30 
(0.8) 
0.63 
(5.9) 
0.06 
(1.2) 
0.07 
(1.6) 
 0.06 
(0.4) 
0.04 
(0.4) 
0.04 
(0.4) 
0.04 
(0.3 
 .71 
3 0.31 
(0.9) 
0.28 
(0.8) 
0.63 
(6.2) 
0.06 
(1.7) 
0.07 
(1.8) 
     0.21 
(1.3) 
.71 
Notes; Theater (T) 1 = Ensemble (180 seat theater-in-the-round in a converted boat shed in a harbor-side 
suburb); 2 = Nimrod (300 seat converted factory in inner suburbs; and 3 = Old Tote (principal state 
drama company in several venues; already was closed when the study was completed); Con = constant 
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term; Cap = venue capacity; Cl (class) A, B and C are as defined in the text prior to the table; and the 
technical standards of source material (Mat), production (Prod), acting (Act) and design (Set) are the q2 
through q5 variables. Absolute values of the t-statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 Since only the Nimrod theater (theater 2) offers plays in all three of the “non- popular” (i.e. class 
D) repertoire classifications entered as dummies, its results regarding those three types of plays should 
be interpreted relative to entertainment, revue and musical plays.  Its audiences reveal a strong distaste 
for class C plays (those by little known authors), but neither classics nor twentieth century plays by 
well-known authors had significant effects.  The type of play also had no effect on Ensemble audiences 
(theater 1), but Old Tote audiences reacted favorably to both classics and well-known plays relative to 
those by little-known authors (type C, the omitted base case for theater 3).  Thus, there is some evidence 
that the type of play is an important variable to include in theater demand equations. 
 
 There were also mixed but generally supportive results regarding the more subjective rankings of 
the four technical performance criteria (whose coefficients could be interpreted as elasticities, but 
Throsby is wary of pressing that interpretation, p.76).  The most noteworthy finding is that for all three 
theaters, the aggregated quality variable generated much more statistical significance in the positive 
coefficient estimates than for each quality variable entered separately (although still not significant for 
theater 3, the Old Tote).  This composite (or multidimensional) quality standard effect was expected by 
Throsby, although he hastened to warn against any suggestion that “the full impact of a production 
could be properly measured simply by the arithmetic sum of its component parts even if the parts were 
adequately measured” (p. 73). The weak results for the Old Tote possibly reflect the high proportion of 
subscription seats sold by that theater, producing what Throsby called a “captive audience” effect (p. 
75).125  Considered individually, the standard of acting has by far the strongest effect on the Ensemble 
theater (theater 1), with set design dominating audience choices for the Nimrod (theater 2).  Throsby 
finds this first result fully consistent with the Ensemble’s known commitment to acting (p. 75).  Taken 
as a whole, these “tentative and qualified “ findings regarding both objective and subjective quality 
variables were viewed by Throsby as confirming “unambiguously” the importance of qualitative 
variables in performing arts demand and supply decisions (p. 81), a view seemingly shared by other 
cultural economists.126          
                                                          
 125 This is reminiscent of the demand implications for the role of quality of the Hjorth-Andersen 
(1992) suggestion that if subscription sales dominate total ticket sales (as he found in his forecasting 
equations for Danish theater, see the discussion below related to subjective quality variables), the 
financial success of a whole season is known before it even starts. 
 126 In addition to the widely varying R2s for the three equations, the primary discordant note was 
in the behavior of the ticket price coefficients, not statistically significant and with conflicting signs for 
the Ensemble and the Old Tote, but positive and significant for the Nimrod.  Throsby suggests that this 
reflects a demand shift for the Nimrod during a time that the real price of admission were only gently 
rising due to the Nimrod’s policy of keeping prices low to encourage audience development rather than 
commercial success (Throsby 1990, p. 75).  Of course, this justification is an extension to the positive 
elasticity case of the “identification” problem regarding estimated negative price elasticities being 
biased downward by the pricing policies of performing arts firms that was fully discussed above in 
section 3.1.2.  
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 Following Throsby (1990), the inclusion of some form of both objective and subjective measures 
of program classification into arts demand studies has become relatively common, although the results 
continue to be mixed.  These approaches and results are reported below, beginning with the objective 
criteria results (summarized in six numbered paragraphs), followed by two numbered paragraphs 
summarizing the subjective criteria results.  The especially significant multidimensional (see fn. 124) 
contribution by Urrutiaguer (2002) is described separately. 
 
 Description of Objective Criteria Results:  
 
 1. Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987) had only limited success in finding a positive effect on 
English provincial theater attendance of “less esoteric” programming (defined as comedies, thrillers and 
musicals, in contrast to so-called serious drama).  While the effect was positive and statistically 
significant, it was not especially economically significant.  He estimated that an increase in the mix of  
less esoteric programming from 50 percent to 60 percent would increase demand by only one percent.  
Furthermore, the mix of programming had minimal effects on the organization pricing equation and on 
the Arts Council and local grants equation in his simultaneous system, and he could find no systematic 
endogenous determinants of the program mix, concluding that it is essentially a random variable (as 
least when defined in highbrow versus lowbrow terms).  
 
 2.  Greckel and Felton (1987) did not attempt to characterize the content of programs, but 
included even more objective measures without success.  Their dummy variable to capture the shift of 
the Louisville Symphony Orchestra to a full-time orchestra, and variables for the number of programs, 
and the number of performances (both intended to reflect desirable product variety) failed and were 
dropped from their reported equations.  Two variables that did work well were idiosyncratic to the 
Louisville Orchestra: (1) a dummy variable to capture “unpopular conductor” was introduced to capture 
the negative effects of the frequent absences of the primary conductor during his final two years, and the 
unpopularity of his successor; and (2) a concert hall capacity variable with the unique interpretation of 
capturing the positive effect of the shift of the orchestra to new and far superior facilities that also 
included a larger hall (a perhaps questionable measure of this effect compared to the use of a dummy 
variable, which they also considered and rejected due to unique timing of the move midway through the 
second to the last season in their 10 year time series).  Even though the derivation of an unpopular 
conductor elasticity of demand (-0.301) was a first and perhaps a last in the literature, Greckel and 
Felton express caution in putting to much emphasis on that result inasmuch as its exclusion in an 
equation with ticket price, real per capita income, and concert hall capacity also performed well in 
explaining the variance over time in audience behavior (p. 66). 
 
 3. Dobson and West (1989) found no significant effect on Atlanta theater audiences of the type 
of play or the day of the week of the performance.  Similarly, Felton (1989) found statistical significance 
for her opera popularity ratings variable in only one of her opera company equations (the Kentucky 
Opera Association), and concluded that in other cities programmatic content had little effect on 
subscriber attendance.  Luksetich and Lange (1995) had no success with their attempt to link total 
expenditure per symphony performance to attendance via a quality argument (see 3.2.1).  
 
 4.   While Abbe-Decarroux (1994) also includes a subjective press reviews variable (see below), 
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he perhaps follows Throsby (1990) as closely as anyone in introducing eight quite objective dummy 
variables (although not aggregating them into a single variable).  He also estimates his seven year (64 
productions) Geneva theater demand function for both full-price and reduced price audiences (as well as 
reporting the total demand equation).   Some variables performed well; others did not.  “Home 
productions” (those produced by the institution itself) had significantly negative effects on per 
performance admissions (explained as due to the higher frequency of such plays being performed), 
while well-known authors, producers and casts had separately positive and generally statistically 
significant effects across all equations.  But surprisingly, the fame of the play, and whether it was a 
classic (written before 1900) or a modern play (after 1990; deceased author) had no real effect on either 
audience segment, but audiences clearly rewarded novelty, with “atypical” plays (circus, revue, 
collection creation or other) having strongly positive effects on per performance attendance.  
Contemporary play (written after 1990; living author) was the omitted type of play control dummy.  
While Abbe-Decarroux (1994)  has previously been discussed as providing some of the strongest 
evidence for price elasticity differences across price ranges (- 0.31 for full-price and not statistically 
significant, but - 2.45 and highly significant for reduced-price customers), the effects of these objective 
quality measures do not significantly differ in economic importance across those two customer groups.  
While statistical significance levels sometimes differ, the estimated coefficient differences are not 
significant at the 0.05 level (p.106).   
 
 5.  Krebs and Pommerehne (1995) considered but rejected using “performances per stage” to 
capture the scope of supply, and also rejected approximating a productions’ average run length by 
constructing a total performances per number of premiers variable.  Instead they tried to capture the 
popularity of various arts productions by measuring the “share of productions with many performances 
out of all performances” (p. 25). Specifically, they construct a proxy for highbrow versus lowbrow 
theater productions by measuring the “ratio of works with more than 75 performances to all works 
played in a season,” which they view as a proxy for more popular lowbrow productions that would 
survive longer than highbrow plays.127  Given the recognized weaknesses of this construction: (1) 75 
performance threshold is arbitrary; (2) some highbrow plays can be quite successful with lay audiences; 
and (3) the partial endogeneity of the variable, “since live performing arts demand influences the 
success and therefore the popularity of the work” (p. 25), it is remarkable that this variable performs 
fairly well - a positive coefficient, although not quite statistically significant (unless income is omitted 
from the equation).  Expressed in elasticity terms, this 0.10 “lowbrow” elasticity of arts demand implies 
that a 10 percent increase in the share of such works will increase paid attendance per capita of the 
population by one percent.   This lowbrow inelasticity result is consistent with the low “less esoteric 
programming” elasticity result in Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987) and suggests that even when this 
dimension of repertoire quality has an effect on attendance, it is not as high as has been generally 
expected.  However, the since the Abbé-Decarroux (1994) definition of “atypical play” seems to include 
some more popularized rather than eccentric content, its strong positive effect in that study is potential 
counter-evidence.  
                                                          
 127 Again, Kelejian and Lawrence (1980) play their customary role of suggesting, but not testing, 
a potentially useful variable.  In this case, their more simply defined “number of different Broadway 
shows in any one year”, which would increase as individual shows remained in theaters for fewer 
performances, was designed to proxy shorter runs and hence an implied lower quality.  .  They also 
failed to find data to implement their proportion of shows that are musicals, and subjective average 
evaluation of critics quality variables.  
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 6.  Corning and Levy (2002) introduced many objective quality variables (as well as some 
subjective measures discussed below), and found evidence that programmatic content (labeled as 
comedy, musical, drama, or the musical “Tommy”) had limited effects on single-ticket theater 
attendance, varying notably across individual theaters and strongest for the unique case of Tommy, 
which in the case of one Southern California theater location would increase per performance attendance 
by over 200 in contrast to a performance of Shakespeare ceteris paribus (p. 230).  Other musicals also 
had positive attendance effects, but the comedy dummy variable was positive and significant no more 
frequently than the drama dummy (i.e. in only one, although, differing venue equation). They also found 
more evidence than did Dobson and West (1989) that scheduling has some effect, including a dizzying 
array of dummy variables to distinguish performances by evening, weekend (to capture weekly seasonal 
effects), prime (Friday and Saturday nights), preview, and opening (matinee was the omitted variable) 
that require some creativity to interpret.  For example, the evening variable alone is supposed to capture 
the effect of a weekday evening performance in contrast to the baseline weekly matinee, but the prime 
and evening variables together are to capture the effect of a Friday or Saturday night performance 
relative to the baseline.  Then, the weekend variable represents the differential effect of a weekend 
matinee.  But there is more - a separate dummy variable is entered for every month of the year to 
address seasonality effects in a more detailed way than with just four seasonal measures (June is the 
omitted baseline).128  Of all these variables, the weekend dummy has the strongest positive effect for all 
three theater locations, followed by the evening dummy and the measure for Friday and Saturday nights 
(prime), significant at the 0.05 level for two of the three locations.  Somewhat surprisingly previews and 
openings had inconsistent and relatively weak effects, and the monthly dummy variables (relative to 
June) were rarely helpful (although in the few cases in which a month was statistically significant, it had 
a positive coefficient, with the only consistent finding the obvious one that the location having a 
targeted outdoor summer season had strong attendance increases during July through September).    
 
 Perhaps the most fascinating Corning and Levy (2002) “objective” variable in a study of quality 
effects is one that would seem to pre-judge the issue: “Flop” is a dummy variable = 1 when the average 
total attendance at a first location prior to a play shifting venues was less than 50 percent of capacity (38 
of 119 productions in the sample period ran in one location and then quickly moved).  Remarkably, it 
was positive in two venue equations (statistically significant in one), and only negative and significant 
in the outdoor summer season venue.  The fact that seemingly clear evidence that a play is a failure 
cannot reliably have later negative effects on attendance, may be the best evidence of the challenge in 
capturing the effects of quality in arts demand studies.      
 
  In contrast to these efforts to capture objective quality effects, some subsequent studies focused 
on the determination of subjective perceptions of quality, typically focusing on the role that various 
expert critics have on the perceptions of the lay public.  In contrast to Throsby (1990), who translated 
those subjective press reviews into a five point scale over four so-called technical criteria, and then 
estimated those four individual effects as well as the effect of their aggregation, most of these efforts 
have been unidimensional.129     
                                                          
 128 Carson and Mobilia (1989) found such effects when using the four seasons rather than the 
twelve months. 
 129 Tobias (2004) shifted the art critic focus back one step by examining the determinants of 
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 Before listing these limited results, it should first be noted that the Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (1996) model (discussed in 3.2.3) represents perhaps the pinnacle of the subjective 
approach by essentially extending the adage “I know nothing about art, but I know what I like” to the 
case of consumers who do not even know what they like, but are capable of discovering their own tastes 
and definition of quality through an adaptive process of learning- by-consuming.  By contrast, while not 
explicitly addressing how artistic quality affects arts demand, Hjorth-Andersen (1992) indirectly offered 
evidence for a “minimal-learning” model with at least no-one period quality effects when he reported 
simple time-series forecasting results for Danish theater indicating that total season attendance could be 
quite accurately estimated using only data on season subscription sales.  His conclusion that the success 
of the whole season can thus be known before it even begins, does not preclude subscriptions being 
sensitive to the advanced announcements about programmatic content (a  common “objective” quality 
variable), nor does it preclude future subscription volume changing with the success of a theater in 
implementing that program.  But it suggests that art critic reviews, word-of-mouth assessments, or even 
disappointing personal experiences during a season may have little or no affect on non-subscriber sales.    
 
 While the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) analysis has been viewed as a success in 
incorporating quality considerations (essentially subjective as determined by consumers themselves 
through experience), it is more clearly a success in the study of taste cultivation and arts demand 
dynamics (see 3.2.3).  In fact, as noted previously, they did not really include any quality variables per 
se into their equations.  Those studies that did include variables designed to capture the effects of 
subjective quality judgments are summarized below. 
 
 Description of Subjective Quality Results 
 
 1. Abbé-Decarroux (1994) supplemented his four repertoire and four “fame” (author, play, 
producer, cast) objective variables with a qualitative press review variable scaled nearly identically to 
Throsby (1990), adding a sixth category for “excellent.”  This variable was positive and highly 
statistically significant in both full-price and reduced-price equations.    
  
 2.   Corning and Levy (2002) also supplemented their inventory of programmatic, scheduling 
and seasonal variables with a newspaper review variable on a five point scale (adding some additional 
detail to the parsimonious Throsby (1990) ratings; their Table II, p. 227).  Due to some format changes 
in the two publications used in their analysis, some productions were not reviewed at all, which was 
registered with a “noreview” variable. The quality of such press reviews had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on per performance attendance in only one case (the summer outdoor festival venue).  
Interestingly, the total absence of any review of a production actually had a positive effect in each of the 
three venue equations, with reasonably high although not statistically significant t-statistics (at the 0.05 
level).     
 
 Finally, Urrutiaguer (2002) provides the most important extension of the Throsby (1990 analysis 
by using four types of quality variables in his study of the French public theater: (1) a variation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
those expert opinions, finding mixed effects of organization artistic spending on generating favorable 
judgments, but he did not conduct any arts demand analysis.   
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four Throsby (1990) type objective repertoire quality measures (defined somewhat differently, adapted 
to the French theater, and converted into theater rather than individual play terms); (2) a sophisticated 
variable constructed from press reviews; (3) a variable designed to capture the unique French esteem 
that is accorded to public theaters having directors who also manage a theatrical institution; and (4) two 
dummy variables to capture the public sanction given to public theaters by their ability to win both state 
and local subsidies.  Because the methods used by Urrutiaguer are almost as interesting as his actual 
empirical results, they are described in detail.   
 
 He modifies the Throsby (1990) model in two ways, one somewhat technical, but the other more 
important conceptually (while adopting most of the Throsby notation).  The technical adjustment is in 
changing the dependent variable from a measurement of seasonal attendance for each year (i.e. per 
performance attendance multiplied by the number of performances per season) to per performance 
attendance by dividing the Throsby dependent variable by the number of performances (S in both 
models).  Urrutiaguer justifies this in his case as necessary to avoid heterogeneity in the size of 
theatrical institutions among his much larger database of 87-104 theaters, and to reduce the risks of 
heteroskedasticity (p. 187).  More fundamentally, he notes that when he applied his model to the 
demand for individual shows in 1995, the adjusted R2 was quite low (about 0.13; the Throsby R2 s 
ranged from 0.21 to 0.71).  He suggests that the weakness of this result should not be surprising 
inasmuch as the theater itself rather than just individual shows is a “much more appropriate” level at 
which to examine variance in demand, which can be caused by an organization’s program, auditorium 
comfort, and the overall image of an individual theater.    
 
 He makes three additional basic modeling points prior to operationalizing his quality variables: 
(1) Audience loyalty as a result of a theater’s overall reputation for quality is important and could be 
measured as the rate of attendance from year to year using the ratio between the paying audience and the 
number of seats available (which is the Throsby  load factor, L = Yd / S C, where C is seating capacity); 
however, the lack of precision about theatrical capacity of the larger number of regional theaters led him 
to choose a lagged endogenous variable approach defined as the number of paying customers per 
performance in the previous year (Yd /S)t-1.  (2) While price and volume variables can be considered 
continuous, judgments on quality would most likely have non-linear effects on demand since “bad and 
good assessments weigh more than medium ones on potential audiences” (p. 187).  Hence he finds 
dummy variables theoretically appropriate, not just convenient, to capture such effects.  (3) Despite the 
fact that his regional theater database is dramatically larger than Throsby’s three theater study, he is 
concerned about this being too limited to generate reliable data for only one year, so he combines his 
1995 and 1996 data and adds a time dummy variable a that equals 0 in 1995 and 1 in 1996.  The 
resulting estimation equation is (for time t): 
          n 
(31) (Yd /S)t = ct + %pt + βSt + χCt + δ0 (Yd /S)t-1 + Gδi qi + τa + et 
         i = 1 
where (Yd /S) is per performance paid attendance, ct is the constant, et is the disturbance vector, p is 
price, S is the number of performances, C is theater seating capacity, a is the time dummy with 1996=1, 
and the qi vector refers to dummy variables for quality, which are entered individually only without the 
alternative Throsby composite specification of each summed into a single variable.  Except for the 
quality dummies, all variables are measured in natural logarithms.  
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 The four repertoire classifications (q4) are updated variations of Throsby (1990) adapted to 
France: with A = classics whose author died before the twentieth century; B = plays written before 1980 
by an author who died in the twentieth century; C = plays in French by a still living author, or by a dead 
author but published after 1980; and D = plays not in French by an author defined as contemporary.  An 
important modification is required to make the resulting dummy variables applicable to a theater rather 
than an individual play.  Hence, each of the four dummies applicable to a theater’s repertoire is defined 
as = 1 if “the part of performances programmed by the institution and belong to A [or B, or C, or D]   
is more than 10 percent higher than the overall average, 0 otherwise” (p. 189).   
 
 A theater reviews variable (q1) is based on an analysis of the opinions published in the 
newspapers Le Monde and Liberation and the magazine Telerama.  Urrutiaguer (2002) then begins in a 
way similar to Throsby (1990 by assigning a numerical score to such reviews (although using only 3 
rankings rather than 5): + 1 if positive comments are emphasized; - 1 if the paper/magazine “highlights 
disparaging remarks” about the show; and 0 for a largely balanced review.  But nothing remains simple 
after that, as the reviews of individual sources are first weighted by “readership impact” (defined as the 
average number of readers per issue multiplied by the number of issues in which a drama review 
appeared), and an adjustment is made for the effect of missing reviews using Heckman’s two-step 
procedure (1979) to correct for the effects of sample selection (Urrutiaguer, pp. 189-192).  Then the 
resulting scores of the drama reviews regarding particular shows must be aggregated to apply to an 
individual theater.  This is done by creating the variable q1t = (Gmt h s h ) / S, for all h = 1 to k, where S is 
the number of performances of p shows put on by a theater, of which k were reviewed and given a score 
of mt h  for show h (present sh times). This constructed variable is then interpreted as the value attributed 
by critics to the theatrical production of any institution for year t.  The final step is to recognize that 
unambiguous reviews have more impact than those with “nuances,” and any dummy variables entered 
into the estimating equation should reflect this. Thus, the variables q1wt and q1ht are set equivalent to 
poor or absent reviews and good reviews respectively, and an iterative search procedure run to generate 
the thresholds that optimize the specification of these variables in both years.  The poor or absent review 
dummy was consequently set = 1 if q1 < 0.009 and 0 otherwise, and the good review dummy variable 
was set = 1 if q1 > 0.2 and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Urrutiaguer (2002) develops a “weak and high centrality” measure to capture the potential 
effects on potential audience choice of the weight in a theater’s programs of shows produced by what he 
calls  “directors-cum-managers.”  Since French audiences seem to attribute higher prestige to directors 
who also manage a theatrical institution, and a manager would likely prefer to select directors who have 
a similar status to that manager to take advantage of their artistic reputation, Urrutiaguer constructs a 
matrix of performances produced by each theatrical company i and presented by others in order to 
construct the variable q2t = Gsi j / (g-1), over all j, for which s I j is the number of performances that 
theater each theater bought from the other theaters j, and g is the number of selected organizations in the 
“network” (restricted to the 104 institutions in his sample).  As with the drama review variable, this 
centrality variable should be more powerful at the extremes (weak or strong rather than medium), so 
thresholds are again estimated to generate the best fit, yielding for the strong measure a value of 1 if q2  
<15, and 0 otherwise, and for the weak measure a value of 1 if q2 >36, and 0 otherwise.   
 
 Given the complexity of the strong and weak press review dummy variables, and strong and 
weak directors-cum-managers centrality quality dummies, it is a relief that the fourth and final quality 
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measure is more straightforward.  Assuming that public recognition of a theater via tax-financed 
subsidies is a quality proxy, this dummy value = 1 if the yearly growth of subsidies is more than 8 
percent, and =0 otherwise.  Two such dummies are defined, one for state and one for local subsidies.  
 
 Despite the sophisticated technical innovations in constructing the drama review and centrality 
dummy variables, and the important conceptual shift toward a focus on the theater rather than the 
individual play, Urrutiaguer (2002) originally had limited success in generating significant results for 
his quality variables, consistent with the frequently mixed experience of prior studies (see above) in 
finding  support for such variables (including Throsby’s own failure to find strong support for the 
subjective technical standard variables when considered individually in contrast to being aggregated into 
his composite technical standard variable).  Urrutiaguer then tests the hypothesis that different portions 
of theater audiences have contrasting perceptions of reputation, especially in how they weigh the 
reputations of drama critics and those of artistic directors. Thus, the full theater sample was segmented 
into two groups: a Group I of 40 institutions for which the audience shares the scale of judgments of 
drama critics and a Group II of 47 institutions whose audience have more trust in the artistic reputation 
of directors-cum-managers (and who either ignore or do not share the judgments of theater critics).130  
Therefore, the signs on certain estimated quality coefficients were expected to differ between Group I 
and Group II regressions.  Specifically, in Group I regressions the effect of weak press reviews should 
be negative and strong press reviews positive. The effects are more complex regarding the director 
artistic reputation variables (weak and strong centrality).  Since the audiences of Group I theaters are 
disinterested in such reputations, there should be negative sign on the high centrality dummy variable 
and a positive sign on the low centrality dummy.  The signs should be reversed for Group II theaters. 
 
  The effect of this disaggregation into two groups is dramatic (as has been shown to be true of 
some other institution or audience disaggregations efforts in terms of the effects on price and income 
elasticities).  The adjusted R2 for both groups is very high (> 0.824, with the F statistic for Group II 
being especially high at 65.08; 38.12 for Group I).  While the price coefficient is enigmatic, positive in 
both equations and strongly significant for Group I,131 and only one objective repertoire quality variable 
was significant (strongly negative for foreign contemporary plays for Group I), the other quality 
variables generally performed well.  Also, consistent with other studies using a one-year lagged 
dependent variable, that effect is strongly positive in both equations (see 3.2.3), as is the venue capacity 
                                                          
 130 To construct these two groups the shows performed by each institution were separated based 
upon whether they had been reviewed or not, and the paid attendance and number of performances for 
each of those two cases was registered. The starting point for building the two groups was the observed 
correlation between attendance per performance and the critics’ opinion, which was positive or negative 
depending on the shows reviewed in the papers/magazine.  Using OLS regression on the basic 
estimation equation (given above in the text) the classification was refined by trying to find the group 
for which each institution optimized the model, classifying any problematic institutions (those that 
weaken the estimated parameters in both groups) into the group in which this weakening effect was 
more limited.  See Urrutiaguer (2002, pp. 195-196).  
 131 Consistent with standard economist “religious” practice on this issue, such perversity is 
explained as price being itself a proxy for quality (p. 199), as was true of other such findings in the arts 
demand literature (e.g. Jenkins and Austen-Smith, 1987; and Huntington, 1991).  
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coefficient (although stronger for Group I).  The regressions confirm the expected opposition of the 
signs on the media and art director reputation variables, except for the weak centrality variable, with 
both groups have highly significant but opposite coefficients on the drama reviews variables.  This 
suggests that the effect of drama critics can be negative as well as positive, at least for some segments of 
the audience, which is a more encouraging result than the lack of significance that such variables have 
sometimes had in other studies (including Urrutiaguer, 2002, prior to segmenting the theater sample by 
audience reputation perceptions).  Despite the delay relative to the appearance of Throsby’s work (as 
early as 1983), Urrutiaguer (2002) significantly advances our understanding of the arts quality issue, 
even if he did not incorporate Throsby’s aggregated composite of different technical standards variable 
into his extensive analysis.      
 
3.3   The Role of Socioeconomic Factors versus Life- Style Determinants of Arts Demand  
 
  Andreasen and Belk (1980; see also 1981) is best known for asserting that life-style factors, 
attitudes and socialization to the arts are more reliable predictors of attendance (at least for theater and 
symphony in the southern U.S.) than are demographic and socioeconomic variables.  Such variables 
appear not only in large-scale surveys that explore aspects of audience segmentation using primarily 
non-regression statistical techniques, but also in formal econometric models where concerns about 
multicollinearity and other specification constraints may limit the number of such variables that can 
plausibly be incorporated into the analysis.  In fact, a notable feature of Andreasen and Belk’s 
provocative assertion is that it was not only founded upon the derivation of statistically significant 
univariate correlations of 56 independent variables with the likelihood of attendance, but was further 
confirmed using step-wise regression analysis.   
 
 However, a very interesting feature of the study is important in evaluating the results: the focus 
was on “marginal attenders” defined as those who do not frequently attend either theater or symphony 
events but who “might be enticed to do so” (p.113).  Therefore, those deemed to have almost no 
likelihood of attending either the theater or a symphony concert in the future were screened out of the 
telephone sample, while conversely, already frequent attenders were “intentionally undersampled.”132  
Thus, while all arts demand studies are examined in part for their implications about future behavior, 
they are usually derived from evidence about observed past behavior.  Andreasen and Belk (1980) 
directly attempt to determine what arts organizations should emphasize in their efforts to build future 
audiences.        
 
 Of course, the multicollinearity problems are severe among the 56 Andreasen and Belk 
independent variables that include all standard socioeconomic determinants (education, gender, income, 
occupation, and age), but also variables as diverse as six “general life-style” dimensions (e.g. 
optimism/hedonism and traditionalism), six “leisure life-style” group characterizations (e.g. passive 
homebody, culture patron, inner-directed self-sufficient), life-cycle variables, and various socialization 
proxies.133  Therefore, only six variables in the step-wise regressions were found to add significantly (at 
                                                          
 132 The authors state that they interviewed only one-half of those who had attended three or more 
theater or symphony performances in the previous year (Andreasen and Belk, 1980, p. 113).  
 133 Levantal (1989) includes a related list of six “psychographic factors” including “eclecticism” 
and “independence of opinion” along with “determination to see a particular play.”   
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the 0.05 level) to the prediction of theater attendance and five to the prediction of symphony attendance, 
with only modest adjusted R2 values of .279 and .289 respectively (Andreasen and Belk, 1980; Table 2).    
         However, despite those limitations, the essential results were striking: Not one of those standard 
socioeconomic variables was a significant predictor of future arts attendance when controlling for 
attitude, and general and specific life-style factors.  Instead, what mattered most as positive predictors of 
future attendance in the theater equation (based on the standardized beta weights) were (1) attitude 
toward attending the theater; (2) being a “culture patron,” a leisure life-style characteristic; (3) interest 
in live theater when growing up; and (4) theater attendance during the past year, with the most important 
negative predictors being two of the “general” life-style characteristics: (5) “traditionalism,” and (6) 
“self-confidence/opinion leadership.”  There were no significant negative predictors of symphony 
attendance, and quite similar positive predictors: (1) attitude toward attending the symphony; (2) culture 
patron; (3) “socially active,” a leisure life-style trait; (4) interest in classical music when growing up; 
and (5) symphony attendance during the past year.   While these results again confirm the importance of 
previous attendance as a predictor of current attendance, as shown in all of the more sophisticated 
dynamic models regardless of the particular mechanism or interpretation (from the static adjustment lag 
model of Houthhaker and Taylor, 1970, to the learning-by-consuming mechanics of Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette, 1996), the elimination of variables like education, income and age as significant 
independent variables was novel.   
 
 There are certainly weaknesses in the Andreasen and Belk (1980) study, generally recognized by 
the authors.  Telephone sample techniques usually generate selectivity biases; the study was limited to 
four southern U.S. cities with an eventual usable final sample of 1,491; and self-reported attitudes and 
perceptions can be unreliable.  Furthermore, the decision to under-represent frequent arts attenders may 
be viewed as partially responsible for the poor showing of the education, income, and age variables.  
However, such a convenient explanation is unlikely inasmuch as the combination of that selectivity bias 
in telephone surveys and the decision to totally eliminate anyone with a “zero probability of attending 
arts events” generated a sample that was younger, more female, and with higher education and income 
than the general population in the surveyed cities (p. 113).   Since highly educated females with 
relatively high incomes would certainly be an excellent target arts audience (and even the youthfulness 
of the sample cannot be reliably viewed as negative), the Andreasen and Belk (1980) results regarding 
the poor performance of education, income and gender are hard to dismiss. 
 
 But have those findings been replicated?    There is certainly evidence that the basic demand 
model for the consumption of arts events A = f(own price, prices of substitutes and complements, 
income or wealth, education, age, arts quality) can be usefully supplemented by the addition of variables 
that either serve as proxies for unexplained taste variations, or as sources of shadow price differences in 
a consumer as producer model.  Even a standard arts demand “taste” variable such as gender, where 
female arts participation and consumption rates have long been recognized as differing from those of 
males (e.g. Table 1, and other previous citations), the reasons for such differences are no doubt subject 
to intricate influences of socialization more so than in the case of “age,” where reasons for differential 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
He finds that having an existing subscription was the primary reason for attendance for 55.7 percent of 
those audience members surveyed, with only 19.7 percent determined to see a particular play.  However, 
among the subsample of single-ticket holders, 33 - 38 percent (depending on the audience surveyed) 
attended to see that particular play.    
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arts consumption have at times focused on human consumption capital accumulation or attitudes toward 
risk in arts programming (e.g. Abbé-Decarroux and Grin, 1992).  Such socialization forces should be at 
least as complex when incorporating other variables such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and 
religious affiliation.  
 
 Some studies have cited important socialization effects within the family (e.g. Ganzeboom, 
1989), and others have carefully distinguished between childhood arts experiences with parents in 
contrast to those obtained in school (e.g. Abbé-Decarroux, 1995; see also Morrison and West, 1986).  
Among the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) determinants are such attitudinal variables as 
“appreciates humanity” (which intriguingly has a negative effect on the probability and frequency of 
attending the theater, but a positive effect on the  “satisfaction” derived from attending; Table 1, p. 36), 
and measures of newspaper (not significant) and magazine (a negative effect )reading habits    And 
when one adds variables from non-regression based studies, the variety of such variables expands 
further.  A mere sampling would include: the ticket purchasing habits of friends (Bamossy and Semenik, 
1980; Kolb, 1996); years spent residing in the geographical area being studied (Ryans and Weinberg, 
1978); divorced versus widowed status in addition to the more standard single versus married 
designations, as well as who within the family makes the decision to attend various types of 
entertainment events (Kaali-Nagy and Garrison, 1972; and Upright, 2004). 
 
 However, there is no real evidence that the Andreasen and Belk (1980) conclusion regarding the 
dominance of the socialization “error term” variables over the other standard demand variables has been 
replicated.  There are three reasons: (1) Even Andreasen and Belk (1980) found that of there daunting 
list of non-traditional variables, only a very few survived the step-wise regression pruning process (as 
described above); (2) Studies of arguably novel “socialization” type variables have found that income,  
education and age are not eliminated from those equations and often perform quite well (DiMaggio and 
Ostrower, 1990; and Lewis and Seaman (2004); and (3) From the purely limited perspective of 
“explaining” the variance in the dependent variable, extremely parsimonious time-series or pooled 
studied sometimes do quite well without adding such so-called taste adjusting variables (Gapinski, 1984 
generated an adjusted R2  of .96 from a demand equation with only own price, income, and a constant 
term; although the constant term had the highest t-statistic).   
 
 This section closes with a more detailed look at both the DiMaggio and Ostrower (1990) study of 
racial differences and the Lewis and Seaman (2004) examination of sexual orientation and religious 
affiliation differences in U.S. arts consumption behavior.134   DiMaggio and Ostrower observe that (as of 
the late 1980's) surprisingly little study had been done of black participation in the arts (1990, p. 753).  
That has changed little in the interim period.   However, race has been a surveyed characteristic of the 
SPPA since 1982, with black participation rates in the performing arts about 50 percent that of whites in 
                                                          
 134 While religious affiliation has been as absent as sexual orientation from the list of 
independent variables in arts demand studies, Lee and Szenberg (1989) did estimate a “real per capita 
dollar religious book sales” equation as part of their study of American book consumption.  
Unfortunately they lacked any data on religious affiliation, but found that the key determining variables 
were size of the population in white collar occupations (and elasticity coefficient of 5.34), while the 
income coefficient was only 0.73.  The amount of time spent watching TV had a negative effect on 
religious book sales (an elasticity of -3.39).    
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1982, nearly equal for theater and only modestly lower for art museums by 1997 (Table 3.3, Heilbrun 
and Gray, 2001), and then falling again by  the 2002 SPPA (NEA 2004) with notable black/white 
differentials for all 11 of the SPPA categories (although only modestly lower for “other dance,” and 
about 11 percent higher for jazz; Table 9).  Nevertheless, it is certainly true that race and ethnicity have 
been nearly absent from econometric arts demand studies, with only Dobson and West (1989), Gray 
(2003, using data from the 1997 SPPA), and Lewis and Seaman (2004) as exceptions when using U.S. 
data.  It is also difficult to find examples using non-U.S. data, with Trienekens (2002) applied to the 
U.K. being a rare exception.  
 
  Dobson and West (1989) found “ethnic background” to have a modestly negative effect on 
Atlanta theater attendance (but not statistically significant at the 0.05 level); Lewis and Seaman (2004) 
found mixed results, with “Black” being a negative and statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) 
determinant of classical music attendance, but with competing and not statistically significant effects on 
arts museum (negative) and dance (positive) attendance.  The 1997 SPPA based Gray (2003) logistic 
regression results are of interest inasmuch as, after adjusting for age, income, education, gender, work 
hours, and music and art lessons, the “Black” variable coefficient is statistically significant (at 0.001) 
and negative for only classical music, opera, and ballet, while being positive for jazz, musical theater, 
non-musical theater, dance, and museum.   Also, he reported ceteris paribus positive coefficients for 
“Hispanic” across all categories, negative “Asian” coefficients for all arts categories except dance and 
museum, and negative “Indian” coefficients for all arts categories except opera and musical theater (all 
coefficients statistically significant at the 0.001 level).   While not all of those coefficients were 
economically significant (e.g. six coefficients were below 0.10 in absolute value), no other study 
incorporated that degree of ethnic variety. 
 
 The surprisingly weak and mixed performance of racial/ethnic variables in these few studies is 
noteworthy in light of the DiMaggio and Ostrower (1990) conclusion that “given the degree of racial 
oppression and exclusion to which black Americans have been subjected, they participate in the arts at 
rates and in ways remarkably similar to those of white Americans,” a pattern they call “differentiation 
without segmentation” (p. 772).  Their analysis is by far the most substantive attempt to address the role 
of ethnicity on arts participation, in part because it differentiates Euro-American from Afro-American 
art forms, and also because it attempts to address the reasons for any remaining differences after 
controlling for other determinants. Utilizing the 1982 SPPA as the data source, DiMaggio and Ostrower 
pose the key question: Since whites are more likely than blacks to exhibit key characteristics linked to 
demand for the performing arts (higher levels of education, income and prestigious occupations) is there 
really an independent role for race in explaining the lower arts participation rates of blacks?   
 
 Four features of their multivariate analysis are noteworthy.  Firstly, while the SPPA question 
format never captures frequency of attendance, but only whether the respondent has gone to a particular 
kind of event in the previous 12 months, DiMaggio and Ostrower create an additive 0-4 scale for the 
performing arts consumption variable by summing the positive answers for four categories of 
performing arts performances (not including jazz), and an additive 0-4 scale for visual arts (exhibition) 
consumption. They also include a dependent variable for the watching of televison arts programming.  
Secondly, since SPPA questions also generate information about playing instruments, acting in stage 
plays, etc., they also generate a dependent variable on a 0-4 scale for performing arts production 
activities and a 0-6 scaled dependent variable for visual arts production activity.  Thirdly, in addition to 
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including education and race (with black = 1) as independent variables, they are unusual in the empirical 
arts demand literature in using interaction variables, interacting race with five variables: urban 
residence, marital status (single or divorced), education, gender (female), occupation (sales/clerical), 
and income.  Fourthly, they then regress their consumption and production dependent variables on race, 
education and their interaction variables using OLS, while separately employing logistic regression for 
the same independent variables, but different dependent variables measuring (1) jazz concert attendance 
and (2) jazz watching behavior on television, as well as “musical taste” dependent variables generated 
from the SPPA questions regarding the “enjoyment” of classical music, jazz, opera, and the combined 
category soul, blues or R&B.    
 
 While they do not report the performance of all interaction terms in all of the equations in their 
Tables 2 and 3 (DiMaggio and Ostrower, pp. 762,763), there are four major results of their empirical 
analysis.  (1) The unique negative effect of race on Euro-American high culture arts participation is 
modest, but statistically significant (roughly consistent with the Gray, 2003, results reported above from 
the 1997 SPPA where after controlling for other variables, race alone did not have as widespread a 
negative effect on arts participation as suggested by the raw participation rate differentials.  (2) Race 
effects are stronger for arts consumption than for arts production behavior, and stronger for public arts 
consumption than for private arts consumption via television watching, where it fact the racial effect is 
nearly absent - a fascinating result consistent with their view that racial discrimination may adversely 
affect public but not private participation in the arts and that arts consumption but not production is 
affected by “status competition.”  (3) Consistent with what would have been expected from the non-
regression descriptive statistics, race (with black =1) has strong positive effects on both attendance and 
enjoyment measures for the non-European based art forms of jazz, soul, blues and R&B, confirming the 
obvious point that viewing black arts participation rates as relatively low depends in large part on one’s 
definition of the arts.  (4) The behavior of the interaction terms with race and the other control variables 
is a bit complex. Regarding high arts consumption, there is a negative interaction between race and 
educational attainment that is nevertheless small compared to the strong positive effect of education for 
both blacks and whites, and small negative (but statistically significant) interactions between race and 
urban residence, and race and being female.  Regarding attending the visual arts, watching arts programs 
on television, or expressing enjoyment of classical music or opera, there are no significant interactions 
between race and the other socioeconomic variables.  The combined force of small racial interaction 
effects for the attendance at high arts events along with no such effects at all regarding the visual arts, 
the high arts on television and the self-reported enjoyment of classical music and opera is to prompt an 
intriguing conclusion from DiMaggio and Ostrower (p. 761), i.e. despite lower arts participation rates 
for blacks compared to whites, the “determinants of such participation are essentially the same,” 
suggesting the “apparent hegemony of a standardized form of cultural capital in the heterogenous U.S., 
as is also the case in the more homogenous societies such as France” [at least at that time]. 
 
 In addition to generating these important results, DiMaggio and Ostrower conducted a detailed 
analysis of two hypotheses that might explain the remaining racial differences in arts participation: (1) a 
“cultural convergence” model by which any such differences would be expected to diminish with 
increased interracial peer contact, especially among the young, and with increasing education, access to 
prestigious occupations and income (a version of the previously discussed “Cwi hypothesis” applied to 
ethnicity); and (2) a “cultural resistence” model by which increased black/white economic competition 
creates opportunities for younger, well-educated blacks to embrace minority cultural norms (e.g. 1990, 
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p. 773).  However, despite their best efforts, they eventually find little systematic evidence to support 
either of these perspectives.  
 
 Lewis and Seaman (2004), which relied upon the 1993 and 1998 U.S. General Social Survey  
(GSS) for data (since leisure, recreational and arts activities were addressed in those years), included 
race only as a control variable and did not pattern its study of lesbians, gay males and bisexuals (LGBs) 
after the DiMaggio and Ostrower analysis of race (1990).  However, those two studies share important 
similarities.  Just as one might suspect that a large part of the explanation for racial arts consumption 
differences is actually educational, occupational and income disparities, similar control variable 
problems (along with urban location factors and differential family obligations) complicate the effort to 
isolate a unique role for sexual orientation.135  And even after establishing that unique role, Lewis and 
Seaman (2004) confronted a similarly frustrating problem in explaining why it exists.  Little compelling 
evidence was found from supplemental tests for any of four explanations: (1) pure demographics; (2) an 
innate “gay affinity for the arts,” tested by also examining arts production behavior such as “make art, 
play music, perform live or identity as a professional artist” in addition to estimating arts consumption 
equations (as did DiMaggio and Ostrower, 1990); (3) a reaction to the historical  repression of 
homosexuality; and (4) an ongoing more welcoming environment for LGBs in arts venues than in other 
public entertainment environments - an explanation that was at least weakly supported.      
 
 Certainly, a major reason why sexual orientation had never before entered arts demand studies 
(and “sex” had always meant gender) is the fundamental problem of definition, which must be based on 
some version of self-reporting.136  The GSS asks only two relevant behavioral questions (and no 
questions related to attraction or self-identification): the number of male and female sex partners since 
age 18, and whether one’s recent sex partners have been male, female, or both.  While Lewis and 
Seaman experimented with a variety of definitions (all yielding similar results), they chose the one 
yielding the largest sample size (5 percent, or 180 of 2,188 respondents) in order to reduce standard 
errors, hence coding the LGB variable as 1 for those who reported at least one same sex partner since 
their 18th birthday, and 0 for everyone else. 
 The descriptive data yielded powerfully suggestive results (their Table 1).  With no demographic 
or other controls, substantially higher percentages of LCBs compared to straight respondents had visited 
or attended an art museum/gallery, or ballet, dance, classical music or opera performance in the prior 
year, yielding attendance differentials of between 16 and 19 percentage points, with LGBs being about 
twice as likely to have attended a classical music or dance performance and almost three times as likely 
                                                          
 135 While there is evidence that LGB’s are more educated, urbanized, and more likely to be 
childless than heterosexuals, the common notion that their average incomes are also higher is due 
largely to nonrepresentative samples of wealthy gay men and lesbians.  In fact, controlling for 
education, gay men earn 15 to 30 percent less than straight men of the same age, and the evidence on 
lesbian versus heterosexual women is mixed.  Yet, there is indeed evidence that gay male couples have 
higher income (especially disposable income) than married straight couples, with lesbian couple 
earnings the lowest of the three groups.  See Lewis and Seaman (2004, p. 525 and related citations).     
 136  As noted previously, the only prior hint at this topic was the finding using Canadian data in 
Globerman and Book (1977) that “being male and unmarried is positively related to frequency of 
attendance at music and opera performances, cet. par. (p. 25).    
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to have attended a museum, musical and dance performance, i.e. 17 percent compared to 6 percent 
(Lewis and Seaman, 2004, p.529).  Even more remarkably, using the narrowest available definition for 
LGBs (those who had a same sex partner within the past year and rejected the claim that “homosexual 
relations are almost always wrong”) overall differences rose from 16-19 percent to 25 percent (their note 
5, p. 529).   Even after controlling for demographic and other variables, the differences between LGB 
and heterosexual attendance patterns drops only to 12 (museum), 10 (dance) and 14 percent (music) 
from the unadjusted respective differences of 17, 16 and 19 percent (p. 531).   
 
  Finally, their logistic consumption regression equations137 revealed strong and statistically 
significant positive effects on attendance due to being LGB, higher education, higher parents’ education, 
higher income, and living in a city over 50,000 population, with a moderately positive effect due to 
being Jewish (but not statistically significant in the classical music equation).   Consistent with many 
prior discussions of its surprising complexity, age was modestly positive and statistically significant in 
only the classical music equation.  Strong negative predictors of arts attendance were being male 
(controlling for sexual orientation), and having children, with being a Fundamentalist Protestant 
modestly negative and significant for dance performances (and negative but not significant for 
museums, and almost dropping out of the classical music equation entirely).  
 
 Summarizing this evidence regarding life-style, socialization and ethnicity variables (and 
including other variables such as having children, who within a household makes entertainment event 
choices, and an array of attitudinal variables), it cannot be said that the Andreasen and Belk (1980) 
“strong hypothesis” has been confirmed.  Their conclusion that such variables eliminate from 
significance the standard socioeconomic variables of education, income, age and occupation (not to 
mention own price and substitute/complement prices, which were not addressed by that hypothesis) is 
too strong. However, despite the fact that some arts demand equations with very few variables have 
yielded useful results (e.g. Gapinski, 1984 using only own price and income, after dropping any 
substitute price measures, and Schimmelpfennig, 1997 using only price), any full understanding of the 
demand for the arts clearly cannot ignore this larger variety of important determinants.              
 
Evaluation and Conclusions  
 
 The arts demand literature contains much diligent and insightful research, generally conducted 
under the customary constraints of empirical analysis, but also complicated by unique conceptual and 
data challenges presented by its target industry.  Yet, despite the quality of many of these contributions, 
it is hard to dispute the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2003) assessment that critical issues 
remained unresolved.  This is especially the case regarding the robustness and interpretation of the price 
inelasticity “consensus,” the limited evidence regarding substitutes and complements (and the 
conventional wisdom that movie theaters present effective performing arts competition seems 
questionable), and the complex relative roles of the traditional socioeconomic demand determining 
variables and the vast array of specialized “lifestyle” and socialization factors.   
 
                                                          
 137 Their dependent variable = 1 for attended and 0 for did not attend in each of three equations 
for art museum, dance performance, and classical music.  Results did not change using ordered logit 
when the three dummy variables were summed to get a proxy for “intensity of arts attendance.”    
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 There are also two common perceptions of important studies that are useful simplifications, yet  
have been shown to require clarification.  Gapinski’s (1986) analysis of substitution across different 
performing art forms (rather than with outside entertainments such as cinema, television or reading) did 
uniquely show the importance of considering inter-arts substitution, but did not directly address 
competitive effects within any one art form, and generated largely cross-price inelastic results that 
varied significantly in magnitude across individual arts companies and with simulated unilateral versus 
more unlikely coordinated price changes (see 3.2.4).138  And Felton (1992) correctly stressed the 
theoretically correct proposition that aggregate (market or industry) price elasticities will be lower than 
firm price elasticities, but was hampered in empirically applying this to the arts by data limitations that 
allowed for few city (geographic market) observations to have multiple arts firms (and almost none with 
multiple companies in any one art form), a reality no doubt responsible for the high proportion of her 
individual arts companies that continued to reveal quite low price elasticities of demand (see 3.1).  It can 
also be noted that, while the sophisticated analysis of Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) had 
important indirect implications for the role of arts quality, as “self-discovered” by consumers via 
learning-by-consuming, it did not clarify the role of various independent measures of quality in affecting 
consumer decisions to attend arts performances.              
 
 Four other empirical results stand out:  
 
 (1) Income elasticities of demand for the arts cannot be adequately estimated without separating 
the real income effect from the opportunity cost of leisure pure substitution effect, an early Withers 
(1980) rationalization for the low “gross” income elasticities that are frequently estimated.  
 
 (2) Quality matters, although the mixed results from various objective and subjective measures 
suggest that we are not yet sure how best to capture this important determinant of variations in arts 
attendance and participation.  Nevertheless, a multidimensional aggregation of various individual 
quality dimensions seems to capture quality effects better than a variety of individual measures 
(Throsby,1990); there is reasonable but not uniform evidence that the opinions of theater critics can 
affect attendance, although sometimes negatively, at least for some segments of the audience 
(Urrutiaguer, 2002); and the degree to which lowbrow popularized theater repertoires increase 
attendance appears smaller than commonly believed (i.e., usually but not always positive, and with 
relatively low elasticities).  
 
 (3) Some version of dynamics in consumption, be it passive inertia, learning-by-consuming, or 
the more complex rational addiction, should be incorporated to better understand arts demand, 
especially because these distinct notions have quite different implications for the optimal marketing 
strategies of arts managers. 
 
                                                          
 138 As noted in Table 15, the definition of the substitute price for any one of the 13 arts 
organizations in Gapinski (1988) did include the prices of other intra-art form venues as part of the 
average ticket prices charged by all other companies, including, e.g., the three other symphony 
orchestras as well as all theater, dance and opera companies in the “symphony number one” equation.  
This study of resident, tourist, and combined demands for these London organizations generated no 
significant own or cross price results, in contrast to Gapinski (1986). 
 145
  and (4) The survey study evidence (most notably from the Ford Foundation, 1974, Vol. II) 
favoring formal education as the most powerful determinant of variations in arts attendance has not been 
reliably strengthened by regression analysis.  On this last point, however, it is perhaps significant that 
among the strongest econometric evidence confirming the primacy of education are three recent studies 
using relatively large databases and varying techniques (Peterson et al., 2000; Gray, 2003; Lewis and 
Seaman, 2004).  Yet, the econometric evidence has also provided evidence favoring arts training, family 
socialization, and more specific forms of arts experience over general levels of formal education, and 
has sometimes produced evidence of a weak role for formal education in explaining arts demand 
variations when controlling for other determinants.   
 
 Regarding research improvements, the Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (2003) faith in the 
importance of well-defined taste cultivation models, larger databases and more sophisticated 
econometric modeling in improving our empirical models is understandable, but such analytical 
improvements to date have largely failed to generate substantial changes in the results or new insights 
about arts demand.  This can be demonstrated by comparing the results of larger versus smaller 
databases, and more sophisticated theoretical and econometric modeling versus more “naive” 
approaches.  By contrast, the most important areas for improvement may be the greater focus on 
disaggregated data, and a clearer definition of key variables such as own price, and substitute price, as 
well as a fuller appreciation for the importance of socialization variables in reducing the unexplained 
variation in consumption behavior (whether viewed as taste determinants or as Beckerian constraint 
variations).   
 
 It is extremely difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions about the unique effects of either 
sample size or econometric technique on the results of arts demand analysis, since studies differ in so 
many dimensions beyond those two.  Furthermore, simply documenting the degree to which the 
empirical results are different across these dimensions does not necessarily address whether the results 
have “improved.”  Beyond the universal agreement that “sound” empirical methods be employed and 
that the choice of functional forms and variables would ideally stem from well-defined theoretical 
models (the second goal rarely achieved), the criteria for assessing improvement may vary.   Blaug 
(2001, p. 126) praises Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) for going “beyond all previous work on 
demand for the arts” in terms of their data (a large sample size), the number and variety of variables 
incorporated into their equations (as previously noted, a total of 58 with as many as 26 in an individual 
equation), and the novelty of their finding that the demand for theater in France may be price elastic.   
 
 However, despite the fact that those Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) modeling features 
have indeed contributed to the clarification of the distinction between learning-by-consuming and 
rational addiction that also contributed to our understanding of how quality considerations might be 
incorporated into arts demand studies, they were not totally unique regarding the dimensions Blaug 
identifies.  For example, Andreasen and Belk (1980), while a hybrid of regression and non-regression 
analysis (1980) examined 57 variables (many discussed above in 3.3) and certainly incorporated a wide 
variety of socioeconomic variables along with many socialization, lifestyle and attitudinal variables.  
Other non-regression studies also incorporate a large number of variables (e.g. Kolb 1997, based on a 
longer unpublished paper from 1996, considered 16 variables that explain “reasons why young people 
do not attend the arts;” see section 3.3)   
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 Yet, with the further possible exceptions of Prieto-Rodríguez and Fernández-Blanco (2000), 
discussed in 3.2.3, and Corning and Levy (2002), who included many separate variables to capture the 
same basic effect (e.g. 11 monthly variables to capture theater seasonality; see 3.2.5), Blaug’s (2001) 
“amended” point remains essentially correct that no other regression-based study has ever included as 
many as 26 “non-repetitive” independent variables in one equation (22 of which had coefficients with 
absolute value t-statistics above 2.0).139  The practical payoff from the richness of those equations is 
questionable, however, inasmuch as even their own claims for their work may appear modest. They 
identify their construction of a measure of knowledge and taste for the theater, capturing “several 
aspects of the full price, objective quality of the outing and many socioeconomic variables,” while 
confirming that the distinctive property of cultural goods “is their uniqueness or great differentiation” 
and that their “choice involves long learning processes”(p. 44).  They also found evidence that televised 
theater broadcasts, cinema and reading are substitutes for live performances.  One might argue that as 
early as Withers (1980) the role of the full price of attendance was well-established; that objective 
qualities of a performance were proven to be critical by Throsby (1990), and that while they included 
some novel socioeconomic and demographic variables (e.g. “has a telephone,” “owns more than one 
automobile;” “owns a microcomputer”), such variables are either substitutes for the missing income 
variable (although they may also be proxies for the under-studied issue of “wealth”), or in the case of 
telephones and computers, identify trivial characteristics that may not distinguish among any relevant 
consumers.  Furthermore, despite the underdeveloped topic of confirming the relevant product and 
geographic market in which the individual performing arts organizations compete, evidence has long 
existed for television broadcasts, cinema and even reading as potential gross substitutes for the lively 
arts, even if some of that evidence is weak (see 3.2.4).   
 
   The relatively large sample of  8,000 individuals 15 years and older in the Ministry of Culture 
survey, allowed Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) to distinguish three samples: (1) an overall 
sample of 7,970; (2) a first subsample of those who had attended the theater in the previous four years 
(898); and (3) a second subsample, nested in the first one, n = 501, of those who had attended the theater 
within the past one year (p. 26).  They were then able to better address the potential selectivity bias that 
often characterizes small samples, and did in fact find differences in the results using the two different 
subsamples.  What may not be fully appreciated, however, is that in many other studies that rely on 
survey data (typically the Type P studies defined in 3.2.2 above)140 the sample sizes were also quite 
large, suggesting that those studies were also likely to have avoided serious selectivity biases in their 
data.141   In comparison to the two Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996) subsamples of 898 and 501 
                                                          
 139 Although, no other equation regardless of dependent variable or estimation technique had 
greater than 13 such coefficients with t-statistics greater than one in absolute value, with the lowest 
number being 8 in the probit equation estimating the probability of theater attendance during the last 
year; see Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996, Table 1).  Those with t-statistics less than one were 
not reported to allow for a more “parsimonious” presentation (p. 34).  
 140 Some other studies rely only in part on data from audience or other surveys.  For example, 
Moore (1966) reported that his cross-section data were developed via a personally conducted 
questionnaire survey of theater-goers, with a response rate of 26 percent of evening audiences, and 16 
percent of those attending matinees (p. 79). But his time-series analysis did not  rely on this survey data.  
 141 Note that this issue is distinct from the number of observations that result from the frequent 
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(from an original 7,979), the sample sizes of the following 11 studies are: 
 
(1)  Peterson et al. (2000): n = 17,135 from the 1997 SPPA; (2) Globerman and Book (1977): n = 
13,750; (3) Ganzeboom (1989) reporting Hungarian results with n = 8,358; (4) Montgomery and 
Robinson (2005): n = 8,000; (5) Bajic (1985): n = 6,714; (6) Prieto-Rodríguez and Fernández-
Blanco (2000): n = 6,632; (7) Goudriian and de Kam (1983): n > 5,000; (8) Abbé-Decarroux and 
Grin (1992): n = 4,000; (9) Lewis and Seaman (2004): n = 2,118; (10) Dobson and West (1989): 
n = 406; and (11) Ganzeboom (1989) reporting Dutch results with n = 369.   
 
In addition to the likelihood that serious selectivity biases may have been avoided in the larger surveys 
(although steps were often taken to address this problem regardless of the survey size; e.g., Lewis and 
Seaman, 2004), it can be noted that the results regarding some key issues in arts demand do not show 
any systematic relationship to sample size, ceteris paribus.  For example, regarding the issue of the 
importance of formal education, sample size studies ranging from very large to quite small in Peterson et 
al. (2000), Ganzeboom (Hungary),  Lewis and Seaman (2004) to Ganzeboom (Netherlands) found a 
strong positive influence on arts attendance, while very weak effects of formal education were found in 
large sample size Bajic (1985) and small sample size Dobson and West (1989).  Because it is very 
difficult to really impose ceteris paribus conditions on such comparisons, a fuller determination of how 
a broader array of results varies with sample size is nearly impossible. 
 
 Another comparison can, however, be made with more confidence: the degree to which 
“sophistication” of econometric technique generates differing results in arts demand analysis.  Here, we 
are assisted by three direct comparisons of how, as only one reflection of this issue, standard OLS 
estimation varies from the more sophisticated 2SLS (two-stage least squares).  It has been well 
established that Moore (1966) despite his belief that performing arts markets should not be estimated as 
a recursive process, actually found no evidence to suggest that the use of non-simultaneous estimation 
techniques (either OLS linear or multiplicative) affected his results in any way (see Table 11 and the 
discussion in 3.2.1).  This result, more than any single reason, accounts for the relative dearth of 
simultaneous equation studies.  Yet, when they have been attempted since 1966, Moore’s essential 
conclusion has been essentially confirmed.  While Luksetich and Lange (1995) do use 2SLS to estimate 
their symphony demand equations, their essential insight regarding the importance of incorporating 
donations and a “donor price” into the analysis (already established by their simpler methods in Lange 
and Luksetich, 1984) was primarily strengthened and elaborated upon rather than discovered by such 
analysis.  More importantly, the evidence that simultaneity bias would have been significant from single 
equation estimation was not overwhelming (see fn. 93 above). 
 
 But the clearest statement regarding the relative unimportance of simultaneous equation methods 
in these studies was provided by Jenkins and Austen-Smith (1987).  In comparing their OLS estimates 
with their 2SLS results, they cite a test proposed by Sargan (1958) to test for exogeneity by assessing 
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
pooling of time-series and cross-section data in “Type A” studies using more aggregated city or regional 
measures of many of the independent variables.  Thus, a study based on data from 15 opera companies 
in 15 cities over 20 years can generate 300 observations without having any relevance to the adequacy 
of a sample size since typically no sample of the general population (or even of an audience) was used 
in that kind of study.  
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whether an OLS estimate lay within one (2SLS) standard error of the corresponding 2SLS estimate.  
They then conclude that, contrary to their prior expectations, the strong evidence for exogeneity they 
find in their explanatory variables in all of their equations, including their demand equation, means that 
“the OLS results for each equation should be preferred” since the data “suggest that the cross-equation 
statistical effects are relatively small in each case” (p. 166).  This also provides further justification for 
those previously cited multi-equation studies that did, in fact, rely upon OLS estimation.  
 
 Extending the comparison of basic OLS to non-parametric techniques (including bivariate probit, 
tobit and logit estimation, as well as non-parametric linear regression without a binary dependent 
variable) is more problematic.  Available data (i.e, the frequency with which survey data yield zero 
observations on arts attendance prompting the use of a binary dependent variable, or simply very small 
sample sizes that make parametric methods suspect), and not modeling sophistication itself, is the 
dominant reason for the use of such techniques.  However, while the most common characteristic of 
studies using non-parametric techniques is that they are typically Type P studies (i.e. including 
independent variables personalized to individual consumers, but not including any localized arts price, 
other price, and organization size or quality variables, with Schimmelpfennig, 1997, an exception in that 
he lacked data for individual attenders), there is no clear difference in the results regarding the 
importance of education, age, or income compared to studies using non-parametric techniques.142   
However, Schimmelpfennig (1997) is an interesting example of both a small sample size (consisting of 
nine performances of two ballets during one season), and a resulting non-parametric technique (non-
parametric linear regression with elasticities derived at median prices) that does indeed derive unusual 
results.  But while his high price elasticities of demand and recommendation for price reductions so as to 
maximize revenues might be viewed as an example of results varying with sample size and technique, 
they are also (and likely more importantly) the result of his novel effort to estimate arts demand for 
specific seating sections of a theater.     
 
 However, the very databases that prompt the use of non-parametric techniques have often also 
allowed novel variables to be investigated that were relatively ignored (or excluded entirely) in the more 
traditionally specified Type A double-log OLS demand models.  Examples include the DiMaggio and 
Ostrower (1990) study of the small but persistent effects of race, the Lewis and Seaman (2004) 
demonstration of the strongly positive effect of sexual orientation (and the difference between Jewish 
and Fundamentalist Protestant religious affiliation), and the Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-Rodriguez 
(2000) demonstration of the complementarity between sports and arts event consumption.  Despite the 
importance of those results, they cannot be uniquely attributed to the relative superiority of non-
parametric methods per se, but instead to their desirable attributes when dealing with binary dependent 
variables. In fact, DiMaggio and Ostrower (1990) utilized both OLS and logistic regression models en 
route to their conclusions and such techniques are often used in complementary ways.143  While it is true 
                                                          
 142 In fact, even within Type P studies, results using OLS (e.g. Peterson et al., 2001) and those 
using non-parametric techniques (e.g. Lewis and Seaman, 2004) can be very similar.  On the contentious 
issue of the importance of formal education versus income, both studies found strongly significant 
results for both variables (as well as parents’ education), with formal education the somewhat stronger 
determinant.  
 143 
 It was noted in 3.3 that DiMaggio and Ostrower used OLS for their scaled (typically 0-4) ordinal 
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that Montgomery and Robinson (2005) used OLS estimation in generating their finding of a greater 
degree of substitution between the arts and sports in the U.S. (at least in their budget constrained case) 
than that found by Fernández-Blanco and Prieto-Rodriguez for Spain using bivariate probit (2000), the 
estimation model alone did not dictate those results from studies using data from quite different 
countries, and with the Spanish survey generating less useful data.        
 
 Despite the lack of firm evidence that more complex econometric techniques are necessary to 
resolve the remaining enigmas in arts demand studies (especially when compared to obtaining more 
disaggregated data),144 it is clear that applying additional theoretical structure to the derivation and 
interpretation of empirical results is warranted.  It has been argued that this is necessary regarding the 
debate about the price elasticity of demand for the arts, and the choice of model specification may be 
particularly important regarding that issue.  For example, some evidence from the sports literature has 
been cited to suggest that using an econometric specification that allows price elasticity to vary with 
price rather than remain constant (as with the common double-log formulation), and to adjust for 
possible price endogeneity, may be important in generating reliable price elasticity results (see 3.1.2, 
especially fn. 63).  And the Pommerehne and Kirchgassner (1987) findings of income elasticities that 
varied somewhat by level of income, and the uncommon result of higher own price elasticities for 
theater than for cinema were derived using the rarely used restrictions of the almost ideal demand 
system model.  Furthermore, the modeling effort of Globerman and Book (1977) is critical to a proper 
understanding of the role of education in arts demand, and is important to understanding some later 
research results that utilize the new theory of consumer behavior.  Thus the Lévy-Garboua and 
Montmarquette (2003) call for more carefully done modeling, when combined with efforts to apply such 
models to less aggregated data, will doubtless be important to making further improvements in our 
understanding of the demand for the performing arts.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                         
dependent variables and logit for those dependent variables that remained dichotomous. However, since 
their ordinal variables were skewed to low values, they redefined those dependent variables in binary 
terms and re-ran those regressions with logit.  Since they found results to be “substantially identical” 
using either OLS or logit, they reported the more easily interpreted OLS results for their performing and 
visual arts, consumption and production, dependent variables in their Table 2.  See DiMaggio and 
Ostrower (1990, note 11, p. 775).   
 144 Perhaps the best example of where more technical sophistication, at least in constructing 
some of the underlying independent variables is Urrutiaguer (2002), whose considerably more complex 
derivation of the dummy variables for the drama reviews variable compared to Throsby (1990) seemed 
to improve the strength of those variables in explaining per performance theater attendance.  Yet even 
here, as shown in 3.2.5, most of estimated quality parameters were insignificant for the entire theater 
sample and better results were obtained only after segmenting the audience based on contrasting 
perceptions of the importance of media reputation in contrast to director reputation. This is consistent 
with the frequently made argument that using less aggregated data and exploring audience segments will 
generate more insightful results. Another key innovation was more conceptual than technique driven: 
the modification of the Throsby model to focus on the full record of theaters across all productions 
rather than just individual plays.  Thus, more than just more sophisticated technical analysis was 
responsible for the Urrutiaguer (2002) results, which nevertheless did not also include the key Throsby 
(1990) approach of aggregating various technical performance criteria into a single composite subjective 
quality variable. 
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 Yet, perhaps the most disappointing indication that such improvements may not come quickly is 
the lack of progress noted several times in this chapter in building upon three early key arts demand 
contributions, and the delay in generating a full extension of a fourth: (1) the just noted effort by 
Globerman and Book (1977) to analyze why education has an effect on arts consumption by explicitly 
testing for a consumption efficiency effect in a consumer household production framework;145 (2) the 
Withers (1980) and Throsby and Withers (1979) sophisticated clarification of the pure income effect 
versus the price of leisure substitution effect on performing arts demand; (3) the Gapinski (1986) use of 
disaggregated data by arts companies in a specific geographic market to explore the possible inter-arts 
type (although not intra-arts type) substitution relationships (also related to the incomplete attempt by 
Felton (1992) to test for firm versus local market own price elasticity distinctions, which has also not be 
replicated); and (4) the delayed and partial response to the Throsby (1990;1983) demonstration that an 
aggregation of quality dimensions is likely to best capture the role of differential quality across arts 
organizations or across specific arts productions (an aggregation only partially addressed by the 
important and sophisticated contribution by Urrutiaguer, 2002; see 3.2.5). 
 
 The reason why no one should believe that any of these contributions are already “axiomatic” 
and not capable of generating a high professional payoff from revisiting can be shown by a few closing 
reminders of points already made about the Withers (1980) study.  It is universally forgotten that the 
Withers (1980) results using American data were not able to be replicated even by Throsby and Withers 
(1979) themselves using relatively flawed Australian and Canadian data (see fn. 88 above).  Even the 
U.S. results were derived only with highly aggregated data, and this chapter has shown that the level of 
data aggregation can have very significant effects on the results.  Furthermore, the closest attempt to 
conduct a somewhat similar (but far less well-specified) analysis of the role of time costs (Ekelund and 
Ritenour, 1999) drew opposite conclusions regarding the broader significance of their results than those 
drawn by Withers (1980).   Whereas Withers expresses optimism that the net income elasticity remains 
reasonably high even in the face of such time costs (in his conventional model), Ekelund and Ritenour 
(1999) express concern for the future of the performing arts if those opportunity costs are an important 
demand determinant (see section 3.2.1).  While all cultural economists accept that the price of leisure is 
important to arts demand, and all studies make note of it as an explanation for surprisingly low 
estimated income elasticities, or even cite it as partial justification for the inclusion of age (or other) 
demand determining variables (e.g. Gray, 2003), these propositions remain more presumed that 
rigorously confirmed. 
 
   In fact, despite this chapter beginning with the fear that the least attentive lay person could 
probably guess at the determinants (and their relative importance) of the typical performing arts demand 
function, there are surprisingly few arts demand axioms beyond the confirmation that demand curves are 
negatively sloped (i.e., assuming any contrary results reflect own price being a proxy for quality), the 
performing arts are normal (but not necessarily luxury) goods, and that some positive cross-price 
elasticities can be identified.  As stated by Lévy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1996, p. 26) after noting 
some general limitations of past arts demand studies, “it is nevertheless known that the performing arts 
are not exempt from the law of demand.” Furthermore, while the econometric evidence is more mixed 
                                                          
 145 Although it was previously noted that its appearance in Volume 1 of the Journal of Cultural 
Economics has doubtless had an adverse effect in making it as well known as it deserves to be.  
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than generally thought, education in some form stands out as the most notable demand shifting variable, 
although the precise reasons for that result remain controversial.   
There have unquestionably been many well-executed and revealing empirical studies of arts 
attendance and participation rates that have also been highly suggestive regarding the role of arts quality 
and an array of so-called lifestyle or socialization variables.  The quality of the modeling and the data 
are improving and progress is being made despite some legitimate skepticism about how critical 
technical sophistication alone has been to that process.  But given the misperceptions about some of the 
most quoted of the previous results, and the gap between myth and reality of core propositions, 
empirical arts demand studies remain a surprisingly rich area for further sound economic analysis.           
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